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FIVE YEARS A DRAGOON ('49 TO '54) AND OTHER
ADVENTURES ON THE GREAT PLAINS.

PART VIII.

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I PASS over a little more than two years of busy life, more or less successful, during which I traveled the road between Leavenworth and Denver twelve times, or six round trips. The reason I pass over this, to me, interesting part of my life is that I was not, and my services and experiences were not in any way connected with the army, and hence would not be of interest to the majority of the readers of the JOURNAL, but rather an imposition upon its space.

A large number of horses and teams were ordered from Fort Leavenworth to Fort Union, New Mexico, and I took charge of them. As soon as a train of teams was ready it moved to Fort Riley, a hundred and thirty miles, with orders for the wagonmaster to report his train to Captain Scott, acting quartermaster, for assignment to camp in that vicinity. As soon as a string of horses was ready it moved to Riley, the man in charge also to report to Captain Scott for assignment to camp. Five trains of wagons—a hundred and four four-mule and sixteen six-mule—one hundred and twenty teams, and a traveling forge hauled by eight mules, and eighteen strings of



SIX-MULE TEAM IN DAYS OF THE PLAINS.

horses (six hundred and fourteen), including some riding horses, comprised the outfit. When all were gone, I drove in my four-mule government ambulance to Fort Riley in two days. Pat Devine, who had been my driver to Denver the previous year, drove for me now, and fed me as well as circumstances would permit. If I lacked anything, it was not his fault. I slept in the ambulance every night from start to finish of the trip, except two nights that Captain Scott cared for me at Riley, one night that Colonel Leavenworth cared for me at Fort Lyon and six nights that my friend Captain William Van Vliet cared for me at Fort Union.

At Riley Captain Scott furnished me all the corn I cared to take.

The object in sending four-mule teams was to get as many wagons to New Mexico as possible with fewest mules; mules could be bought there but wagons could not. A big six-mule wagon is hard on four mules—jerks the leaders painfully and gives them sore shoulders. Six mules can haul 2,500 pounds with less injury to them than four mules can haul the empty

wagon, hence as a supply train for the horses the four-mule teams did not amount to much. This I did not realize for some days, as I had never before tried four mules on a big wagon. We loaded about 2,500 to each six mule team, 1,200 to each four-mule team, and two sacks of 112 pounds each to each horse-string, and the rule was to keep two whole sacks of corn in each horse-string wagon in case of any accident that might separate it for a night from the supply train.


There was in my instructions no limit to the time I should take to reach Union or to make the round trip, but the general understanding was that as the season was getting late, the sooner the horses could be delivered, without too much strain, the better for them. They were not expected to gain flesh on the trip, and were always liable to accidents. Horses naturally travel more freely than mules, and hence the day's travel must, as a rule, be measured by the distance that the mules were able to make without injury to them.

I may here describe a horse-string and manner of managing it. A three-inch thimble skein wagon was what we used, with double covers and wheel harness for pair of horses. An inch and one-half or two-inch rope is put through the iron at the end of the tongue and spliced. At the other end the rope is put through an iron ring and spliced. About eight feet apart from tongue to iron ring, strong rings were seized onto the rope. In motion a pair of horses are hitched to the wagon, with which and the brake the driver manages it. At the end of the rope, another pair of horses are hitched to keep it straight. A man rides the near horse to manage the pair. Another pair of horses in the middle of the string, each wearing a collar, hames and back-strap with a chain hitched to the inside ring of each hame crossing under the rope to hold it up. A man rides the near horse of this pair to keep them steady. On either side of the rope a horse is tied to lead. Complete, the string may be made of any number of horses, according to its length; in my case, there were about thirty two on a string, including wheelers and leaders. The foreman and another rode horses, one on each side of the string, to be ready to dismount and assist in case of trouble. Horses were liable to get badly hurt by getting a

leg over the rope, and often the string must stop to shorten up if the horses were tied too long; so that a string crew consisted of foreman, cook, driver, lead-rider, swing-rider, and out-rider—six men in all. The cook slept in the wagon during the day and must see that the other men's attention was not diverted from the horses to get something to eat. Each string crew had its tent, mess-kit and rations, five water-buckets and ten-gallon water-keg which must be kept full, a big maul, and wooden picket-pins with iron rings around the top. Having arrived in camp, the first thing to do was to picket the wagon-wheels, so that they could not be moved, then the cross-jacks, about thirty feet apart, made of one and one-half by three-inch hardwood seven feet long, crossed and bolted together about one foot from the end. These were opened and set under the rope, as shown in the cut, raising it about four feet from the ground. In these the rope rests from the end of the tongue to the end of the rope, which is kept straight by another rope which extends from the end about ten feet farther, and is fastened by an iron-bound wooden picket-pin driven deep into the ground. To the picket line the horses stand tied as they traveled, the halter straps being tied long enough to reach the ground to eat hay or corn comfortably.

Always in camp the horses must be untied and led to water, unless the watering place is bad, in which case they must be watered from buckets. During the day they must be watered from buckets, if convenient; but if one trusts to men to water from buckets always some horses will suffer many times—partly the man's fault and partly because the horse never drinks as well from the bucket as when free to plunge his nose into the stream in his own way.

Each horse-string wagon carried two scythes, a scythe handle and stone, and we had a grindstone in one of the trains. Grass in abundance was cut and put along under the picket rope so that every horse could have plenty. Great industry would be necessary to take these horses 752 miles across the plains in good shape, and we started with this understanding and kept it constantly in view.




The mule trains left Riley the 10th of September, 1862, each traveling independently, with instruction to camp on the Smoky Hill River at Salina, then a mere stage station, until I came up. There was a plain road, but little traveled, and this the first government train of any importance to pass over it. The Kansas Stage Company ran their stages over it to Fort Larned, under the superintendence of my old friend L. G. Terry. The next day the horse-strings crossed Chapman's Creek, where I left them the morning of the 12th and overtook the trains at Salina that evening—thirty-nine miles in three drives. During the afternoon of that day I was asleep in the ambulance when Pat woke me and said there were two horsemen ahead going the same way that we were. I looked out, and as we drew near found them to be in soldier's uniform. A horse had been stolen from my back yard two days before I left Leavenworth, and one of these horses looked like mine. I told Pat to keep straight on by them until I told him to stop. When 300 yards ahead I got out and stood in the road with double-barrelled shotgun. When within a few steps I told them to halt and asked if they had any arms, to which they replied in the negative, and seemed extremely surprised at my action. They were mere boys and this their first taste of war, as they told me later. I asked where they were from and where going. They were from Leavenworth and were going to Larned to join their regiment, the Ninth Kansas Cavalry. In short, they enlisted under a rule to furnish their own horses, for which they were to be paid. I told one of them he was riding my horse, to which he replied that he had bought him in Leavenworth. I told him to raise the mane from the right side of his neck and if he did not find the letter "L" branded thereon, he could keep the horse and I would give him his value in money. He immediately said the brand was there, but he did not steal the horse, and I believed him, and invited both to camp with me at Salina and we would talk it over, which they did, and agreed to see me when I came into Larned if I would allow him to keep the horse until that time; to take him now would leave him afoot and he would be over the time allowed to report to his commanding officer. I was

sure that the youth was honest and that he had bought the horse of one of the numerous horse thieves, or "red-legs" who shouted liberty and union while they robbed the people right and left.

I found the trains all right at Salina. The next day we would lie by until the horse-string came up and from that time on traveled together.

About midnight a fearful storm of thunder, lightning, rain and hail came up suddenly. I never saw a worse storm. All the wagonmasters knew that in any extreme case of that kind my rule was for every man to get out, pull the picket-pins and tie mules to wagons. I found everyone doing his best



GENERAL LANGDON C. EASTON.*

except in one train, and the assistant wagonmaster and half of the men were out, and all of the mules made safe. At Riley this train had lost four mules, undoubtedly by neglect, and I made up my mind to dispense with the services of this wagonmaster. Morning came, and men were hurrying fires to dry themselves, the mules were all safe and being picketed out, when I saw the derelict wagonmaster crawl-

ing out of a wagon dry and comfortable. I had some whisky of my own, got it out, and with a little gill cup gave to every

*Major Easton graduated at the Military Academy in 1838. He served in the Sixth Infantry until 1847, when he was made a captain in the Quartermaster's Department. He remained in this Department until retired, January 24, 1881. He was brevetted lieutenant colonel, colonel, and brigadier general for distinguished and important service in the Atlanta campaign, and major general for meritorious service during the war. Died April 29, 1884.

man who wanted it a "nip." All of the old timers took it. The dry wagonmaster came to explain to me how he got all of his mules tied up before the heaviest hail came, etc. I cut him off with the assurance that I knew that he was lying, and he could not have any whisky; he might take his mule and go back to Leavenworth and lie to the man who hired him, but if he took the mule he must take his "time" from me, in which I would state that he was discharged for gross neglect of duty and general worthlessness. He took it, and I wrote to Major Easton, quartermaster at Fort Leavenworth, a copy of his discharge. Henry Farmer came to me in 1855, and had been with me most of the time since. He was now in charge of a horse string at \$45 per month, and I made him wagonmaster at \$65. I did not have to lose any sleep for fear he would not do his duty. My wagonmasters were now John Wilson, who was with me in 1858 in Utah, Reed, Underwood, Farmer and Shehan.

The horse strings came up all right; they escaped most of the heavy storm and had no hail.

There was a family in Salina, and the nice woman had a few days before received a dozen chickens, brought on behind the stage-coach from near Silver Lake. Early she was out looking for them; the rooster failed to crow, and there were no hens hunting crumbs at her door. Of course she was sad. I sent Pat to her house for milk and eggs and he found her crying. She told him of her loss, sent me two eggs, all she had, and a quart of milk. I was *mad*. For a family out here in the wilderness to be robbed of precious hens was too much, but I said nothing. Strolling about from train to train, I was looking for evidence of chicken thieves. In Reed's train they had tried to burn the feathers, but failed; there they were, half consumed in the ashes. I lifted the lid from a big bake oven containing three chickens. Reed was with me and much embarrassed. I told him that I would not look any further, he could do the hunting; and the first thing to hunt was a dollar apiece for twelve chickens, and not a cent less, which must be given to that woman, and if a cent's worth of anything was stolen from any one I would break up the whole outfit but that it should be righted. We had come from the border

where thieves were stealing and robbing in the name of patriotism and liberty, but such things should not follow my trail. I would not have it said, as was often said of commands passing through the country, that they stole everything they could carry away. Reed was a fine man, did not know of the stealing until it was done, and like many other good men at the head of a troop or company, did not realize that he should teach "the boys" to protect people's property and not to steal it. The woman got her money and every man of my party a lesson.

The 14th was lovely and we moved ten miles to "Spring Creek." This was the first camp where we had all been together, and I made it as I intended making it when camping on a stream where there was room. Spring Creek runs from west to east. The first horse string crossed the creek, turned east and stopped; the next string passed beyond and turned the same way, placing wagon and horse-string about twenty-four feet beyond the first; third, fourth and fifth go the same distance beyond and face the same way—that is, five wagons in line facing the same way, the same distance apart. The sixth string goes past the rear end of the first five far enough to be out of the way of the last one and stopped, fronting north; the next string obliques enough to place the wagon twenty four feet beyond, west of the last one, and so on until eight wagons and horse strings front north. Then the fourteenth string passes west far enough advanced to be out of the way of the thirteenth, the other following in like order until the camp stands thus: Five wagons fronting east, eight north and five west, all horse-strings fronting out, rear end of wagons forming three sides of a square and river the fourth side. Inside of this square my ambulance and traveling forge, and room to hobble or picket a few horses that had met with some accident or need extra care, or horses or mules waiting their turn to be shod. Always more or less horses were under special treatment, and this inside space was referred to as "the hospital." And now I made my big round corral two hundred yards in front of the long side of the horse camp. The camp is shown by the accompanying cut. The horse string tents are shown behind the wagons. The wagonmaster's tents

were near the corral. And now the mules are turned out with lariats on without picket-pins. All wagonmasters and twenty men besides myself mounted—the mules driven away from the horse strings, for they were sure to stampede the first time they were turned loose. After circling around for a while, all settled down to grazing and there was no more trouble. A man led a gentle white horse with big bell on his neck, and the mules learned to follow him to the corral. After two or three days the lariats were stored away in the wagons and not used any more. In the middle of the afternoon a large herd of buffalo came in sight, evidently going for water at Spring Creek, moving straight for our camp. They were moving toward the sun which blinded them so that they could not see the wagons until near to them. The mules were corralled quickly and the gap closed, guns were gotten out and a long skirmish line thrown out between the buffalo and the camp. After a good deal of shooting the buffalo sheered off and crossed the creek a mile west of the horses and continued their course until out of sight. Several buffalo were killed and many wounded. It was quite an exciting battle, but if not turned they would have been in our horse camp before they knew it, and the ruin would have been great.

And here the rules for the future were laid down: The mules would be herded, a wagonmaster or his assistant always on herd with ten teamsters, who stayed on until midnight and were then relieved and the mules corralled at early dawn, and any time in the night that there seemed to be danger; we must not be caught out in a bad storm; in fact, with the gray horse and the bell, they were very little trouble. All hands were roused at early dawn and the mules fed two quarts of corn each—no corn for the mules at night—the grass was good enough. The horses were fed two quarts of corn at night and green grass piled up under their picket lines; in the morning they were fed two quarts of corn each and groomed. Breakfast over they were watered, preparation was made for starting, and at 7:00 o'clock we rolled out, the horse strings in front, the first string to-day the rear string to-morrow, and so on to the end; the trains moved in the same order following the

horses. The horse-strings naturally traveled a little faster than the mule teams, but where there was no danger of Indians it made little difference if the trains were a little behind. If anything caused a horse-string to stop, the others passed on and the delayed one fell in behind; the same way if a team would stop for any purpose. All found their proper place in camp and there was no confusion. And here I made a rule that about two miles out of camp horse-strings would pull out of the hard road on to the grass and stop ten minutes, while the men readjusted anything out of place or attended to their own necessities. While waiting this ten minutes, three horses out of four would urinate. The mule teams must do the same way, with like results. The amount of suffering for men and animals thereby avoided cannot be estimated.

On the 15th we moved twelve miles and again camped on Spring Creek, the same as yesterday. Only two or three buffaloes seen to-day. As soon as camp is established horses are led to water, and again after feeding corn and grooming.

I am determined that these horses shall go through to Union in the best condition possible. We are a comfortably provided for party, and men need not give way to carelessness and neglect because they are away from home. They fare as well as men do on farms and are much better paid, and must not permit things to go at loose ends because it is "Uncle Sam's" property. And here I will say that the men with me this trip were the best civilians that I ever traveled with. More than half of them had never been on the plains before; had been raised in good homes in Missouri, but on account of troubles growing out of the war, when the news went through the country that this big caravan would go to New Mexico the best young men in the border counties came. There was a singular reticence about them—apparent desire not to talk of themselves from the fear of being condemned for rebels if they hailed from Missouri, and all the way to New Mexico and back there was a quietness unusual on the plains. The men were young and willing to do right, and among the nearly three hundred with me there were no quarrels, no jarrings. Two youths in adjoining horse-strings fell out and drew pistols. I rode in between them and made

each bring his pistol to me, and each tell his grievance, which amounted to nothing, and I lectured them; told them of home, family and friends. I stated to them that it was no unusual thing in civilian outfits going long journeys for men to fall out and some one be killed, and assured them that no one would be hurt with me. I would allow no man to ill-treat another, especially such men as they were. I was going to send them home to Missouri wiser and better men, and here and now they must shake hands, which they did. I did not tell them so, but imagined each one felt his honor vindicated by showing pluck enough to draw his pistol, and his vanity was satisfied.

I pass my daily journal because too voluminous. Crossed the Smoky Hill at the stage station called Ellsworth, where Fort Harker was afterwards built. I never drove in my ambulance during the day from Salina to Union, with two exceptions. I rode one horse during the day and had another one saddled to use after coming into camp. Each horse-string had a man on guard the fore part and another the last half of the night, whose duties were to walk up and down the horse-string and be ready to attend to a horse that got his foot over the rope or in any other trouble, so that the string crew, including foreman and cooks, were on guard half of every night. I had a man to ride all night from one horse-string to another around the corral out to the herd and every point about the whole camp, with instructions to report to me if there was anything wrong, if a watchman was asleep, or any one neglecting his duty. He slept in a wagon nicely fitted up during the day. His name was John Gartin, and I never saw his equal for faithful endurance.

I was instructed to go this route because it was supposed to be much nearer than by the old Santa Fe trail. I arrived on the high ground overlooking Cheyenne Bottom and was surprised at its extent—an expanse of about ten miles of bottom with a mere trail but little traveled and apparently wet. I could not plunge into that without examining it. I had an inkling that there was such a bottom, and had ridden some miles ahead of the horse-strings, and now wrote a few lines to the man in charge of the first string telling him and all to halt here until my return, put it on a stick and stuck

it in the ground. I kept an assistant wagonmaster with me, and we rode across the bottom to a good camp on the west side and back in about three hours. I determined to take the horse-strings across, but if I got the loaded wagons into that bottom and it should rain, which was threatening, I might wallow in the mud indefinitely, and so I instructed the trains to corral. If it rained I would have to go south to the old Santa Fe trail. The horse-string wagons were so light that I could risk them. The horse-strings crossed all right, and were in a good camp on the west side before dark. I was off in the morning early, reached the trains by starting time and led them over the bottom, and on across Walnut Creek, the horse-strings coming in a little later. The next day we passed Pawnee Rock, and crossed Pawnee Fork at its mouth (where now stands the town of Larned) and camped on the west side. I was told when I left Leavenworth that a strong escort would be ready at Fort Larned to accompany me all the way through to Union, and I sent a man from my Walnut Creek camp with a letter to the commanding officer at Fort Larned, apprising him of my approach and requested that the escort join me en route and save delay. I knew that every mail carried, from Fort Leavenworth to Fort Larned, something upon that subject and had reason to suppose that the escort would be ready. It was eight miles out of my way to go by Larned and I wanted to avoid it. Capt. Reed of the Ninth Kansas, commanding Fort Larned, with my messenger met me at camp, where I learned that there were few troops at Larned and they hardly initiated as soldiers, and all that he could possibly spare would be Lieutenant Dodge, of a Wisconsin battery, and twenty-five men of the Ninth; he would select the very best that he had and they would be well disciplined with a good officer. After lunch we drove in my ambulance to the Fort and saw the escort which would move to join me early in the morning. I knew, and so did Captain Reed, that I would have to pass through the whole Kiowa and Comanche Nations, camped along the Arkansas in the vicinity of where now stands Dodge City, and the sight of 600 fine horses passing close would be a great temptation to possess themselves of some. I ought to

have an escort of 500 men, but they were not to be had. Be it remembered that an Indian's weak point (or strong point) is horse; horses, scalps, and squaws are what contribute to his happiness and make life worth living. Captain Reed said that the young man with my horse had reported to him and was in trouble. He was sent for, I believed him honest, and wrote and gave him a bill of sale (or rather "a bill of gift"), reading:

"I have this day presented to Private ———, of ——— Troop, Ninth Kansas Cavalry, one small bay horse seven years old, branded L on right side of neck, said horse having been previously stolen from me at Leavenworth and sold to said ———, who was an innocent purchaser.

(Signed) "P. G. LOWE."

To say that the young man was greatly relieved would be putting it mildly. I liked Captain Reed immensely and am sorry I do not know his career.

The next day we moved up to near where is now Kinsley, and Lieutenant Dodge and command joined us. His party were well mounted, and from first to last Dodge and his men were to me all that that number could be. Having no mess or servant, I invited Dodge to join me, which he was glad to do. He placed his men wherever I asked him to and relieved me of much care all the way through. My horse-string men were armed with revolvers and teamsters with muskets, and I inspected them carefully and saw that they had plenty of ammunition. The next morning, a short distance from camp, we met Company F, Second Colorado,— about seventy-five men under Lieutenant Weis, of Denver. They were on the way from Fort Lyon to Larned to report to Captain Reed. "Billie" Weis was a fine saddler and worked in the shop at Fort Leavenworth a number of years. On the Cheyenne expedition he went with me as saddler, and was of much service fixing up the pack-trains, and went with them. On the Utah expedition he was my cook to Camp Floyd. When I went into business with Mr. Clayton he went as cook to Denver and cooked for our mess until we set him up in the saddlery business, and now he was a good officer, commanding as fine a company of men as I ever saw,

every man a pioneer, experienced in everything that makes a man on the plains or in the mountains self-supporting—all recruited in Denver. I knew several of them, and was introduced and shook hands with the whole company. I wrote a note to Captain Reed requesting him to order Lieutenant Weis to join me and go all the way through, and told the Lieutenant where I would camp and wait for him to join me, for I did not want to reach the Indian camp until he did join. He had wagon transportation, could make good time, and he was as anxious to go as I was to have him. At early dawn the next morning John Gartin called me and said that Lieutenant Weis wanted to report. Here he was with his company twenty hours after he left me. The distance traveled to Larned and back to where he joined was sixty-five miles. I told him to let his men sleep as long as he wanted to; I would only move ten miles and camp two miles east of the Indian camp. I had ridden up and selected my camp the night before and would not move early. We moved out about 9 o'clock and camped on high ground near the junction of the Dry or Coon Creek route and the river road. For miles along both sides of the Arkansas, commencing two miles above my camp, were Indian tepees with numerous inhabitants. My camp was carefully made, as it always was, and abundance of grass collected. Dodge's men picketed the high points. Weis came up and was assigned a position just west of the horse-strings. A line was designated for the sentinels, and all of his men put on guard, and no Indian allowed to cross the line without my permission. Hundreds came, but only two, Satenta and Lone Wolf, were permitted to cross the line, and they stayed and dined with me and Lieutenants Dodge and Weis. "Joe" Armijo, who had been with me nearly five years, was my interpreter; all of the Indians understood Mexican. I left the impression upon the minds of these chiefs that the soldiers were asleep in wagons and that those on post were only a few of what we had. Each teamster placed his musket so that it stuck out from under the wagon covers. I impressed upon them that while we did not believe the Indians would purposely annoy us, the curiosity of young

men, women and children might cause them to come too near, frighten the horses and give us trouble, which could be avoided, and they could see the big train pass by just as well at a little distance—a few hundred yards away. They promised that all of their people would observe my wishes and I need feel no uneasiness about it.

I had traveled two horse-strings and two wagons abreast during the last two days to keep them more compact, as was always customary on the Santa Fe trail from Walnut Creek to Bent's Fort. There were two, three and sometimes four well broken roads for many miles through the Indian country along the Arkansas River, from the west line of what is now McPherson County to Bent's Old Fort, and now I rolled out three abreast, six horse-strings long and three wide; forty mule-teams long and three wide. Muskets protruded from under the wagon covers, soldiers were wide awake and plain to be seen. Dodge rode ahead with me with a skirmish line of a dozen of his men spread out wide, indicating that none must come inside of this width, while the balance of his men picketed the hills. For one who knew the curiosity of Indians under such circumstances it was remarkable how by thousands, men, women and children observed the promise the chiefs had made the day before. For more than ten miles these people trudged on foot, or cavorted about on ponies on either side of the train, never approaching nearer than 200 yards. When we had traveled more than twenty miles and started up over the Seven-mile Journada, most of them were out of sight; but the two chiefs referred to and a few others came to shake hands and say good-bye. Armijo conveyed to them my thanks, and I had a barrel of hard bread and small sack of sugar gotten out for them.

Seven-mile Journada was a rugged bluff running down to the river, very broken—a good place for an ambush. I explained to Dodge, who rode ahead with his skirmish line and examined every break. There could be no traveling abreast, there being but one hard gravelly road only wide enough for one wagon. All horse-strings and wagons returned to single file and we reached the Arkansas River and Cimarron Crossing in safety, went into a fine camp at the

end of the thirty-five mile drive, without stopping to water. Fortunately the day was cloudy and cool. It is hardly necessary to tell how eager the horses were for water and how, when turned loose, the mules rushed into the river to drink and roll on the sandbars. Possibly I could have made half of the distance and camped without trouble but I should have revealed the weakness of my escort, and the temptation to crowd in would make it almost impossible to restrain a thousand or two young bucks. I never heard the wisdom of



COL. JESSE H. LEAVENWORTH.*

my action questioned by any of my party. Dodge and Weis freely expressed themselves as pleased; it was a great relief to have passed safely by that great camp and to feel that they were left behind; but we did not relax our vigilance; the Indians might think we had grown confident and careless, and the guards were doubly cautious.

From the Cimarron Crossing to Fort Union was the best natural road probably in the world, and shorter than by the Raton route by about one hundred miles, but the impression prevailed at Fort Leavenworth that it was very dan-

gerous for my outfit on account of the Confederate guerillas and Apache Indians, hence my orders were to go the Raton route.

Next morning we rolled out at the usual hour and traveled about twelve miles. There was nothing worthy of note

*General Henry Leavenworth, the founder of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, left an only son, Colonel Jesse H. Leavenworth. Colonel Leavenworth graduated at West Point in 1830 and served in the Fourth and Second Infantry until 1836, when he resigned to engage in civil engineering. In 1862 Secretary Stanton commissioned him to organize a regiment of cavalry in Colorado, and this organization became known as the "Rocky Mountain Rangers." It did valiant service in protecting a thousand miles of Western frontier from the encroachment of hostile tribes of Indians. He died in 1885, and his remains rest at Milwaukee. His four daughters reside in Chicago and Tacoma.

until we reached Fort Lyon, commanded by Colonel Leavenworth of the "Rocky Mountain Rangers," a son of the founder of Fort Leavenworth. We were two days here; got all the hay we wanted and turned over 100 horses. Up to this time I had abandoned two horses, hopelessly crippled, so that I left Lyon with 510.

From Lyon west and southwest, there had been a drought and the grass was too short to mow. We filled all the wagons at Lyon and fed sparingly. Crossed the river at Bent's Old Fort and camped ten miles above. Here was a species of canebrake, flat-leaved, and relished by animals in the absence of other long forage. I had all cut, and piled into the wagons all that was not eaten. The next day it was thirty miles to Timpas without water between camps; grass good for mules running loose, but none could be cut with a scythe. On this route from the Arkansas to the Picketwire River (Purgatoire) was always a hard problem for forage and water. My little supply of hay and cane would be all consumed to-night, and I did not expect to use a scythe again this side of the Raton Mountains. The mules could be herded where grass could not be mowed, but it was too late to break the horses to herd, and I would not be justified in trying it, if I met with an accident; but I will here express the opinion that divided into herds of 200 or 300 the horses would have gone to Mexico better on grass than they would on strings with plenty of hay and corn. From Timpas to water holes was fifteen miles, and as I knew, no place to camp. Six miles further was Hole in the Rock, and nothing but volcanic rock and stunted pine and cedar. Twelve miles more to Hole in the Prairie, there ought to be grass and water.

In all these places watering must be done with buckets, and so it looked as if we would travel thirty-three miles and camp at Hole in the Prairie. The horse-strings reached the water holes and were well watered. While they were watering the trains came and were told to pass on to Hole in the Rock to save time. The horse-strings came up and passed the trains while watering at Hole in the Rock. With an assistant wagonmaster I rode on to Hole in the Prairie, where the ground showed no signs of rain for a long time, and was cov-

ered with a white scum of alkali and water strongly impregnated with it. Surely I could not camp anything here and let the animals drink. When the strings got here they would have traveled eighteen miles since watering and the trains twelve, in all thirty-three miles from Timpas. Fortunately the weather was cool.

When the strings came up I sent them right on, not allowing men or beasts to use the water. I showed where the trains should camp on high ground above the alkali bottom; told the wagonmaster in charge to have the mules herded without allowing them in the bottoms or near the water; to corral the mules at dark and start early in the morning. Then I got into my ambulance with an assistant wagonmaster and drove for the Picketwire; arrived there, I found the road had been changed since 1854 and ran up the north side. Following it about three miles, I saw a cabin and some stacks of oats. A young man living here alone had come from St. Louis in the spring, raised a crop of oats and a good garden. It was like an oasis in the desert. In short, I bought his three stacks of oats, as fine as I ever saw, and sent my assistant back to the turn of the road to bring up the horse-strings. Two dollars a bushel the man wanted for his oats. That was the government price at Maxwell's ranch on the Cimarron. I did not dispute the price, and he left it to me to say how many bundles should make a bushel. They were large and I allowed a dozen, which was satisfactory.

Near sunset the horse-strings came up at the end of their forty-seven mile drive, and the horses all led into the beautiful clear stream up to their knees. Had we found no feed but the corn we had, they were fortunate to be here instead of at the Hole in the Prairie. All of the foremen of strings and myself stood by to see that the horses were led out before drinking too much. They were watered all they wanted an hour later. Three bundles were given each horse and no corn. A gorge of water with corn might cause some sickness; they ate every straw. After watering next morning they were given two bundles each and ate it clean before noon, and the balance was put into the wagons and taken along. Three hundred dozen bundles of oats the man

sold me, and reserved a few dozen for his horse. It was cheap feed under the circumstances for my horses, and none too much for him to get. We bought some nice vegetables from him also.

Half a mile above lived Mr. — whose wife was a sister to Kit Carson, and she had a nice five-year-old boy. She brought him with her when she came with some milk and eggs to my camp to sell—a bright little fellow, and I had quite a romp with him. A week later he died from the effects of a rattlesnake bite. I was shocked to hear it on my return.

The next morning I rode up to where now stands Trinidad and selected a camp. A man named Hall, formerly sergeant in the Second Dragoons, lived there with a Mexican wife—the only inhabitants. He had raised a crop of corn and had a stack of fodder cut off above the ears and nicely cured. I bought it. The trains came up and watered where I bought the oats, and camped near Hall's. They found fairly good grass on hills. The horse-strings came up in the afternoon.

Since leaving Lyon we had been feeding mules the same amount of corn that we did the horses on account of short grass. The next day we moved about twelve miles up the cañon towards the Raton summit. The mules did well herded on gramma grass and the horses had fodder. The next day we had before us three miles to the summit and then down ten miles of steep, rocky, mountain road and three more to water holes. We had passed all the alkali country without losing an animal, but here a horse died.

Colonel Leavenworth assured me that great efforts would be made by guerillas, rebel sympathizers, etc., of which he claimed to have positive knowledge, to capture my outfit; that said guerillas were in strong bands ranging through the country; this would be a rich haul for them, and once captured they could easily run to Texas or Indian Territory, and there were no troops in the country to pursue or make them afraid. And the Colonel declared that these same guerillas were presuming that the civilians of my party would have little incentive to fight, and my hundred soldiers,

suddenly surprised by two or three hundred Texans, might not stand up very long either. To myself I must admit that with a well organized party of such men as I had known I could surprise and stampede a herd of mules and demoralize a lot of horse-strings without great loss.

There was nothing strange in the Colonel's story, and why an enterprising enemy should permit such a valuable caravan with so little protection to escape seemed a mystery. Armed as my men were they would seem a strong defensive party, and so they were in corral and could protect it, but a party of rough riders dashing into a herd or a train en route could cause much demoralization, and all the teamsters could do would be to care for their teams, and the horse-string men would be too busy to fight, so that as a fighting force my men amounted to nothing en route. On the open plains with my little squad of cavalry on the lookout, we were tolerably safe, but in the mountains or broken country it was more dangerous. I had talked with Lieutenants Dodge and Weis a good deal, and they fully appreciated the danger and were extremely vigilant. Surely if I was to have trouble it would be in getting down the south side of the mountain.

Dodge was off early and covered a wide range without seeing a man or anything to arouse suspicion. As the horse-strings worked their way slowly down with great difficulty Weis's men faithfully picketed the way. It was a hard road for horse-strings, but we finally reached camp at the water holes, when some wagons came in sight and kept coming until sunset, when all were in camp and no animals hurt, F Company bringing up the rear. It was a faithful day's work for all concerned and no sign of an enemy.

Early the next morning I sent Mr. Sharp, a man in charge of a horse-string, with a letter to Mr. Maxwell, of Maxwell's ranch, requesting him to deliver at my camp on Vermijo, fifteen miles northeast of his ranch, 2000 bundles of sheaf oats, or an equivalent in hay or other long fodder—whatever he had. It was twenty eight miles, and I found Sharp and the oats ready for me. Sharp's ride was fifty-eight miles, and if he had not stayed with the Mexican ox drivers, they would not have reached my camp.

The next day twenty-five miles to Sweet Water. I found men putting up hay, claiming they had the right, and I bought from them enough for one night and to haul along for to-morrow night, for I knew we would find none at Ocate, where we arrived the next day—fourteen miles.

At the Sweet Water camp, a young Mexican complained that two men had come to his sheep herd and taken two young sheep, shot them, took out their entrails and packed the sheep off on their backs. His employer would take \$2 apiece out of his wages for losing them, and he wanted that much money. I went around with him, found fresh mutton, and he pointed out the men who took the sheep. I told the men to hustle the \$4 and I would make no fuss about it; otherwise, I would find a way to get it. It was soon paid, and notice given that no robbery would be permitted; "the damn greaser," as they pleased to call him, had rights that must be respected. No more sheep were stolen.

Ocate to Fort Union, twenty miles, where I was well received by Captain Craig, the quartermaster (whom I had not seen since 1854), Captain VanVliet, military storekeeper, old Captain Shoemaker, ordnance officer (whom I had met here in 1854), and Colonel Moore, the post trader. This was the 10th of October, and we had traveled 622 miles from Fort Riley in thirty days, including two days lay-by at Fort Lyon. Our losses had been three horses and four mules.

I turned over all wagons, except the eighteen light ones used by horse-strings and my ambulance, all mules except nineteen four-mule teams and five riding mules, and all horses except two. A few men wanted to remain in New Mexico and found employment, but 250 returned with me.

I disliked parting with Lieutenant Weis and Company F and Lieutenant Dodge and his Ninth Kansans, but I no longer needed them and they did not need me. I would travel much faster than they, and so we parted, on my part regretfully. I do not know Dodge's career, but fear that he joined the great majority during the terrible war. Major William Weis, after many adventures—ups and downs, can be found at his saddlery shop industriously making an honorable living at 2630 Champa Street, Denver, Col.

But about half of the men could ride at one time in the eighteen wagons. I put a wagonmaster or foreman of horse-strings in charge of each wagon, and the men were divided off so that each man knew the wagon and mess that he belonged to, and the man in charge must see that they rode turn about. Some men never rode; one, "Dick" Anderson of Platte County, Missouri, left camp as soon as he got breakfast and was in camp in the evening among the first. He came from Utah with me in 1858, and never rode a step except when snow was deep. Weather on the return trip was good until towards the last—just cold enough to make men relish walking.

I measured the road from Union to Leavenworth, 752 miles, with an odometer on my ambulance wheel. The second night from Union we camped at Sweet Water. A high promontory juts out into the plain south of our camp; wagons came around it following the road with half of the men strung along on foot; and bringing up the extreme rear was a cavalcade of about twenty men mounted on ponies, horses, mules or burros. They had improvised bridles of lariat ropes. I inquired where they got their mounts, and they claimed to have found them loose and picked them up as strays and thought they had a right to them. I told them that ranchmen had stock all over this country; all of them were branded; this was a public pasture, and to take an animal from it without consulting the owner, was stealing just as much as was stealing a horse from a farm, and they must turn them loose. One tough fellow said that the people in this country were "nothing but a damn set of rebels anyhow;" to which I replied that he was not commissioned to judge of the loyalty of any man, and if he did not go back to the other side of that bluff and turn loose the horse that he was riding and the pony that he was leading I would turn him loose without a scratch to show the amount due him and he should not be permitted to travel with my party. Turning to the other men I told them that my remarks applied to them also. All but two said they had no idea they were stealing, and laughingly rode back and turned loose. I told the two sulky ones not to come near my camp until they got ready

to live up to my rule. Two or three men went out and talked to them, and they finally rode around the bluff and returned on foot. This incident stopped all lawlessness. If it had been permitted, all of the unscrupulous fellows would have come into Leavenworth mounted, and flattered themselves that they were brave.

We made two drives, herding the mules night and day, fed two quarts of corn to each animal to Fort Lyon; Lyon to Riley one quart, and then four quarts the balance of the way. I did not want to take much corn from Union or Lyon; nor did I want to haul so much as to keep men from riding. From Riley east grass was dead and I bought hay.

Where the Indian camp stood on the Arkansas when we went west were camped two companies of the Second Colorado, under command of Captain Scott J. Anthony, of Denver. The Indians had gone south for the winter.

Approaching the Saline River to select camp, traveling along the west bank was an immense flock of wild turkeys. I got out with my shotgun and killed two, and they did not fly; did not seem to know what it was all about, and I killed one with my pistol. They ran and fluttered along into the thick timber where they roosted. After we were camped, men got after them and one German, who had a double-barreled shotgun, killed a dozen. The weather was cold and I kept my largest one until I got home, November 17th.

In the 1,500 mile round trip with more than 250 men, representing all classes, with no doctor, dependent upon the box of medicines that my friend Dr. Samuel Phillips put up for me, without the loss of a man by desertion or illness, with no serious illness or other inability to perform hard duty, we made the return trip from Union to Leavenworth in thirty-one days—more than twenty-four miles per day—half of the way on foot. The cold weather was upon us; we were all anxious to get home, and there was no complaint. I came in two days ahead of my party.

Again my vanity prompts me to challenge comparison with anyone who has ever traversed the Great Plains with horses or mules. Five or ten per cent. of loss was not unusual, but here we sent 614 horses 550 miles and 510 horses

more than 200 miles further, and 534 mules 752 miles, and return two horses and eighty-one mules with a loss of but three horses and four mules, and 250 men return in perfect health, after more than two months of out-door exposure and hard work, and no sickness.

But the merit of my trip, if any be due, lies in the safe delivery of so many animals at the end of so long a journey with so little loss, and a bill of health unparalleled for that length of time with that number of men. With few exceptions, wherever I have met one of these men I have felt no hesitancy in recommending him. Men who could work so hard and faithfully without any previous discipline can be trusted anywhere. Most of the men entered trains and continued in government employ without losing time, and I had the pleasure of placing many of them in good positions. Three men of this party served with me in the First Dragoons—Mr. William P. Drummond, who was a sergeant in my (B) troop, was this trip in charge of a horse-string. Warren Kimball (since dead), who joined with me as a recruit, and Mr. James H. Beddow, whom I knew in K Troop, and who is now and has been ever since he returned with me from New Mexico, an employee of the quartermaster's department, now and for many years, having police supervision of the Fort Leavenworth military reservation and wearing the star of deputy United States marshal—universally respected for his long and faithful service.

Probably thirty men of my party had been with me on other trips, and to them I was indebted for much of the good order and discipline.

THE BATTLE OF THE SHADES.

By AN UNKNOWN CONTRIBUTOR.

CAPTAIN JOHN STARK was enjoying a post-prandial smoke when an orderly trumpeter interrupted to deliver an envelope from the adjutant's office. After noting the hour of receipt and signing his initials in the orderly's book, he opened the envelope and glanced through a long series of indorsements on the enclosed paper. When he came to the first of the returning indorsements he threw away his cigar and became absorbed in reading it.

The enclosure was Captain Stark's essay for the first year in the post-graduate course of the garrison school for officers. He had submitted it just before he left the States for the Philippines. The indorsement which absorbed his attention read: "Respectfully returned. The ideas set forth in this essay are not in accordance with advanced military thought. It is regretted that Captain Stark does not keep more nearly abreast of the advanced thinkers of his profession."

The indorsement was signed by Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, who was a plebe when Stark was a first-classman at the Academy. He was a well known officer. Ever since he graduated he had been on staff duties of various sorts, such as his many amiable qualities fitted him for.

During the Sioux campaign he was a lieutenant of the same regiment in which Stark was serving, but was on duty in Washington at the time. Captain Stark now remembered that Smith had written a paper on that campaign which had been printed with his photograph, and had been widely and favorably commented upon by officers on duty in the War Department. Stark had read the paper while he was at Fort Meade recovering from a wound.

Captain Stark had never been a prominent officer. He had been continuously on duty with his troop since he left

the Academy. The winds of the plains and the sun had burned and bronzed his face until he had a parchment-like complexion. His hair and mustache were gray and somewhat grizzled. Lonely service had given him that reserved and silent bearing which is characteristic of a man of deeds and daring in the West. He had never failed in the performance of any duty which came to him by assignment or lot.

The part of his education which impressed him as being of the most value was that which he had acquired by experience. The essay now returned to him was on "The Care of Horses in Winter Campaigning." For this essay he had obtained his ideas from the Sioux and other campaigns. He had written what he had observed to be true, not what other people thought.

"I wish I was not so dense," he mused, as he refolded the paper. "There must be something in the air of Washington that instills military knowledge into people. Smith has always served there, and now he is a lieutenant-colonel—almost a colonel. I have stayed with my troop, and Smith says I am behind the times and don't know how to take care of horses in the winter time.

"Shades of great commanders! I wish I could learn to be a soldier," he sighed.

"We are here," said a hollow, sepulchral voice.

An unearthly light filled the room, and the light upon the table seemed to burn dimly. Phosphorescent shades of material figures stood about. It was a notable company from the unexplored country. Nearly all were generals, marshals, or emperors, but some had been famous in civilian roles.

Now, our honest captain was known to have no fear of any earthly being or known device of war, but spirits had not heretofore been in his line. His invocation of the spectral forms had been sincere enough, but he had not had faith that they would appear.

The shade of the venerable Duke of Wellington had spoken. It continued: "We are here to give you any aid you ask. What is your pleasure?"

Captain Stark had arisen and, collecting himself and be-

coming as courtly as he knew how, he replied: "Sire, I desire to succeed in the profession of arms. I would like the advice of this illustrious company as to how I am to attain that end."

"In the bright lexicon of youth there is no such word as fail," quoth Richelieu solemnly, adjusting the shade of his cardinal's hat.

"I know better," said Hannibal feelingly. "I presume you never had your head used as a foot-ball?"

"No, but I have used generals as foot-balls," thundered the shade of the old ruler of thrones.

"You played at politics and won your victories in ladies' chambers," sneered Cæsar, "and——"

"It is not right that our reasoning should be turned aside so far from the issue. We are here as imperial counselors to aid this man in securing a crown," said Demosthenes, speaking with careful distinctness.

"Oh, forget that crown business!" exclaimed Æschines.

"Have you found it very easy to do?" Demosthenes queried, sarcastically.

"When you politicians have finished your quibbling the generals will decide the matter in hand," declared Alexander.

"But for politicians you generals would have nothing to decide," Epictetus remarked, sagely. He was present as a spectator, apparently.

"That is even so," assented Cæsar. "Politicians are the life and death of generals."

The shade of Brutus seemed pained at this remark.

"Let us get to work," urged Wellington. "It cannot benefit this officer to hear you talk about issues which died with you. The politics of the world of shades cannot interest the denizen of this. Let the Captain state more definitely in what way we can serve him."

"I am about to go on a small campaign, and I believe that if I had the aid of the most illustrious soldiers who ever lived I might bring myself to the attention of the educated soldiers in Washington. I desire the help and coöperation of

the consolidated military genius of the past," the Captain explained.

"I suggest that a committee be appointed to go with Captain Stark on the campaign and direct and advise him," suggested Gustavus Adolphus.

"That is a good plan," agreed Wellington. "Let the committee league itself with the Captain and, through him, command his forces."

After some discussion it was decided that Captain Stark should be in league with Wellington, Napoleon, Alexander, Hannibal, Julius Cæsar and Marshals Ney and Murat. Others of the shades were permitted to accompany the expedition, but were to remain non-combatants unless placed on duty by Captain Stark or one of the committee of commanders. All were free to aid by gaining information.

The expedition in prospect, to which Captain Stark had referred, was to be commanded by Colonel Jones, who had been for years a distinguished success in Washington, where he was on duty as an acting commissary. He had written extensively upon "Scouting and Trailing," "Irregular Warfare," "The Principles of Campaigning," and other similar themes. He was a captain in the regular service, junior in rank to Stark, but he had been made a colonel of volunteers. When the insurgents in this province became troublesome and illusive, he had been selected on account of his knowledge of woodcraft and irregular warfare, as the man to bring order out of chaos.

Days had been devoted to preparations. Colonel Jones had summoned and questioned the *presidentes* of all the neighboring towns. He had located the insurgent forces definitely, and had had maps prepared which he had permitted no one to see except his engineer officer, his adjutant and his quartermaster.

According to the information obtained, there were fully 500 insurgents. Colonel Jones had determined to lead against this force eight companies of infantry, two troops of cavalry and one platoon of mountain artillery. The distance to be marched was about forty miles. In view of the length of the campaign, he had all the men examined by the surgeons

to determine their fitness to go. Those pronounced unfit were left behind to garrison Sumilao, the base of supplies.

These preparations puzzled Cæsar and Napoleon, but were very entertaining to the rest of the committee of shades.

"Are these barbarians blind, or have they no spies?" queried Cæsar, as he watched the natives going and coming, and being closeted with the Colonel.

"They have a peculiar religion. They believe that human actions go by contraries. The commander is playing upon their superstitions," explained Alexander, nudging Gustavus Adolphus.

"I could never trust the superstitions of the Gauls," said Cæsar, thoughtfully.

"You and the Gauls are behind the times," dryly remarked Hannibal.

"I do not seem to grasp the idea," said the shade of Napoleon. "We are not in accord," he sighed, as he reached into his boot and withdrew the shade of a mountain leech.

The day of the departure came after ten days of preparation. The column marched at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. The troops were reviewed in the plaza and then halted in line while the Colonel went to headquarters and wired the Department Commander, "I take the field this morning."

"That sounds like business," declared General Booth when he received the dispatch. He had read all of Jones's books and articles, and knew he had the right man in the right place.

"What is the purpose of having the cavalry in the rear?" asked Napoleon.

"I am to guard the pack train," replied Captain Stark.

"Suggest that you be allowed in front as a screen. Then you can push on, fight an advance guard action and end the campaign."

"I have suggested that I take the advance guard work, but Colonel Jones told me that experts no longer consider a cavalry advance guard advisable where contact is desired," Captain Stark answered sadly.

"I wish the Russians had had more experts," muttered

the shade of the man of destiny, doubtless recalling the retreat of the Grand Army.

The column wound its way across plateaus and through cañons, preceded by an infantry advance guard, formed according to the diagrams in text books. The artillery marched at the head of the main body. The progress was very slow, for the flanking groups maintained by Colonel Jones could not keep pace with the march of the column.

The committee of shades rode about Captain Stark, visible to him but not to others. He conversed with them *sotto voce*. The younger officers noticed that he occasionally muttered to himself, but they attributed this to the abstraction of deep thought.

During the night following the third day, dispositions were made for an attack upon the enemy at dawn the following morning. Colonel Jones's map showed the enemy's stronghold to be in a town surrounded by slightly higher ground. Native guides indicated the high ground, upon which troops were arranged for an attack from three sides against the town the following morning. The men got little or no sleep on account of frequent changes of positions of troops during the night. They were formed ready for attack long before dawn. The cavalry was kept with the commanding officer as a reserve, to guard the pack train and to carry messages.

At dawn a salvo from the artillery, which had been posted on the highest ground in the center, started the attack. The infantry advanced in normal formation, pouring a steady rifle fire into the town, which could be distinguished in the gray dawn as a group of bamboo shacks among clusters of hémp plants. The artillery kept up a rapid shrapnel fire upon the helpless village until the infantry was so close that it was no longer safe to fire over their heads.

Colonel Jones made a heroic figure as he sat on his white horse watching the attack. He had put on a horseman's cape and thrown half of it back over his right shoulder—doubtless a freak of absent-mindedness, due to the abstraction of genius. It was neither raining nor cold. His staff stood about him spellbound with admiration. The cavalry was in

his rear under cover of the hill, mounted and waiting for orders. Captain Stark had ridden forward a little to watch the display before him.

"Our forces are suffering no losses at all," observed Alexander. "I had supposed that modern arms were more deadly."

"They are not under fire," said Captain Stark. The shades seemed puzzled.

"Order a charge along the whole line," thundered Colonel Jones, turning to his staff officers.

The staff officers dashed away to carry his orders to the different provisional battalion commanders. Soon a terrific rapid fire was poured into the town. Colonel Jones now dashed up to the line and rode in with the charge, which was made at once, the troops yelling lustily and looking foolish.

"Cease firing" was soon sounded, and Colonel Jones came dashing back to where the cavalry had remained. "Captain Stark, deploy and follow up the enemy's retreat," he ordered. "Remember that you are to take advantage of his confusion and punish him severely, but do not get out of supporting distance of the infantry."

The Captain formed the cavalry in a line of squads and swept through the town at a brisk trot. About the only havoc wrought in the town was upon inanimate objects. The church was pretty badly damaged by shells, and one or two shacks were demolished. A carabao was dying at one side of the little plaza, and a wounded pig was running about squealing. No native, living or dead, was to be seen. The infantry soldiers were hunting about for firewood with which to cook breakfast coffee.

"The attack was anticipated," said Alexander, sadly. "It was splendidly conceived and beautifully carried out. It is a pity there was no enemy."

"Were you accustomed to attack, in the dark, a position which had not been reconnoitered," asked the shade of Ney.

"No," replied Alexander, quickly, seeming to desire to end a discussion which might offend Captain Stark, "but my fighting was different."

"We may now be able to help our protégé," said Wellington, as Stark formed column on the road with scouting parties to the front and flanks.

"Orders do not permit us to get out of supporting distance," observed Gustavus Adolphus.

"Orders did not permit me to get out of Egypt," said Napoleon, with some sarcasm, "but I got out and never went back."

"I will not get out of reach of all the support I need from Colonel Jones," observed Captain Stark as he gave the signal for increasing the gait.

After the party had been riding for about an hour the shade of Fouché appeared coming back over the trail. He reported to Napoleon, saying that he had been present at a conference of insurgent officers, and had learned the location of their forces and had secured their plans. He had made a copy of the map they were using, and also of the written orders governing their plans, on a piece of asbestos. It was the intention of the insurgent commander to avoid contact with the combined forces, and to attack smaller bodies sent out to reconnoiter.

Napoleon took the map and the orders, studied them intently for a time, and then handed them to Alexander. The shades dropped behind and rode along together, conferring over the map and orders—all except Napoleon, who rode at one side of the trail alone. He was wrapped in the shades of thought. His face was sombre and expressionless.

"It is eight leagues to their position. The battle must be fought to-day. Push forward and get contact along their front," he directed.

About noon word was sent back by the advance that insurgent couriers were riding ahead, out of range.

"Push on rapidly and strike hard," urged Alexander.

Soon a river was reached with a wide channel and precipitous banks. Here the advance guard was greeted with a fierce volley from across the stream.

"Close up with half your forces, engage and hold their attention," said Napoleon.

Soon a troop, dismounted, was under cover along the bank, firing with spasmodic intensity at a line of stone trenches on the farther bank. The fire returned was terrific, the bullets giving the cracking sound of the Mauser, but nearly all passing harmlessly overhead. Gustavus Adolphus and Cæsar were everywhere, directing and advising upon the details of the frontal attack, contriving to give it a constant appearance of desperation. The trumpeters were moved down the stream with a platoon and the fire slackened at the first point of attack. With a great sounding of trumpets it opened again lower down, and the insurgents were sure an attempt would be made to cross below and were prepared to meet it.

In the meantime Captain Stark was prepared to ride rapidly up the stream with one troop, accompanied by Murat, Ney and Alexander. He first outlined his plan to Captain Stone, who was left in command at the crossing. Stark was to cross a few miles above, get between the enemy and his mountain stronghold, attack him on his flank and force him into the open country below.

It was a long, hard ride over rough ground and through tangled growth, but before long a suitable crossing was found. Alexander and Ney began a dispute over the best methods for crossing such streams, but soon Alexander noticed that Captain Stark and the troop were across, adjusting saddles after the swim. Telling Ney that the discussion would have to be resumed at another time, he urged Bucephalus into the stream and, followed by Ney, joined the command. Murat smiled and asked them if they had agreed, but he got no reply.

Captain Stone noticed that the enemy's fire had slackened and that he was leaving his trenches. He sent one platoon to rush across with their horses, while he kept down the enemy with a fire from the other. The platoon first across gained a part of the trenches, leaving its horses under the bank. The platoon opened fire and Stone crossed with the other platoon. The Americans had taken the trenches and were prepared to hold them.

The fields beyond were filled with confused, retreating

insurgents, upon whom a merciless fire was now poured by Captain Stone's troop.

The charge rang out from Captain Stark's troop, which suddenly appeared on the higher ground to the right. It was taken up by Stone, who swept down upon the enemy in his front.

Hemmed in, the insurgents sought to rally, but the fury of the ages was upon them. On the right of Captain Stark rode the shade of Alexander, and on his left those of Murat and Ney. Among the troopers with Stone towered the imperial Cæsar. Revolvers cracked and sabers flashed and fell, and fell again. On the high ground, near the trenches, the shade of Napoleon sat upon the shade of the horse which he rode at Austerlitz. He was watching the *melée*, calm and inscrutable. Gustavus Adolphus stood by his side, looking pensively upon the scene. A little apart was Wellington—a tinge of regret upon his countenance. These cavalrymen were charging over a sunken road, and doing it successfully.

Cries of "*tenga piedad!*" ("have mercy") came from hundreds of insurgents, now prostrate and terrified. The troops swept wide, cutting off all egress from the trap, and the firing ceased.

The fight had ended. Pasedena, with eight hundred riflemen, was taken. The field yielded three hundred dead and wounded.

"This was a case where the Lord was not on the side of the largest battalions," observed Napoleon.

Captain Stark withdrew a short distance from his men, and thanked the shades for their aid.

"It will be our pleasure to be present when you are rewarded," said Wellington. "Even the victory at Waterloo was not more complete, and destiny was master there."

"Mud was master," hotly rejoined Napoleon. "If there had been less mud I would have managed the destiny part of that battle."

"Well, let us not quarrel now over our laurels," remonstrated Wellington. "I admit that destiny's name might have been mud on that occasion."

"I must return home to-night, as Claudia and I are to entertain Xerxes and Horatius at a game of bridge," said Cæsar. "I propose that we meet Captain Stark at Sumilao and witness his reward for his remarkable fight."

"I also have an engagement," said Napoleon. "Czar Alexander has promised to give me a definite answer to a letter I sent him just before I crossed the Niemen. He had not quite decided last week what he would say."

Alexander was to dine with the Queen of Sheba. Gustavus Adolphus had some work to do on a military code which he was reviewing with Blackstone and Justinian. Murat was expected at a *bal masqué* given by Madame de Pompadour. So it was that the shades vanished for the time being.

Captain Stark dispatched an officer with an escort to carry a brief report to Colonel Jones, and then entered upon the work of collecting arms and caring for the wounded. A platoon was sent to the enemy's base of supplies a few miles back in the mountains, where it destroyed all buildings and stores, and captured the insurgent funds.

The officer sent to Colonel Jones returned before dawn with instructions for Captain Stark to bring all prisoners and arms to Sumilao. In a note the Colonel expressed gratification that his "carefully prepared plans" had been so faithfully and loyally carried out by the officers and men of his command.

The march back to Sumilao was slow and trying. The afternoon of the fourth day Captain Stark's column arrived at that town. Colonel Jones and his staff rode out to meet it and rode in at its head. The pack-train which had been sent to Stark toiled along, loaded down with arms, and behind came the prisoners carrying the wounded.

When the column had been dramatically dismissed by Colonel Jones, Captain Mitchell of the infantry, handed Stark a Manila paper, saying: "Here is some news for you."

Flaring headlines declared that Colonel Jones had destroyed the insurgents in the Island of Oanaduim in a short campaign which was marked at every stage by evidences of remarkable military genius. By his well known military skill he had pacified an island which had exasperated and

baffled the army for months. He was to be appointed a brigadier general at once as a reward for his work.

Then followed Jones's report, which detailed his preparations and the march to the insurgent position, and continued:

"During the night I made dispositions so as to attack the enemy's positions at daylight. The artillery opened a brisk cannonade at 5:30 o'clock in the morning. The infantry was sent forward in normal attack, its fire being very effective. The charge was ordered and the town taken at 6:30 o'clock. I conducted the charge personally. Without delay the cavalry was brought up in pursuit of the flying enemy. At 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon the last remnant of the insurgent force was surrounded and captured at Gusa River. The enemy's loss is 600 killed and wounded, and 1,600 captured. Large quantities of arms and stores were taken and destroyed.

"The victory was complete, and is due to the officers and men who so faithfully carried out the plans which I had made with much attention to detail. The campaign has convinced me that it requires merely intelligent field work to conquer these insurgents.

"I desire to commend to the attention of superior authority Captain Henry Scott, adjutant, and Captain John Williams, quartermaster. These officers showed great gallantry, remaining near me in the severest part of the action, and giving intelligent aid. All officers did their duty as they should."

Following this was this dispatch to Colonel Jones:

"Jones, Colonel, Sumilao:

"Report received. Although you modestly give credit to officers and men, it is plain you were the genius of campaign. Recommended you for brigadier general. Brilliant work always brings reward. Commendatory order to be issued.

"BOOTH,

"Brigadier General."

"I'll be damned!" said Stark in a resigned sort of manner.

"Don't; it hurts," advised the shade of Fouché, who had been looking over his shoulder and reading the article to the other shades.

Captain Stark suddenly realized that he was surrounded by the shades of the geniuses who had been in league with him.

"Well, how does the reward strike the allies of the ages?" asked Wellington.

"I never swear," remarked Gustavus Adolphus, turning away.

"There was never an artistic liar in France," declared Napoleon, speaking as though he was suddenly convinced.

"I have been sorry the library was burned," said Alexander, "but there is still hope. Myths may yet be written which will surpass all the priceless ones lost there."

"Look!" whispered Fouché, indicating Colonel Jones, who was passing near. Talleyrand and Richelieu were walking on either side of him. Both were looking askance at the shades of the illustrious generals, chuckling merrily.

"There is no such word as fail—when you go at it right," said Richelieu, *sotto voce*.

The illustrious military shades affected not to hear or see the merriment of their political friends, but Fouché called their attention to another, a stooping, bewhiskered shade following close behind Talleyrand. He called this shade to the group.

"Ananias, where have you been?" he asked.

"With the force of Colonel Jones," replied that most ancient prevaricator, looking from beneath shaggy brows with a sinister leer.

"Probably Judas Iscariot was detained at home by illness," suggested Wellington. "This has been a remarkable sequel, Captain Stark. We have given you our combined aid, and have failed. My advice to you is either to league yourself with the Devil, or become content with your present rank and clear conscience."

The shades vanished and have been seen no more on earthly battlefields.

There is little more to tell.

Colonel Jones was made a brigadier general. Captain Stark, constantly oversloughed by the selection of men of greater literary military attainments, was retired as senior captain of the army.

LES GRANDES MANŒUVRES.

By SAMUEL A. PURVIANCE, FIRST LIEUTENANT FOURTH CAVALRY.

THE French army maneuvers of 1905, or as they are commonly called, "The Grand Maneuvers," to distinguish them from the corps maneuvers which immediately precede them, were held in the country around Brienne, about 150 miles east of Paris, commencing September 8th.

In the vicinity of the little town of Brienne le Chateau, which was the early school-place of the great Napoleon, were quartered over 100,000 French troops of all arms, with the usual swarm of camp followers of all conditions.

These troops were divided into two armies, approximately equal in numbers: Army A, or the Army of the North, under the command of Major-General Hagron, which was quartered in Chavanges and in other villages to the north of Brienne, and Army B, or the Army of the South, commanded by Major-General Dessirrier, which was quartered in Brienne and other towns and villages to the south of Brienne.

The general situation throughout the maneuvers was that Army A represented a hostile force which had crossed the frontier and was marching on Paris, while Army B was sent out from Paris to check and drive back the invaders. The only distinguishing mark between the two forces was that the invading forces wore white caps instead of the usual red caps of the French soldiers, so in speaking of the different movements of the troops, we shall use the term "Red" for the Southern forces and "White" for the Northern forces.

On September 7th, a companion and myself who had been spending part of our leave in Paris, took the morning train, and after a rather tedious ride, arrived at Brienne le Chateau late in the afternoon. On going to a small inn near the

station we were told that it, in fact both of the local inns, were filled, and that every house in town was crowded with officers and soldiers.

This was not encouraging, and as we walked down the main street on our quest for quarters, the outlook seemed hopeless, as every large house, stable or building of any kind was filled with soldiers, while the smaller cottages bore notices on the front door saying that they were reserved for such and such officers.

As we spoke only a little French of the café brand, with a strong Kansas accent, our progress was slow and it took us some time to go down the main street, but we eventually finished without finding any unoccupied room. We then tried the other street (there are two streets in Brienne, crossing at right angles so that one can leave town in any direction) and finally found a small room which we promptly took for the week at a regular war time price.

The street was crowded with soldiers coming back from the day's maneuver, and we strolled along it watching the different regiments march by until we reached the public square where a band concert was going on.

Here we were fortunate in meeting the war correspondent of one of the leading London newspapers, who not only gave us the program for the next day's maneuvers, but also offered to show us where the only good restaurant in town was to be found.

As we have always found war correspondents to be good foragers as well as good fellows, we gladly accepted his offer and accompanied him to a small inn where for three francs we obtained a good table d'hôte dinner and a bottle of very fair claret; and here we spent several very pleasant hours listening to reminiscences of the Soudan, South Africa and Manchuria, from our companion who had followed the English flag in several wars, and had just returned from Manchuria where he had been for some months with the Japanese forces.

After dinner, he put us still further in his debt by offering to take us to the maneuvers the following day in his automobile. So bright and early next morning we were dashing along the road leading north from Brienne towards

Rosnay, where the first contact was expected. As we passed through the country we saw that it was an ideal one for maneuver purposes, being a farming country, with no fences to impede the progress of troops, and while fairly level and open, contained enough hills and forests to vary the terrain and conceal the movements of the troops.

As we moved along the road we passed different parts of the Red forces on their way to the front; first some infantry, then a battery, then some more infantry, and as we neared Rosnay we saw a battery climbing a large hill to the left of the road; and as the time and place seemed a favorable one from which to witness the opening of the conflict, we left the automobile alongside the road and followed the battery up the hill.

On reaching the top, we found we had indeed struck the proper place to watch the opening of the day's fight, as we were on the spur of a long ridge which afforded a view in all directions.

Back of us, just below the crest of the hill, the Red battery was opening fire on a hostile battery on a wooded ridge about 2500 yards to our right front.

Further down on the military crest of the ridge, and concealed by a hedge, was a regiment of Red infantry. Far out in front were the mounted scouts feeling for the enemy, while with our glasses we could see a large body of the Red cavalry moving rapidly on our right flank in an endeavor to outflank the invading force.

It was a beautiful panorama of a well planned and well executed movement, and we watched eagerly for coming developments.

We have seen map problems so ruthlessly blue penciled by instructors at our service schools; we have heard all the movements of the day so fully criticised by the umpires in the big tent at our maneuvers, and we have read the long range criticisms on actual engagements by the writers of our yellow journals, till we have grown skeptical and come to believe that perfection in military movements was to be found only in novels or on the comic opera stage.

But here before us seemed to be the beginning of an ideal movement, and our hearts beat high with hope which even as we watched was dashed to the ground. A brigade of infantry marched up and leaving the road, where it had been sheltered by a low ridge and a fringe of trees, marched across an open plain straight at the hostile battery, which turned its guns upon it with full force.

The brigade marched in line of quarter columns to within 900 yards of the battery, and then formed two lines and continued the advance in close order, with the men shoulder to shoulder and about three yards intervals between the companies, and the supporting line about sixty yards in rear of the firing line. The movement was beautifully executed and the maneuvering of the different units was splendid; but we shudder to think of the terrible losses a conscientious Fort Riley umpire would have inflicted on that brigade.

However, as no such personage was present, the line moved up to within 800 yards of the battery and opened fire, whereat the battery promptly left for the rear, and the brigade continued its march up to the ridge just vacated by the battery.

On reaching the crest of the ridge, it came under fire of another battery on its left front and a heavy infantry fire all along a ridge directly in front of the one the brigade occupied and about 900 yards away.

It was apparent that this ridge was the main position of the White Army, so we left our hill and started towards the road to get a closer view of the coming struggle, passing several Red regiments who were marching to the front to form on the left flank of the brigade which had advanced. We reached our car and soon passed through the advanced troops and halted on the crest of the ridge in the center of the White position.

There was a battery in position on each side of the road and long lines of infantry lining the ridge as far as one could see.

As the advanced brigade of the Reds had withdrawn below the crest of their ridge and their supporting troops had not yet come up, there was a lull in the firing, and we seized

the opportunity to open our lunch basket and refresh the inner man; but we had not finished a hasty lunch before the battle was raging in full force around us, the Reds making a frontal attack combined with a flanking movement towards the right flank of the White Army, which was slowly and stubbornly falling back, when the movements for the day were stopped by the chief umpire, the troops having come to actual contact.

The troops bivouacked on the field, and the next morning resumed the maneuvers from the positions they held at the close of the day. Having heard that General Dessirrier would move first against the invader's left flank, we took the road leading to Chavanges and arrived there just in time to see the opening attack.

The Whites held the town and the ridge to the west of it in force, but the Reds concentrated their artillery fire on the position and then moved their infantry forward in such numbers that the Whites were forced back on their reserves, which occupied the high ground near Margarie Hancourt. Here for twenty minutes the firing was terrific, the two forces being only about 400 yards apart, and both infantry and artillery using rapid fire. The Red force then charged all along the line, but the umpires at this point sounded "cease firing," and decided that the White force had been defeated.

Hearing that there was a cavalry fight about to come off over towards the west, we got in the car and rapidly moved towards the outer flank, but were too late to see the fight, which had resulted in the Red cavalry being driven back by the White cavalry, supported by some artillery.

We then started back towards the center of the position, where we arrived just in time to witness a dashing charge by the White cavalry in a gallant effort to save their center, which was being forced back from the heights they had held for two days. It was a magnificent sight, as squadron after squadron went by, dragoons, lancers, hussars and cuirassiers, in long lines with helmets, sabers and lances gleaming in the bright sunlight and their horses at a full gallop.

They charged in successive lines, passed their own infantry, and on right up to the guns and infantry of the Reds;

and at this point the balloon, which was the signal for the termination of the day's maneuvers rose over the battlefield, and we started towards Brienne.

The following day the Army of the South was ordered to fall back on Troyes, at the same time holding the invading army north of the Aube as long as possible without incurring heavy losses. This was a rather difficult task, as both the Voire and Aube Rivers would have to be crossed in the face of a strong and presumably victorious army. To accomplish this, General Dessirrier sent his cavalry well out on his left flank to hold the bridge over the Aube and protect his line of retreat, while he placed a strong rear guard of infantry and artillery on the high ground north of the Voire and west of Rosnay, with orders to hold the position to cover the retreat of the army and transport.

The position was a strong one, but by a clever feint and skillful handling of his troops, General Hagron was in possession of the ridge in a few hours.

The Reds were at first equally distributed along the top of the ridge, but as the enemy was seen moving in large numbers toward their right flank, it was supposed that the attack would fall on that point, and troops were detached from the center and left flank to strengthen the threatened point.

When a considerable number of troops had been thus taken away, General Hagron suddenly hurled a brigade of infantry at the weakened lines and the Reds were forced back from the ridge into the valley, while the victorious Whites poured a heavy fire into them as they retreated across the plain towards Troyes, and then started down the valley to harass the retreating troops.

As we were on our way home we met the right flank of the Red rear guard, which was falling back on the road to Brienne in good order, with a battery and a regiment of dragoons holding in check the advancing Whites, while from the west came the sound of heavy firing where General Dessirrier's cavalry was covering the crossing of the infantry over the bridges of the Aube.

The retreat had been made in good order and was well conducted throughout, but the honors of the day belonged to General Hagron, whose victorious troops marched into Brienne and were soon quartered in the buildings vacated that morning by the Army of the South, and that night we saw new faces and uniforms on the streets and in the cafés of the town.

The movements on the last day were made short and spectacular in order to enable the troops to be assembled and reviewed by the President and to afford a spectacle for the thousands of spectators who poured in from all directions by special trains.

The Army of the South continued its retreat along the Brienne-Troyes road closely pursued by General Hagron, and a running fight was kept up till the crossroads north of Piney were reached, and here the signal for the cessation of hostilities was given; the troops were drawn up on both sides of the road while the President of the Republic, M. Loubet, in his automobile, with the tricolors, the commander-in-chief General Brugere, with his staff, and accompanied by the foreign military attachés, rode along the lines. And so the grand maneuvers of 1905 were brought to an end.

We cannot lay down our pen without paying some slight tribute to one whose work throughout the maneuvers continually impressed us and filled us with admiration, and yet whose name does not appear in the official reports or newspapers, *i. e.*, the soldier in the ranks.

Those of us who have seen the French soldier around the streets of Paris, and have noticed his ill-fitting uniform and rather slight, unmilitary figure have probably wondered what sort of a field soldier he would make, and whether he would be able to stand the hard work of an active campaign.

Any doubts of this sort will be speedily settled by a few days attendance at the maneuvers, and the spectator will be filled with admiration at the wonderful marching powers of the French infantryman.

The weather during the maneuvers was quite warm, yet the troops clad in heavy woolen clothing with a long coat reaching to their knee and carrying a heavy pack and equip-

ment, would march often from 5 o'clock in the morning till 5 in the afternoon, and come back marching through the streets of the town apparently as fresh as when they marched out, with their ranks closed up and no stragglers.

The cavalry are well mounted on stock that is bred by the government for the purpose of providing cavalry mounts, and the men ride and handle their horses in a manner that shows them to be well trained horsemen.

Some new features that we noticed were the presence of an automobile and a bicycle corps, the latter being quite numerous, and equipped with a bicycle that could be taken apart and packed on the soldier's back in a few minutes.

The other branches of the service, such as engineers, medical corps, etc., are organized and equipped very much in the same manner as in our own service, and need no special mention.

The maneuvers were conducted in about the same way as our own field maneuvers, with the exception that the French use close order formations in all their movements, and did not seem to attach much importance to taking cover when under fire, which enables the movements to be made more rapidly and in a more spectacular manner, but we doubt whether either officers or men obtain as much benefit and information as they would if they used the methods which troops of the present day must necessarily adopt in actual warfare.

LES GRANDES MANOEUVRES 1905



PREFECTURE OU SOUS-PREFECTURE.



CHEF-LIEU DE CANTON



Commune



Hameau

Chemin de Fer

Station

Route Nationale


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
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THE MODERN WOODMEN OF AMERICA.

BY CAPTAIN HERBERT A. WHITE, ELEVENTH CAVALRY.

A CERTAIN regiment on its return from the Islands a year or so ago participated in the Decoration Day ceremonies in one of our Western cities. As the line stood at rest along the sidewalk watching the various National Guard and civic organizations march by to take up their positions in rear, two squads of sixteen men each, carrying axes, passed. "What are those squads," the regular officers asked of one another, and the suggestion by one was taken as correct, that they must belong to the Chief Knockers' Club. If we think for a moment of the old line insurance companies and the knocks they are at present getting from fraternal insurance societies, we see that the above remark was not far amiss.

It is not the purpose of this article to more than hastily compare fraternal insurance with what may be called business insurance, and that only to judge whether fraternal insurance is a good enough business proposition to live long enough to be of value as a life investment. After this short review, it is intended to discuss the military features of one fraternal insurance society, viz., the Modern Woodmen of America.

Just at present an examination of life insurance is likely to be somewhat colored by the soot of the New York investigations. However we should remember that abuses do not determine the uses of anything. I should like to believe that there are some old line companies that are being run honestly. One of the lamentable features of the New York muddle is the loss of faith in public men. If we cannot trust such men as those connected with the large insurance

companies, where are we to find the men that can be depended upon while this trail of graft is encircling all business? It looks very much as if American civilization was not able to produce manhood capable of withstanding the glitter of money and power. The erection of million dollar homes, the buying and selling of stocks between two firms when the directors of the two firms are the same persons, seem to be a temptation that Americanism cannot withstand. For we have little reason to believe that any man in our body politic could withstand it when we recall the prominence and the evident trustworthiness of the men that have fallen. And I am not sure that I use the word fallen advisedly, for it is doubtful if the people particularly care for what is constructive fraud. I quote here from the last edition of Markby's "Elements of Law," where the author is speaking of the tendency of modern legislation: "I am inclined to think that the disgrace of a criminal conviction, which is an important part of punishment, has diminished, especially in certain cases, for example, as the conviction of directors of a large company for fraud." If such a deep student of the trend of affairs as Sir William Markby comes to such conclusions, it is time for all of us to wonder what the modern business drift is.

If publicity will be nothing more than an intermediate sanction there would seem to be but one solution for the difficulty: publish monthly reports of directors and officials, with penal laws compelling imprisonment for non-compliance, capable of being set in motion by any policy-holder. It may be said there are laws capable of this now, but let us have such as can be readily enforced. It would certainly seem that we are on the threshold of a considerable readjustment of the domain of life insurance companies.

Life insurance may be of two kinds, as before intimated: insurance pure and simple, which is the field of most fraternal societies, and insurance as an investment, which is the method of most of the old line companies. Now, life insurance costs a certain amount. What this amount is can be quite correctly and definitely estimated by use of mortuary tables, and so a company or society starting to-day can figure quite accurately on rates. Insurance men say that when many of

the fraternal societies were organized the cost of insurance was not scientifically determined. A guess was made at what would be a fair rate, and this was made the basis of future assessments. Moreover, many of them adopted a flat rate based upon the age of the insured when he entered the organization, and this rate was never increased. If the insured paid sixty cents a month for each thousand dollars of insurance when he entered the organization at the age of twenty-five he continued to pay that amount and only that till he died.

This was the method adopted by the Army Mutual Aid.

Now this will be all right for the first few years of an organization, especially when old men are not admitted and the consequent death rate is low. But the time must come when the original members and the admissions of the first few years become old and die, and then the cost of insurance will be greater than the revenues. Moreover, the time will come to any organization when there will be practically no increase in membership. This is true even of the Modern Woodmen of America, which organization now numbers some 740,000, and is still increasing. When that time comes the death rate will be large, so large that it will be necessary to secure more money from the policy-holders. The flat rate plan will in time swamp any organization. The weakness of the flat rate plan has been foreseen by some societies in time to change to a progressive rate system before the tornado broke. It was this change in rates that threatened to disrupt the Royal Arcanum. Their advance in rates has attracted the attention of the whole country, but some societies have changed long enough beforehand to have the adoption of the progressive rate quietly done and without danger to the society. The Modern Woodmen have not yet adopted the progressive rate, but have increased their original rates appreciably. The only safe way to conduct a fraternal insurance company is to adopt the progressive rate system, thereby charging every man what it costs to insure him.

Of course change of rate produces irritation and danger of disruption. Take the Army Mutual Aid, which did busi-

ness, and I believe does yet, on a current cost basis.* The current cost for the first twenty or twenty-five years is much less than the average cost for a whole life term. The difference between the current cost and the average cost has been left in the pockets of the members instead of in the safe of the treasurer of the society. As stated above, insurance costs a certain definite amount. If less than this amount has been paid in in years past it must now be made up. But in making this up the company finds most of its members ignorant of these simple laws, and the kick results. The draft on the pocket reserve causes trouble. The member is called upon to put up for the next fifteen to twenty years what should have been distributed evenly over his whole life expectancy. The member has been honestly dealt with in the past, and is now being honestly dealt with in the increase of rates. In the past the money that the society will soon need has been left in the pockets of the members.

While fraternal societies have generally been charging too low rates, what have the old line companies been charging? It may be somewhat more difficult to definitely determine rates in investment insurance than in straight insurance, but enough has been shown by the late investigations to lead to a conviction that the old line companies have been charging their policy-holders a great deal too much. Franklin Giddings, of Columbia College, making a special study of insurance, has this to say: "Roughly speaking, the payment of \$200 a year in premiums to an insurance company by a man forty years of age, and in good health, buys an insurance of the face value of \$5,000. A examination of the finances of the great New York companies, as made public in the recent disclosures, and a comparison of them

*The writer has just received a short letter from General Geo. B. Davis, Judge Advocate General of the Army, who has always taken the greatest interest in the Army Mutual Aid. He remarks as follows: "The committee which was appointed to look into the matter of rates to be adopted by the Army Mutual Aid is going into the matter pretty deeply. We find that the only basis upon which a set of rates can securely rest is one which will insure each member getting \$3,000 at his death and will also insure the last man, if there ever is one, getting the same sum when he pulls out. We have never been on such a basis, and the sooner we settle on it the better."

with the finances of the life insurance systems of a country like New Zealand, where the business is honestly managed by the state, indicates that a premium of \$200 ought to secure an insurance of between \$10,000 and \$15,000."

This has been disputed by some. But I believe it nearer the truth than the statements of Giddings' disputants. It must be dangerous to economy to have vast amounts in the hands of a few men who hold themselves practically responsible to no one, and whose integrity is so benumbed that they consider it not only a proper but a laudable act to use trust funds to purchase elections and lobby Legislatures. I consider the money paid by policy-holders as a trust fund, especially in mutual companies, and if such funds are to be used as certain directors see fit with no accounting, or false accounting, one must wonder where life insurance will end.*

Being satisfied that old line insurance has been too high and fraternal insurance too low, I believe there is a happy medium that will secure to both company and policy holder good business investments. I hope to see this medium taken up by some existing organization, and I know of none better fitted for the work than the Modern Woodmen of America. Now, while life insurance is being studied and the entire subject is attracting the attention of our whole people, let the Woodmen take up the matter, readjust their system, and start on a business as well as on a fraternal basis. While the appointing of prominent men as heads and committees of the old line companies may do much to wash them out and make them clean, I believe the people at large are so disgusted with them that they are ready to respond to a fraternal organization that offers security.

The Modern Woodmen of America, which, I believe, is to-day the largest fraternal insurance society in the world, was organized at Lyons, Iowa, January 5, 1883, with twenty-one charter members. To-day the order has more than 11,000 camps with a membership of 740,000. The growth of the order has been truly marvellous.

*The writer wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness for some of the matter above given to the *A. O. U. W. Bulletin* and the *Daily Review* of Chicago.

The society works under a charter granted by the State of Illinois May 5, 1884. The conditions of the charter make it necessary that the head office of the society be located in Illinois. Fulton was first selected as the location, but it was changed in 1897 to Rock Island, where it has since remained.

In the Modern Woodmen society the expense of management is met out of a general fund, created by a per capita tax of one dollar, collected annually from each member. From the general fund thus collected the management of the society have saved enough to erect a magnificent head office building costing \$150,000. An addition to this office, doubling its floor space, costing \$145,000, and like the main building, erected without any special tax on the membership, is now being completed. The buildings of the head office are, of course, at Rock Island, Illinois. Besides the ordinary expenses of management, and such extraordinary expenditures as the construction of the head office and annex, the expenses of holding the triennial State and Head Camp meetings are defrayed out of the general fund. Mileage and per diem are paid all delegates to these meetings by the society, and, as there are thirty-seven State and Territorial meetings, attended by over 4500 delegates, and a Head Camp attended by several hundred delegates from all the States, the disbursements on this account usually foot close to \$75,000 annually, on the average.

The society is, in its government, truly representative. Every law made for the society's government must be approved by the delegates elected by the members. The law-making body meets once in three years. The manner of selecting delegates to the body known as the Head Camp is as follows:

The local Woodmen Camps, within each county, select delegates to a County Camp, the basis of representation being one delegate for each twenty-five members or major fraction thereof. The County Camps elect delegates to the State Camps, the basis of representation being one delegate for each 500 members residing within the county. The State Camps elect delegates to the Head Camp, or supreme law-

making body, one delegate for each 1500 members residing in each State or Territory.

These Head Camp delegates, elected in the manner described, make the laws and dictate the policy of the society, subject to the instructions given them by the State Camps, which instructions the delegates must obey.

The finances of the organization are guarded by a system of checks intended to make successful fraud impossible. All moneys received by the Head Clerk are deposited *daily* to the credit of the Head Banker. The receipts of the Head Clerk are published monthly in the official paper, and these receipts must correspond with the amounts transferred to the Head Banker, of which the latter makes monthly report. The Head Banker can pay out no moneys except upon benefit and general fund orders, signed by at least three members of the Board of Directors, the Head Consul and the Head Clerk. All claims against the society are reviewed by the Board of Directors, which allows or rejects on merit. Not a cent can be drawn from the funds of the society except upon the order of the Board of Directors, made after consideration of each claim.

Such being the organic constitution of the society, let us see who can become members. To be eligible for beneficial* membership, a person must be a white male, of sound mind and body, of good moral character, not addicted to any bad habits, and over 18 years of age and under 45. If over 41 years of age a person can secure no more than \$2000 insurance. There are five policies that may be taken, \$500, \$1000, \$1500, \$2000, \$3000, this insurance being payable at death to the beneficiaries.

The by-laws of the Modern Woodmen society do not permit the admission to either beneficial or social membership of persons engaged in the manufacture or sale of malt, spirituous or vinous liquors to be used as a beverage, either in the capacity of proprietor, stockholder, agent or servant. Members of the society engaging in the liquor traffic in any

*A social member is required to pay an admission fee of \$5.00, and thereafter small annual dues. He has all the fraternal privileges of membership and may secure sick benefits. But he does not carry insurance.

capacity, by such act forfeit all rights as members, and their contract of membership becomes absolutely null and void. Also, if members are convicted of any misdemeanor, crime or felony, the punishment for which may be imprisonment in the penitentiary, they forfeit their membership upon conviction. The morality and respectability of its membership are carefully guarded and are the pride of the society. I shall have occasion to speak of this later on under the head of the discipline of their military organizations. The society exercises a peculiar watchfulness over its members in the matter of occupations in which they may engage. Some fifty occupations are classed as hazardous, and persons engaged in these cannot become members, and if, after becoming members they engage in these employments, the society is relieved from all liability if death occurs by reason of such employment. This exclusion operates to maintain a minimum loss rate, thus reducing the cost of insurance.

By a late law members engaging in certain of the hazardous occupations may, by applying for and receiving a new certificate and paying the additional cost of the extra hazard, continue valid their insurance. Persons not now members engaged in certain of the lesser hazardous occupations are eligible to membership in the extra hazardous class at a rate adequate to cover the extra hazard of their occupation.

Persons engaged in the naval or military service are in the excluded list of occupations, but in this regard the attitude of the society is shown by the action of the Board of Directors during the Spanish War and the ratification thereof by the Head Camp afterwards. Thousands of the Woodmen volunteered for service during the Spanish War, and although the laws of the society provided, as stated above, that the benefit certificate of such a member would be invalidated during time of war, the Head Consul, acting upon the advice of the Executive Council, waived this provision of the by-laws, and the society paid more than \$100,000 to the beneficiaries of the members who as soldiers laid down their lives in defense of the flag during the Spanish-American War. This action of the Executive Council was ratified

with rounding cheers when its report was made to the next Head Camp and its approval requested for the same.

Now what is the military feature of this society and why is it possible for the Head Consul to say that "should our country be menaced by a foreign foe and the President call for volunteers to defend the flag, the Modern Woodmen of America could assemble at Chicago 50,000 well drilled uniformed men ready to lay down their lives for the country?" The ritualistic work of the society provides for a uniformed team to assist in the initiatory work. The team became not only an adjunct for the proper exemplification of the work, but for its proper presentation absolutely indispensable, working together under one Chief Forester, who originally was appointed on his qualifications for ritualistic work only. In one respect this condition still continues. Every team captain (Chief Forester) even when of national reputation, is still a ritualistic officer, administering an obligation and aiding in delivering lectures in the exemplification of the work of adoption. The ritual provides for a uniformed team to assist in the initiatory work, and because the ritual was for Woodmen, one scene depicting the candidate in the forest, the team came to be called foresters. The work had progressed but little before the advantage of a uniform for the teams was discovered, and each team proceeded to adopt its own. Invariably, at first, this was that of an ordinary woodman in the forest. No attempt at military discipline or drill was made. But soon the floor work being better exemplified by the aid of concerted movements a little of the military crept in. From the first appearance in public until the present time the effort has been to make the uniforms conform more and more to the military. Many, if not the majority, have a uniform of khaki, and those teams that have the money and desire more showy uniforms have an additional one for dress functions and competitive drills.

I might pause here and state that as one of the judges at the national competitive drills last June at Milwaukee, the teams that came onto the field in khaki invariably looked worse and dirtier than any other of the competing teams. This would have been enough to convince me, had I not

already known it, that the khaki uniform cannot be made a dress uniform, and its service to us is exactly in line with the reason of its adoption, a working uniform and not one that we expect a soldier ever to appear in except for designated duty. Of course the dress uniforms now are of all colors and designs, but 2000 or 3000 men in regimental review make a very pretty, even if unusual sight, in the showy dress. It is variegated, and to see these totally different uniformed teams pass by in street parade appears queer, but to



MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN H. MITCHELL,
Commanding M. W. A. Foresters.

see them in division review or battalion drill is another matter.

At first the Chief Foresters made up drills of their own, or adopted them from military or other organizations. Next came claims from different camps of the superiority of the drill of their particular team, which in time led to local drill competition. From this sprang district contests, and finally at the Head Camp arrangements were made for

offering a single set of prizes for national team prize drills. Such teams as came at first, few in number, were there simply for a few hours, usually putting on a parade in the streets during the day, the competitive drill occurring in the evening. At the Head Camp in Kansas City in 1899, there were present and competing some nineteen teams. It was observed by head officers that these few hours of meeting were not greatly benefiting to the Foresters' interests or their efficiency, and so the matter was taken up by the Head Camp,


and it directed that a committee be appointed to consider the matter of drill regulations. The committee reported a drill manual which was approved and adopted. The teams soon became the public feature of the Head Camps. The first encampment of the Woodmen Foresters was held at St. Paul, Minn., in 1901. This encampment was to be in charge of General J. N. Reese, of Springfield, Ill., but serious illness preventing him attending, his Adjutant General, J. H. Mitchell, was appointed temporary commander, and on the death of General Reese, Adjutant General Mitchell was appointed Major General, commanding Foresters, a position which he has since held with the greatest credit to himself and benefit to the society.

For the St. Paul encampment General Reese had appointed as staff some Chief Foresters, a few of whom had had experience in the National Guard or Volunteers. This staff met at Rock Island prior to the encampment and made the arrangements. Some 1600 Foresters reported for encampment duty. Taken as a whole, even the team commanders were without military experience of any kind or nature, and few of them had ever seen a battalion formation. This was also true of a portion of the staff. The teams upon reporting for duty were divided into provisional battalions, and commanders appointed. This idea is still adhered to in all cases where the teams were not enabled to report in permanent battalion formation, as many teams from large cities were. At this first encampment morning inspection and other matters of camp routine were not upon military principles, and but one military idea was carried out and preserved with any marked degree of success, and that was discipline.

By the officers of the society, however, the St. Paul encampment in its results was deemed so satisfactory that the Forestry encampment idea was continued as an auxiliary to the Head Camp. So the second encampment of uniformed Foresters was at Camp Reese, Indianapolis, in 1903. At this encampment permanent battalions first made their appearance; sentry duty was begun; the battalions, both permanent and provisional, were divided into brigades; bugle calls, which at St. Paul had been a form, controlled and di-

rected as in a military encampment; morning inspection began; a stand of colors had been provided, including brigade guidons and markers, and were used. This camp was a great improvement upon the previous one.

The favorable newspaper notoriety given Camp Reese attracted the attention of the Louisiana Exposition authorities and caused them to offer inducements far beyond those presented to any other organization to secure the encampment of the M. W. A. Foresters at the World's Fair. Camp Talbot upon the Exposition grounds was the result. In at-




VIEW OF PORTION OF CAMP HAWES, MILWAUKEE, JUNE, 1905.

tendance and in some of its work it was a decidedly marked improvement upon the preceding encampment, but it fell far below what was still desired and hoped for by the commanding officer. In justice to the Foresters some notes as to Camp Talbot might be made. Theirs was the first and only parade during the opening of the Exposition that formed and moved on the time designated. The Chief Inspector of the Exposition placed the discipline of the Foresters as decidedly superior to that of any similar organization. When the prize drills upon the plaza drew enormous crowds, the members of the teams not drilling were used as guards to

keep the people from mingling with and interfering with the drilling teams. This was done satisfactorily and well, and without friction with the spectators.

Camp Hawes at Milwaukee in June, 1905, showed an increase in attendance and an advancement in efficiency. The instruction of former encampments was felt through the staff, brigades, battalions and teams. The engraving shows a part of the camp, but fails to show it in full, or give an adequate idea of its size, and, in spite of excessive rains, its neatness. Teams from all parts of the United States arrived



HOSPITAL DETACHMENT, M. W. A. FORESTERS.

and quietly went into camp without friction or confusion. Almost full military routine was found by the judges. Bugle calls sounded for formations and calls, morning inspection took place every day, sentry duty was well performed; there was found work by a signal corps; a trained hospital corps, with a completely equipped hospital was established, and dress parade by brigades, and division reviews took place in the evenings after the competitive drills for the day were over. The writer was very much struck by the proficiency displayed by the teams the night of the First Brigade parade and review. It took some time to get the teams into place, as



DIVISION REVIEW, M. W. A. FORESTERS, MILWAUKEE, JUNE, 1905.

there were some eighteen or twenty teams to get into line. The following night the Second Brigade, having the advantage of having watched the First the evening before, swung into place with ease and regularity. The park at Milwaukee, though large, was not large enough to accommodate a division in line, so the brigades formed one behind the other and the rear one came into review after the front one passed.

The team of Foresters consists of sixteen men. Sometimes a camp will have a team of only twelve men, but as a competing team of this number loses five points out of a total of one hundred, there are no teams of twelve men that report for competitive drill at a national encampment. Some local camps that are small have what are called pony teams, which consist of eight men.

For prize drills the teams are arranged as follows: The senior class, the junior class, the pony class and the battalion class. Any team in the organization may compete in the senior class. No team that has won a prize at a national encampment can compete in the junior class. Pony teams are unrestricted and so are the battalions, the latter being either permanent or provisional.

The judges for the drill are invariably selected from officers of the regular army. This selection at present is made by one of the Directors of the society, Mr. E. E. Murphy, of Leavenworth, who has an extensive army acquaintance. They number nine, and are divided into committees of three each, one committee taking the senior teams, another the juniors, and the third the pony and battalion teams. At Milwaukee some thirty to thirty-five teams competed in each the senior and junior classes, and a less number in the pony and battalion classes. A committee of judges would finish about ten teams a day, each team occupying at least twenty-five minutes.

The drill of the senior teams was almost perfection. The drill is modeled on the infantry drill regulations, with many fancy movements additional. In this class, teams would vary only by a small fraction of one per cent. St. Paul lost to Joliet by the stumbling of one man on slippery ground, so close was the competition. In the junior classes the competition was

not so close. The winning team carried off four hundred dollars; the second, three hundred; the third, two hundred, and other money prizes were awarded as far down as the seventh team. The money prizes in the junior class were somewhat smaller and were about the same as for the pony and battalion classes. About five thousand dollars was given in prizes.

As for the discipline of the Foresters I must say it passed my expectations. Military courtesy was marked in every particular, from the salute of the lowest private to the reports of the Adjutant General to his superior. Not the slightest grumbling was heard from a single man or team during the close competition, and when a protest was entered it was done in the most formal and military way. Of course, in speaking of the Woodmen we are speaking of the men that form the backbone of our country, the great industrious middle class, so it is almost needless to state that drunkenness and rowdiness were absolutely absent from the camp.

There is a woman's organization in connection with the Woodmen called the Royal Neighbors, that bears, I suppose, some such relation to the order that the Eastern Star does to the Masonic Lodge. So when the members come to a national encampment they come with their families. So one would expect a good state of discipline, but when one considers some fifty or sixty thousand visitors in a city as large as Milwaukee, it could easily be expected that the mayor and his force might be busy. Such, however, was not the case; and I do not recall the sight of one drunken or boisterous Forester during my stay with them at Milwaukee.

The Modern Woodmen of America, Foresters' Department, is a combination of military discipline with complete home rule. The camp elects the Venerable Consul and he appoints the Chief Forester. No Chief can retain his position except as he is satisfactory to his camp. This close connection of these teams with the home camp has always been maintained, and with this the present head of the Foresters has endeavored to accomplish certain measures of military advancement. His idea is that the Woodmen shall have a certain number of fairly well drilled men to serve as the

second line of defense when the nation is in trouble. And a second line that will be of far greater value than the ordinary undrilled, undisciplined American. This has certainly been done. The principles of discipline are familiar to these men, something of drill has been taught them, and instruction in camp work is not now new to them. A regimental commander finding some of these Foresters in his command at the time of rapid concentration will have a help that will be most acceptable and useful.

We were pleased to find a number of our old friends of the National Guard as officers in the Foresters. Their experience in the Guard and in active service in the Spanish War and in the Islands has been of great help in getting the organization in shape so rapidly. Their interest speaks well for their military inclination and patriotism.

Army officers of the regular establishment should remember that our Republic still depends, and always will, upon its citizen soldiery in time of war. Our duty is to have the small number at our command so instructed that they can form instructors for the mass of uninstructed or partially instructed, or else form the first line of defense that sustains a waiting action until the second line can be formed in its full strength. A close, familiar knowledge with civic organizations that have military features, giving them when they desire the best of our training and experience, is not only a question of personal taste or policy, but one of duty, imposed upon us by patriotism. If we are imbued with the proper spirit of love for our country, realizing that some day the armed force may be the last safeguard of our nation, we will do all that we can to foster military knowledge and virtue among our people.

THE SEA GIRT COMPETITION RESULTS.

THE low standing of the Cavalry Team (eleventh place) at the national shoot this year brings us to a realization that something must be done to place the team up among the first. What was the reason of the low standing this year? The team of 1905 made some forty points more than the team of the year before, yet occupied eleventh place, while the 1904 team was fourth. Have the State teams methods of instruction that are better than those in use in the regular army? Have they this or that, or what is the reason of the low record of the Cavalry Team?

With the idea of finding out, if possible, the reason of the drop, the JOURNAL has asked opinions of many of our best shots in the army, and publish these opinions for the benefit of the Association. We state that the articles are by men whose opinions upon the subject of shooting deserve the highest consideration, and that each article has been written by one who has contested at Sea Girt within the last two or three years. We believe a careful study of these articles will do much to raise the standard in the service and better conditions for the national match.

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THE COMPETITION RESULTS.

The national match of 1905 was won by New York, with the Army Infantry Team second, and the Army Cavalry Team in eleventh place, though the total score of the latter team was some fifty points better than that of 1904, when the cavalry won fourth place.

The match was shot under trying conditions of weather and range. Under favorable range conditions, the variable weather conditions would have been equally trying for all

teams, and would have served as a good test of marksmanship. As it was, however, with insufficient targets to permit of all teams firing simultaneously at each range, there was some element of luck.

We are all interested in the army teams, and hope for their success, but it is doubtful if they can win against the best State teams unless some conditions are changed.

In the first place, the army teams are selected from men who have just finished two gruelling competitions, where each individual is under a great strain and working entirely upon his own responsibility. Some practice as a team is always necessary in order to compare the guns, so there is no period of rest between the army and national competitions. The results of this long continued strain and consequent over-training of both army teams showed, especially in their rapid fire and skirmish firing, both in 1904 and 1905. The figures are not at hand, but the team scores in the national matches of both years were much below the total scores of the same men in the army matches of the same year.

The winning team this year was selected after a competition in the national match course. Our teams are selected after a materially different course. It is entirely possible that a man could win a place on an army team who could do nothing at long range on account of faulty vision. This handicap could be removed by making the courses for division and army competitions the same as the national match course. This change seems a logical one to make, as it is hardly just to designate the army teams as the best shots in the army when they have won their places in a course that does not comprise firing at all the ranges used in the regular target practice. I believe it is a fact that one year the first place on the Army Cavalry Team was won by a man who had not up to that time been able to make sharpshooter owing to faulty vision.

The army teams are usually much more poorly equipped for range work than the State teams. This is largely due to the fact that the teams are organized at the last minute and the team captains, coaches and spotters have not time and

means to procure the necessary instruments. This year both the army teams were obliged to get along with such instruments as the members had themselves, while alongside of them was another team equipped with one large telescope and the necessary small ones furnished by the Signal Corps of the army.

To correct this defect, the team captains and coaches should be designated at least six months before the match, from officers who know the game and are intensely interested in it. They should be required to make requisition for necessary instruments, and have them at the places of holding the army competition when the competition opens. During the competition the coach should be constantly at the firing points, observing the peculiarities of the different men and obtaining from them, in confidence, all the necessary data of the individual guns. The latter measure would obviate the necessity for much team practice and permit of more rest between competitions.

The State teams show a great willingness to trust the fairness, accuracy and ability of officers of the regular service as range officers. Certainly every proper effort should be made to continue this feeling.

Range officers are now selected for various reasons. It is suggested that unsuccessful competitors among the officers at division and army competitions be used as far as they will go, as range officers for the national match. They would be probably the best posted on Firing Regulations and the most interested in the work. They would likewise be more likely to know the various little tricks that are sometimes successfully worked on range officers that know nothing of the practical part of shooting. They would, also, be better able to acquire information from the best shots of the country, with whom they would be thrown in contact, and would be the most likely to disseminate the information so gathered.

As the regular service will also be called on to furnish the details for markers and scorers, the organizations to do this work should be designated long enough beforehand to enable all noncommissioned officers and privates to be thor-

oughly instructed in their duties, and the officers of the organization could then be justly held responsible if a scorer was sent out who did not know the value of the marking disks. The executive officers of the match would not be obliged then to spend their time in instructing ignorant officers and men, and in deciding disputes arising from this ignorance.

In conclusion, I would recommend, in case of the detection of a willful attempt at evasion of the rules of the match by any member or members of a team, that the whole team be disqualified. It is certainly a good time to remove from the ethics of shooting those of the horse trade.

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THE COMPETITION RESULTS.

The poor standing of the Cavalry Team in the last national match was due both to the excellent shooting of other teams and to the indifferent work of our own. With the former we need not concern ourselves except to learn from their good methods, but the latter deserves serious consideration.

In my opinion the following causes contributed to the low scores of the Cavalry Team :

1. The absurdly small handicap given the carbine.
2. The bad condition of the members of the team, due to too much strenuous work in competition.
3. Total lack of team work.
4. Lack of practice at long range and under varying conditions.
5. An improper method of choosing the team, which does not obtain the best material.

The first of these will be corrected when the new rifle is issued. For the others I have heard several remedies proposed, all agreeing in the main points, and will suggest one which may embody features worthy of consideration. The essential thing is not to quibble over details but to adopt some good method of selecting and coaching the team to take the place of the one now in use. For the sake of dis-

tion I shall refer to the twelve men having the highest scores in the army competition as the Army Team, and to the team which represents the cavalry in the national match as the Trophy Team. They are now identical but should not be.

The Army Team is a team in name only. They have just passed through two gruelling, nerve-racking competitions and are "shot out." Their entire practice has been antagonistic and competitive, while that of the Trophy Team should be quite the opposite, every man's thought being the total score of the team and not his own score. Again, on the Army Team will be found brilliant and promising but inexperienced shots, men who have been lucky (for luck plays an important part in shooting), and men who are good individual shots but poor team men. Every man on the Trophy Team ought to be an excellent shot and a good coach.

I would suggest the following procedure.

1. Select the team captain now. Let him at least three months before the national match, and after consultation with every member of the Army Team for the past two years, select the coach. The coach ought to be an excellent shot, thoroughly up to date in every detail of shooting, and of full experience in competition. He ought also to be a man who would usually rub the team the way the fur lies and at the same time not hesitate to tell them what is expected of them. And above all he must be a hard worker. These qualifications are hard to find, but at least two or three men in the cavalry possess them.

- 2 Two months before the national match let the coach assemble from thirty to forty of the most promising candidates at some convenient place for preliminary practice. After a month's practice let the coach select four members of the team; and let these five men select the remaining members of the team, substitutes and spotter. The spotter ought to possess as far as possible the same qualifications as the coach. After this, order all the disappointed candidates to the army competition.

3. Then let the Trophy Team thus selected continue practice for a month on different ranges and under varying

conditions. As a part of this practice let the team go and shoot as supernumeraries in the army competition, it being understood that they remain the Trophy Team whether other men in the competition make higher scores or not. This practice is suggested because it is observed that one competition does a man good, and by this method where a man could not lose his place on the team his nerves ought not to be racked, and at the same time the stimulus of competition and the desire to show that he is the right man for the place ought to whet him up to the keenest point. It would also be well to award members of the Trophy Team gold and silver medals when their scores are as high as the lowest scores of the gold and silver medal men of the Army Team.

The team should be given as much practice as possible on the range where the national match is held.

It is my belief that a team selected and instructed in this manner would defeat anything in the national match with the possible exception of an Infantry Team selected in some similar way. And if the latter were successful they would know that they had been to a shooting match.

* * *

THE COMPETITION RESULTS.

In thinking over the conditions necessary to make the national match a success, the primary one to my mind is the choice of grounds, and I believe that an improvement could be made on those chosen for the last three meets—Sea Girt twice, Fort Riley once. I talked quite freely on this with a number of National Guard shots, and they were not backward in airing their views. The range at Sea Girt is not a good one in many ways; for one thing, it is too small; it is a difficult range to shoot on, and those who know the range have an immense advantage over the newcomers; besides this, there have been at times ill feelings between New Jersey and some of the other States, who in consequence have strong objections to shooting on that range.

One advantage Sea Girt has—it is on the Atlantic coast,

near the large cities, and this is a great inducement for Western teams, as, when their States can afford the expense, men are glad to seize the opportunity of making the trip and seeing the country. This advantage other and better favored ranges East also have, and I should like to see one of these tried. The Fort Riley range being central, it was supposed that more Western States would be able to send teams, but almost none entered. The Eastern men were glad of the chance to see something of the West, but one visit to Riley seems to have satisfied their desire. At least many said they would not go again. It is true that the Riley range, outside of being a good range, possesses few allurements.

Each team should be required to send its quartermaster to the grounds several days ahead of the team, in order that everything could be in readiness for the team. Massachusetts did this at Riley, and their team was much more comfortable and in better shape in consequence. Some other teams slept on the ground for a night or two.

It should be a strictly enforced rule that all teams should remain on the grounds—sleep and mess in camp as well as shoot there. Teams that live in hotels and on Pullman cars have a great advantage over others that have to undergo the discomforts, inconveniences and even illnesses of camp life.

The rules regarding coaching should be clear and explicit, and strictly carried out. If coaching is to be cut out, it must be cut out absolutely, as in the army competitions. This was the intention, I believe, at the last national match, but it was not carried out, coaching being done even in the skirmish runs by some teams.

Now, in regard to the army teams: Each man of these two teams has just gone through two severe competitions, in which there is no long range firing, and few do themselves justice; they are shot out and stale. After the severe strain they have been through, there is a feeling of relaxation and indifference which strongly affects their shooting, and which cannot be overcome; their nerves and eyes are worn out, and they cannot take the interest and do the shooting they would like to do. Besides this, they have little practice at long range firing, and both teams fall down badly here. Can any

cavalryman look at the carbine team scores at a thousand yards and not weep? The recommendation of Captain W. H. Wright, made two years ago, I believe is practicable, and I should like to see it adopted: the army teams of one year to shoot in the national match of the following year. The teams could be given one month's practice before the match, and would make a much better showing. It is true some of the men constituting the team would be unable to attend the shoot, but there are the substitutes, and if these should prove insufficient, why not call upon other good shots in the army? I have seen men fail to make the team who were undoubtedly better shots than some on the team; besides, there are always good men who did not try for the team.

Of course, the shoot must be in the hands of men especially fitted for the work, as it is work, and work requiring exceptional executive ability. When such men are found, they should be detailed successive years. It is only in this way that the mistakes of one year will be avoided in the next. I do not believe that any men, however capable, can handle for the first time a problem as complex as this and not make serious mistakes. But these men, if the right ones, will be the first to see their mistakes and profit by them the next time. As dear old Papa Michie used to say, "The successful man is not the man who never makes mistakes; that man doesn't live, but the man who never makes the same mistake twice."

* * *

THE COMPETITION RESULTS.

The competitions held in the northern division this year developed the best shooting that has ever been done with the present arms. The season has been a record-breaker in every way, the following records having been established in the competition courses:

For the rifle, 892 by First Sergeant George Sayer, Fifteenth Infantry, at the army infantry competition, Fort Sheridan.

For the carbine, 856 by Captain H. H. Pattison, Third Cavalry, at the army cavalry competition, Fort Riley, Kansas.

For the pistol, 284 by Trumpeter Oscar G. Robinson, Ninth Cavalry, at the army pistol competition, Fort Riley, Kansas.

The following table, showing the team averages made in various competitions held in this division, 1904-5, may be taken as an index of the general improvement of the target practice of the army during the last year :

Competitions.	Team Av.	
	1904	1905
Division Infantry.....	735	801
Division Cavalry.....	729	759
Division Pistol.....	268	272
Army Infantry.....	813	862
Army Cavalry.....	800	817
Army Pistol.....	274	279

This is a most gratifying showing and forms a fitting finale for the last year of practice with the Krag.

The general improvement shown is due to the practice that has been had during the last few years, to the more general use of the peep sight for all classes of fire, and the marked improvement in the infantry averages is largely due to the almost universal use of the gun sling. In the pistol scores the gain of a few points implies a marked improvement, for the course is comparatively short and the margins are small.

It is interesting to compare the corresponding infantry and cavalry competitions, as shown by the team averages:

Competitions.	Team Av.	Difference in favor of Inf.
Division Infantry, 1904.....	735	6
Division Cavalry, 1904.....	729	
Army Infantry, 1904.....	813	13
Army Cavalry, 1904.....	800	
Division Infantry, 1905.....	801	42
Division Cavalry, 1905.....	759	
Army Infantry, 1905.....	862	45
Army Cavalry, 1905.....	817	

The last column shows that the shooting of the infantry teams has been improving much faster than that of the cavalry teams. This is due mainly to the development in the use of the gun sling, and in less degree to the general superiority of the rifle to the carbine in accuracy, which would permit a greater improvement in the scores made, assuming the same improvement in the skill of the firers.

The figures also bear out the statement, made by several experienced shots, that the gun sling is worth twenty points on the marksman's course. That would be forty points on the competition course. Adding the four per cent. allowance of the carbine for the twenty shots (disregarding skirmish) fired at 600 yards in the competition course, we have forty-four points difference between the two weapons, which agrees very closely with the results of this year's competitions.

The discussion of the relative merits of the rifle and carbine loses interest, of course, with the issue of the new Springfield, but the above remarks on the value of the gun sling are of interest in connection with any proposed restriction in its use. It is undoubtedly of great value, and as few restrictions as possible should be placed on its use. Any arrangement of it around the arms of the firer, with both ends attached to the swivels, should, I believe, be permitted.

The great number of places taken by officers on division and army teams during the last two years has been noticed by all interested in target practice. It is universally admitted that this should be corrected. The following scheme for the competitions is recommended :

For the division competitions, that officers and men be selected and ordered to competitions as now provided, except that no distinguished marksmen be sent. That officers and enlisted men fire together in the same competition. That the team be composed only of enlisted men, the strength of the team to be determined by the number of *enlisted* competitors, in the proportion now prescribed, and the gold, silver and bronze medals to be distributed to such teams in the proportions now prescribed. The officers competing to receive such medals as their scores deserve, all bettering or equaling the lowest gold to receive gold medals, and, in the same way, silver and bronze medals.

The army competitions to be open to the medal winners of the division competitions, officers and men, all twelve regular medals to go to enlisted men, the officers receiving such medals as their scores deserve, as provided for division competitions.

This brings us to the composition of the team for the national match. The practice of taking the National Team from those who weather the division and army competitions, does not, I believe, give us the best team that we can get together from the army. The courses are not the same, and we have not been able, in spite of the excellent skirmishing done in our own competitions in the last two seasons, to do sufficiently well in this class of fire at the national matches to make up for our weakness at slow fire, especially at the long ranges. Further, in spite of every effort to expedite the division and army competitions, it has not been possible to give our National Teams the necessary practice. By crowding things as closely as possible, the army competitions were finished this year on August 9th. To do this, it had been necessary to call for the designation of competitors for the division competitions before the close of the target season, July 15th, the regular season itself having been advanced two weeks from the usual date for this division. Upon the completion of the army cavalry competition at Fort Riley on August 9th, a rest was given to the members of the team until the following Monday, August 13th. This was necessary, as the members of the team had been shooting steadily for a month through two hard competitions, and most of them had been on the range with their organizations for one or two months prior to that. Practice was had from the 13th to the 17th inclusive, four days, it being necessary to leave for Sea Girt at noon on the 18th. With the national match set for the latter part of August, there is no time for the members of the Army National Match Team to participate in the division and army competitions.

Nor do these latter competitions give us the best obtainable personnel for the National Team. As stated above, the courses are different, and a winning team must be strong at every range and every class of fire. The State teams are showing great improvement and each year new ones come to the front.

The army competitions this year, both at Riley and Sheridan, were fired under almost perfect weather conditions. At Sea Girt we found rain and twenty miles of wind the

order of the day, with a range facing east that played havoc with our elevations with the change between morning and afternoon light. The team that wins the national match must be one of experienced shots, accustomed to all sorts of weather, able and willing to help each other, and at home at the long ranges. Several such shots did not make the Army Teams this year, because they failed to get together four big skirmish runs in the army competitions.

I would propose that the candidates for the team or teams to represent the army in the national match be assembled for practice and elimination at some post where there is a good range, if possible in the locality where the match is to be held, at least two months prior to the match. That they be taken from the class of distinguished marksmen, together with any other shots of known experience and ability in the service, such selected competitors to give up all idea of entering the division and army competitions for that season. I believe that, with few exceptions, all the material for such team can now be found in the distinguished class, and for that reason I have recommended the above exclusion of distinguished marksmen from the division and army competitions. This will also meet the objection often raised that distinguished marksmen, usually the same individuals, monopolize the army medals year after year.

The competitors for the National Team, to the number of thirty or forty, depending on the material available, should have about a month's work under the direction of the officer who is to be team captain for the match, at the end of which time a tentative team could be selected, with several alternate pairs, and the rest sent home. Then after another month's work as a team on the match course in all sorts of weather, we should be able to turn out a team that would have no weak spots, that would be a team in fact rather than in name, and one that would only be defeated by teams composed of twelve better shots than it is possible to draw from the army.

The question has been frequently asked what was the matter with the Cavalry Team in the national match? The answer lies mainly in the above comparative figures of the

infantry and cavalry competitions. The handicap given to the carbine amounted to eight and a fraction points for each member of the team. The table shows a difference in favor of the rifle of forty-five points per man, on the army competition course, which would indicate that the handicap should be in the neighborhood of fifty points on the national match course. With something over fifty points to its credit over last year's total, the cavalry team dropped from fourth to eleventh place.

The skirmishing of both army teams has been disappointing, both this year and last, when judged by the standard of the army competitions. It is not to be expected that the skirmish scores made at an army competition will be equaled in the national match. In an army competition, at the end of slow and rapid fire, the majority of the competitors have a fair show for the team depending on their luck at skirmish. No man can say in advance that he will average the necessary points to make the team.

So the skirmish average to be expected from a team at the national match is not that the twelve top men of the army competition, but rather that of all the army competitors who might have made the team.

Furthermore, a certain discount on average scores must be made, due to the fact that it *is* a national match, notwithstanding that the individuals firing are conscious of no nervousness, nor feel in any sense rattled. But the time is past when an army team could hope to win the match by skirmish. The trophy has been won for two years by the best team of all-around shots. The army can only hope to win it by developing such a team. Steadiness, rather than brilliancy, is needed, and the above recommendation, will, I think, contribute to that end.

THE COMPETITION RESULTS.

The present Firing Regulations, while admirable in most respects, are defective in that they do not provide for any practice beyond six hundred yards for those men who fail to qualify as marksmen. All officers and enlisted men, whether poor or good shots, should be required to take a course of long range practice. This for three reasons: 1st, it would increase the man's efficiency as a soldier; 2d, it would improve his shooting at short and mid ranges, especially the latter; and, 3d, it would increase the efficiency of the troop or company in collective firing. Under the present system of target practice, thousands of men go through their entire service as soldiers without ever having had an opportunity of firing a shot at the long ranges, except such as are fired at collective fire. No one who has had much experience in teaching men to shoot will need to be told that practice at long range increases a man's general excellence in shooting.

Targets.

For all rifle firing the bull's-eye target should be used, for rapid fire as well as for slow and timed fire. This will give a much better test of the relative skill of the men firing than the present method, and would eliminate those accidents which happen frequently, where a good shot placing all his shots close to the figure, yet makes a poorer score than a much poorer shot who fires all over the target and yet by good luck manages to keep in the figure.

For dismounted revolver practice, the standard American target (I am not sure of the designation) or something similar to it, should be used. The accuracy of a given number of shots should be measured, not by the sum of the number of shots striking within the 5, 4, 3 and 2 rings, as is now the case, but by the average distance of all the shots from the center. A target with ten or twelve rings and a two or three-inch bull's-eye would give a much better means of comparing the accuracy of the shooting of different men than is given by the present target.

Extra Pay for Enlisted Men for Excellence in Shooting.

The extra pay granted to men who qualify as expert riflemen was a step in the right direction, but it did not go far enough. The efficiency of the army in target practice would be greatly increased if increased pay could be granted to all men who qualify as expert riflemen, sharpshooters or marksmen. This extra pay should be given for three years from date of qualification, whether followed by subsequent qualification or not. The amount of this extra pay should be as follows:

For men who qualify as expert riflemen	\$3 00 per month
For men who qualify as sharpshooters	2 00 per month
For men who qualify as marksmen	1 00 per month

Troop and company commanders should also be allowed to forbid the reënlistment of men, who after three years' target practice, fail to get out of third class. Such men are of no use to the army except to fill up its ranks, and they are usually of such a low order of intelligence that they are a drag on a company.

Rifle Competitions.

With the new rifle there should be, as now, separate competition for cavalry and infantry. The competitors for both teams may be assembled at the same place and practice together, two separate teams, however, being made up, one from the cavalry and one from the infantry. The regular division teams, both cavalry and infantry, should be made up entirely of enlisted men, but officers should be allowed to compete as now, and should be given medals such as they would have received had they been competing for places on the regular team. The competitors for places on the army teams would then consist of the members of the regular division teams, such distinguished marksmen as may have qualified, and of those officers who obtained medals as above provided.

On account of the large number of officers composing division teams of late years, it has become necessary, if we are to keep up the interest of enlisted men, to make the change recommended above. The two army service teams, how-

ever, should be composed of the best shots, officers or enlisted men, in the entire army, and for that reason officers and enlisted men should compete alike for those teams.

Distinguished marksmen, who fail for three years to obtain a right to shoot for the Army Team, should be barred from further competitions.

Preliminary practice, except one skirmish run, should be eliminated from all competitions, and competitors should be allowed instead two sighting shots at each range, slow fire. Preliminary practice does a good shot very little good, and is an additional strain on his nerves.

National Competitions.

The officers who are to conduct the competitions, especially the chief executive officer and his assistants, should be chosen, first, with a view to their general ability, and second, on account of their experience in conducting competitions. The chief executive officer should be a man of high rank and should, moreover, be so familiar with the various questions that are likely to arise in a competition, that he can render a just decision on any point that may be referred to him.

The chief range officer should be a man of experience in conducting competitions, and should also be a hustler, a man who can get things done. The most annoying thing about a national competition is the slowness with which many of the matches are conducted. Delays due to bad weather, lack of a sufficient number of targets, etc., can be overlooked, but it is a great trial to the temper of the competitors to be kept waiting because range officers are late, or because the methods of running the competition are antiquated.

At the last competition the management was swamped by the large number of competitors entering the individual match. This match was shot before the team match, and the great majority of the competitors entered it with a view to getting more practice for the team match which was to follow it immediately. It would be wise to have the individual match follow the team match in future.

The Sea Girt range is, in many respects, inferior to the Fort Riley range. The range faces east, and during the greater part of the morning the targets cannot be seen clearly. This is due quite as much to the prevalence of fogs as to the direction in which the range faces.

The national team match should be arranged so as to coincide more nearly with the course of firing required of our men of the regular service. With the present course of slow fire, the army teams are at a great disadvantage.

THE MOUNTED OFFICERS' SCHOOL AT FORT RILEY.

BY CAPTAIN GEORGE H. CAMERON, FOURTH CAVALRY.

IN a recent article in the *Journal of the Military Service Institution* on "Observations in Europe," the writer says: "The one crying need in our service that impresses itself vividly upon the American cavalry officer traveling abroad, is our lack of an officers' riding school."

Admitting that the *need of a lack* vividly impresses any officer, even if he is not traveling abroad, exception is taken to the idea conveyed. Several other officers have published eulogistic descriptions of Saumur. Praise of this institution is always deserved, but in the accounts referred to one could not escape the impression that the observer was making notes on an unfamiliar subject.

The commandant of the School of Application, in January last, made a request to the War Department that the instructor in equitation be allowed to visit foreign schools. He stated that, "the advantages and possible defects of foreign systems have never been carefully weighed by an officer, *himself an instructor and acknowledged expert.*"

This is the point to be emphasized.

There exists throughout the army such a general misunderstanding, or lack of knowledge, concerning the work of officers at Fort Riley that I feel the necessity of saying a word in favor of "home industries."

Let it be understood that there will be no effort to establish the equality of our school of equitation with that of France. One is over one hundred and thirty-five years old; the other, rising three.

Much of the misunderstanding I speak of is due to the fact that older officers who were conversant with the work

accomplished in the nineties are not aware that the instruction of officers is now a separate and added feature. Therefore, before describing the school of to-day, it may be well to briefly trace its origin, object and development, and to point out the changes in policy resulting from experience.

By an act of Congress, approved January 29, 1887, the Secretary of War was "authorized and directed to establish upon the military reservation at Fort Riley a permanent school of instruction for drill and practice for the cavalry and light artillery service of the army of the United States." The reader is requested to carefully note the exact wording of this measure. This first step was brought about by Lieutenant-General Philip H. Sheridan (then in command of the army), who, as a result of long experience in campaign with both veterans and raw troops, fully appreciated the necessity of a trained mounted service. The same act of Congress appropriated funds "for such quarters, barracks and stables as may be required to carry into effect the purposes of this act," and, when the writer arrived at Fort Riley, in September, 1887, the handsome stone buildings of the present plant had not only been planned but were well under way. Confusion attending construction work and the delay in arrival of the requisite troops and batteries, prevented any progress in the establishment of the school until June, 1891, when the first commandant, Colonel James W. Forsyth, Seventh Cavalry, submitted to the War Department a proposed scheme of organization. In the regulations, published in G. O. 17 of March 1902, from headquarters of the army, we find the first conception of the work of the school, stated in very positive terms:

"6. The principal object of this school is instruction in the combined operations of cavalry and light artillery, and this object should be kept steadily in view.

"8. The second half of each school year shall be devoted to the field work and exercises of the two arms, cavalry and artillery, combined."

No mention is made of the instruction of officers. General Schofield, who had succeeded General Sheridan, wrote to the commandant in the spring of 1893 that he noticed a ten-

dency to diverge from the path which should be followed. "There should be no theoretical instruction at the school," he remarks.

In the commandant's annual report for 1893 are published the results of a most successful year's work. Here the "Blues" and "Browns" first make their appearance, and here are drawn up rules for exercises, duties of umpires, etc., which have withstood criticism for twelve years and are embodied, unchanged, in instructions for maneuvers prepared by the General Staff. As might have been expected, however, the period of six months for combined exercises was found by experience to be unnecessarily long, and we read that it is reduced to the months of October and November.

In G. O. 16, A. G. O. 1896, the regulations are republished in more voluminous form. Notice the change in wording:

"A school of instruction for *drill* and *practice* in field duties, and the combined operations for cavalry and light artillery."

In the italicized *practice*, we read anew General Schofield's opinion that Riley must not run to books, and as a further caution the regulations continue:

"Theoretical instruction will be given to officers of the school only through the Lyceum course, which will be especially adapted to the needs of the school."

When the *Maine* was blown up, the school, which consisted of the troops and batteries present, went off to the war, and, until September, 1901, no attempt could be made to do anything outside of ordinary garrison duty. During the following winter school work was resumed on former lines. The years 1894 to 1897 had set a high standard to be reached by organizations with inexperienced subalterns and green enlisted men, but satisfactory progress was made until the appearance of G. O. 102 of 1902, which established the post school for officers. Fort Riley was made no exception to the requirements of this order.

After a season of recitations, the commandant, Colonel C. C. Carr, Fourth Cavalry, suggested to the War Department that the course prescribed for post schools be either modified or rearranged in such a way as to interfere as little

as possible with the object for which this school was established, viz: "the practical instruction of cavalry and field artillery officers in the duties pertaining to their respective arms." Another wording! He continues: "It is believed that the studies prescribed in G. O. 102 could be equally well pursued at other posts from which officers are detailed for duty here, or at those to which they return after having served the prescribed term at this school." This letter received favorable consideration, and the Chief of Staff authorized the commandant to submit proposed new regulations, and to revise the course of instruction.

Prior to this, during the maneuvers of 1902, Colonel Carr impressed upon General Carter that "the interests of the school demanded that some officer with special ability for the training of horses and the teaching of horsemanship should be selected from the army and sent here to instruct the young cavalry and artillery officers." The conversation quoted from a letter of General Carter, resulted in the detail of Captain Walter C. Short, Thirteenth Cavalry, as instructor in equitation. This officer arrived while the post school was still in force, and, consequently, no class in equitation could be organized that winter. But Colonel Carr had other work for him. The commandant had been carrying on correspondence with the War Department concerning the establishment of a training school for farriers and horseshoers. The desired permission was received in November, 1902, and Captain Short was placed in charge. Starting with no facilities and no experienced assistants, the director gradually developed a plant and a corps of instructors that now receive universally favorable comment. First Lieutenant Guy V. Henry, Fourth Cavalry, was the first commissioned officer to seize the opportunities offered to enlisted men in the training school, and the success of his work in the shop and hospital strengthened, if it did not suggest, the idea of officers' classes.

In the first programme of instruction, the school board planned a course lasting one year. Experience showed that this amount of time was wholly inadequate, and, moreover, the scheme made no provision for the remaining two years of the customary tour of duty. Upon the recommendation of

the commandant the course for 1904-5 was, therefore, made progressive, covering three years. During that season for the first time officers of field artillery were combined with officers of cavalry in classes where the subject of instruction was of common benefit. The change for this season, 1905-6, is the dropping of recitations in certain subjects in order to adhere more closely to what is "specially adapted to the needs of the school."

Former policies have been briefly noted. The present policy is in thorough accord with the original Act of Congress. Each arm has its separate school for *drill and practice*, in which every effort is made to pass beyond proficiency. Exercises of the two arms combined are held during the last five weeks of each school year. Every commandant, from Colonel Forsyth down the list, appreciated and urged that the instructors in the two schools of drill and practice should themselves receive careful theoretical and practical training. It remained, however, for the present General Staff to realize that a school must work out its own salvation. The recommendations of the commandant during the past three years have been almost invariably accepted, and, as a result, we have to-day at Fort Riley what may very properly be called the school of the mounted officer. As previously stated, it is young. West Point had its infancy. In years to come, foreign visitors will find much to commend at this school, just as they now unite in approbation of our National Academy.

Colonel Edward L. Anderson, author of "Modern Horsemanship," etc., probably the highest authority in the United States on equitation and horse training, visited Fort Riley in 1904. This gentleman, who has a personal acquaintance with the best instructors in Europe, and who, through many years, has made a careful study of their methods on the ground, records the impressions of his visit in his latest book on equitation ("Riding and Driving," of the American Sportsman's Library, edited by Casper Whitney). He describes our instructor as a "splendid horseman," and terminates his remarks with: "On the whole, one must be a very unobservant, unappreciative visitor who would not be im-


pressed with the great value of the School of Application, not only in the branch upon which I have touched (equitation) but in everything relating to the mounted service."

At Fort Riley are stationed three squadrons of cavalry, three batteries of field artillery, and two batteries of horse artillery. The tour of duty is three years, one squadron and one or two batteries being relieved yearly. The subalterns of these organizations (and captains of less than ten years service) are student officers, and field officers and senior captains are instructors. During the first year of the tour of duty (third class) officers receive no instruction except in equitation and horse training. This is because cavalry squadrons generally come to the school from the Philippines and urgently need all officers to train recruits, while field artillery subalterns, after arrival, must become familiar with their matériel and drill.

In both branches, however, since the officer must act as instructor in mounted work, his own normal school education begins at once. During this first year ninety hours are spent in the riding hall. Special attention is devoted to confirming the strong, correct seat, and to teaching the proper use of the aids. Each officer is allowed to select a green horse from the command, and starts the training work with cavesson and longe. Next follow biting, bending and suppling, using the bit and bridoon. In this instruction the student is on foot. The first mount is made in the McClellan saddle, and the snaffle bit alone is used. When the horse goes well into his bridle at the different gaits, a return is made to the bit and bridoon, and the horse's education is resumed. After he is well balanced, the military saddle is discarded and the student learns the English saddle on a comparatively well-broken horse.

In connection with the elementary work, certain parts of Carter's "Horses, Saddles and Bridles" are used for study, recitation, and examination. First principles are thus thoroughly mastered. It may be noted in passing that in all branches at the school it is planned that theory and practice shall go hand in hand. When the education of the student and horse has progressed sufficiently, a second horse is

selected as a jumper. The selection is made from broken horses of the command, but the animal is chosen for conformation, and has had no previous training in jumping. Thereafter, the last fifteen minutes of each attendance are devoted to the development of the jumpers, beginning on the longe in the chute and gradually working up to about



LIEUT. SCOTT, A STUDENT OFFICER, RIDING ONE OF THE SCHOOL BUCKERS.

four feet, without rider. As in the case of the school horse, the jumper is first ridden with the McClellan, then with the English saddle. Beginning with a very low jump, the bar is gradually raised to about four feet, the rider maintaining the tight seat and good hands, and acquiring the easy confidence essential in bold riding. Two trained buckers are kept on hand. These animals perform at the will of the

instructor, and student officers become familiar with the safe and approved method of sitting the broncho. This class also receives instruction in correcting the ordinary vices of the cavalry horse, the animal, in each case, being handled by the students themselves.



INSTRUCTOR HIGH-SCHOOLING A FOUR-YEAR-OLD RANGE HORSE.
PERFECT BALANCE ON ONE HIND LEG.

Work in the second class is a continuation of that of the third class. This winter, however, for the first time, the second class will train well-bred but absolutely unbroken colts, and will painstakingly put into practice the methods learned last year. In this manner they will qualify as capable instructors of enlisted men should the occasion arise to handle a green remount. When the colts have been thor-

oughly bitted and balanced (as in the first year) they will be carried to the evolutions of the high school, in which the student learns what may be accomplished with the horse mechanism by intelligent use of the aids. The jumper of the first year, provided he has shown satisfactory promise, is also further developed. If not, a trained jumper is supplied. All students have experience in clearing the bar at five feet eight inches, and in the last class of seven, three horses cleared six feet.

Equitation in the first class is confined to cross-country work. A course has been laid out at the base of the foothills along the Pawnee flats. The illustrations of this article show the character of the jumps now in place. The riders shown in the illustrations are student officers, except in the illustration of the high schooled range horse. As funds become available, the course will be extended. The height and difficulty of jumps will also be increased.

Horseshoeing is a course of two terms, each of about thirty-five hours. In the first term (second class) the student learns the preparing of the foot and the fitting of shoes in normal shoeing. There are no assistants. The officers perform all the manual labor, work the forge, trim the foot with nippers and rasp, turn and fit the shoes and nail them on, under the scrutiny of the instructors of the training school. There are many burned and bruised fingers. Occasionally a student must be extricated from among the nail barrels after his first effort with a hind leg, but the work continues with a spirit that warrants my saying that this school will progress to the first rank. In the second term the student learns how to make special shoes—those that will correct faults in gaits, and those that will aid in the treatment of diseased feet. The course in horseshoeing can be readily understood by a perusal of the training school textbook, "The Army Horseshoer," a copy of which has recently been forwarded to all mounted organizations.

Hippology likewise covers two terms—each of about thirty hours. The first term is devoted to theoretical study of anatomy, conformation and points, age of horses, defects and blemishes, diseases of the bone, and detection of lame-

ness, and to practical tests in examination of horses for age, soundness, conformation, and suitability for service. The instructors (those of the training school) are skilled in dissections. Whenever opportunity offers, a horse is hung up in the operating room and gradually dismembered in a manner that will clearly demonstrate parts and functions. For instance, a rubber hose is inserted in the trachea, and the exposed lungs are inflated to their proper position. In the



BRUSH HURDLE.

accompanying illustration (page 459), the lungs have been removed and the heart and diaphragm are subjects of study.

In the second term are studied wounds, sprains, bruises, etc., diseases of the urinary, nervous and lymphatic systems, diseases of the eye and skin, miscellaneous diseases, medicines, and weights and measures. Practical work includes tests in diagnosis of disease, hospital work in which the officer himself makes and applies dressings, applies ban-

dages, administers medicine, and learns hand rubbing and the use of slings. This class also attends operations, the subjects of which are furnished by farmers in the neighborhood. As may be imagined, there is a dearth of material in a well-ordered command, but when the free clinic was established, our veterinarians were pursued by eager horse-owners. The first class this year will have the advantages of the recently completed veterinary hospital, a model of its kind.




LOG JUMP.

Instruction in military sanitation and hygiene is in the form of a series of lectures, which amplify the subject as taught in the garrison school. Practical work consists of sanitary inspections covered by a report submitted by the students.

Lectures on forage are followed by inspection tests. Next summer, visits will be made to the Kansas Agricultural College at Manhattan, where numerous small plots show the

various kinds of cultivated grasses in different stages of growth.

Practical work with quartermaster harness and transportation includes the taking apart and assembling of harness and the different kinds of army wagons. Four-line and jerk-line driving are taught, as well as the training and detraining of stock and wagons.



STONE WALL.


All the subjects thus far mentioned are taught to cavalry and field artillery subalterns alike.

There is extended practical topographical work, but the classes are taught in the separate schools, because this branch of instruction is so intimately connected with the reconnoissance and road work of the separate commands.

Cavalry subalterns receive further practical instruction in packing and in pioneer work and explosives.

In both schools a certain amount of theoretical profes-

sional work is carried on each winter, but this has now taken the form of certified reading. In the third class, the subject matter is selected by the director to fit the individual case. Thus, if an officer joins who has not had the advantages of garrison school, necessary subjects of that course are assigned for reading; otherwise, books are selected bearing on the work in hand, such as Anderson's books on equitation, De-




BOLTING HIS JUMP.

Brack's books on outposts, Du Vernois' "Troop Leading," "Hohenlohe's Letters," etc. In the second class, special studies are assigned to all the students of that class in each school. These include such books as Von der Goltz's "Conduct of War," Formby's "Cavalry in Action," Clery's "Minor Tactics," etc., for the school of cavalry; and Langlois' "Tactical Changes," Rohn's "Tactics of Field Artillery," Rouquerol's "Employment of Quick-firing Artillery," etc., for the school of field artillery. In the first class each

student makes a study of a campaign with special reference to the employment of his own arm. The campaigns are assigned by the instructor and are discussed by the class after the reading.

Study without recitation possesses two merits: First, student officers at Fort Riley cannot be spared away from their organizations for any more extended schedule than that now




WATER JUMP.

existing; and, second, the method establishes the reading habit, and incidentally requires the acquisition of the nucleus of a good professional library.

As may readily be seen, the course is drawn out, to employ the three winter seasons and, as previously stated, to allow subalterns to be present with their organizations as much as possible.

It is, therefore, apparent that the course could be mastered in much less time by student officers (pure and simple)

such as attend other service schools. The War Department has, therefore, as an experiment, detailed the eight senior graduates in the cavalry arm of the last class at the Military Academy, to take a seven-months' course in hippology, horse-shoeing, equitation, and horse training. These young officers, who have been at the school less than two months, are seen in the illustrations of this article. Their daily work in equi-



CAVESSON AND LONGE, TO SCHOOL GREEN OR UNWILLING JUMPERS.

tation requires the training of a green school horse, a cross-country ride on a trained jumper, a game of polo on a broken pony, and the training of a green pony. They average six hours in the saddle, do their own saddling and biting, and in general have their headquarters at the school stable, where Captain Short instructs them in the most minute details of grooming, feeding, and the care of horses. Their first term in hippology will be completed before January, and they will then join the first class. Horseshoeing will

be taken up with the second class, and the second term of this work will be in special class.

It is not too early to predict that the experiment will be regarded as an unqualified success. It is greatly to be regretted that the benefits of the school are not further reaching. Many letters are received from ambitious officers, requesting information as to the best means of obtaining a detail at the school. The commandant, in his report for 1905, recommended that one subaltern from each regiment of cavalry should be selected yearly for a tour of duty. It is interesting to find that the first commandant recommended a plan that would be valuable to-day to both the school and the cavalry service.

General Forsyth, in his annual report of 1893, after remarking that:

"Under present conditions in the army, to keep three officers on duty with each of four troops of one regiment is next to an impossibility," continues: "I, therefore, have the honor to urgently recommend that, as the squadrons now here finish their tours of duty, the organization of the cavalry command be changed to accord with my original recommendation, viz: that it consist of twelve troops, all regiments being represented. My reasons are as follows:


"1. Troops serving here could then be maintained at a war strength, without injustice to any regiment, since all would continuously participate in the benefits of the school.*

"2. Each regimental commander would be enabled to offer the detail as a reward for that captain of his regiment who had displayed the most interest in and succeeded best with instruction, discipline and efficiency of his troop. Selection would then be an honor, and would be worked for, thereby promoting efficiency.

"3. He could more easily spare sufficient officers to keep three on duty with the troop of his regiment here, and, being fewer in number, he would be able to select only the most suitable, who have a natural taste for the work. This is a matter of no small importance.

"4. All regiments would sooner derive some benefit than under the present organization.

*By special provision troops at Fort Riley are now 85 strong.



SPECIAL CLASS ATTENDING DISSECTION.

"5. The War Department would probably find it easier to annually arrange for the detail of one troop each from four regiments than four troops from one regiment. Probably fewer emergencies and difficulties would interfere with the ordering them here at a regular specified time. The period of instruction should, however, remain three years, four troops being relieved each year, as now."

Another matter of regret is, that graduates of the school do not receive recognition as such in the *Army Register*. They certainly work hard, and their examinations are rigid. At the completion of their course they are, without any doubt, as well advanced in their chosen profession as are the graduates of any service school.

PROBLEM.

LETTERS are being constantly received by officers on duty at the Infantry and Cavalry School asking information about the course at that institution. Many officers after arriving say that their ideas of the system at the school were very crude, and had they had some knowledge as to the nature of the work before coming to the school preparation would have been much easier. With the idea of placing some of the work done at the Infantry and Cavalry School before our readers, we publish below a problem from the Department of Military Art. The accepted solution to this problem will be given in our next issue. Similar problems will be hereafter published in each issue of the JOURNAL, and the solution in each case will follow in the next succeeding JOURNAL. We trust that these problems will also be found useful to officers in connection with noncommissioned officers schools. As will be seen from the problem there is nothing so hard that the noncommissioned personnel could not master with a little help.

* * *

DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY ART, INFANTRY AND CAVALRY SCHOOL.

Course in Security and Information, 1905-06.

MAP PROBLEM NO. 1. PATROLLING, CAVALRY.

Situation:

Your army (Blue) operating in hostile country, is approaching Leavenworth from the north. You have a cavalry patrol of five men from the cavalry screen with instructions to seek information of the enemy, your nearest supporting troops being about five miles to the rear. When

you reach Fort Leavenworth one of your scouts reports enemy's sentinels visible on high ground south of and overlooking Corral Creek.

You decide to reconnoiter the enemy's position and advance with your patrol to the south edge of the woods on Pope Hill.

Required:

1. Description of the visible terrain to south, southeast and southwest.
2. Indicate on the map the disposition of your patrol while you remain in observation at Pope Hill.

A member of your patrol captures a civilian near Merritt Lake, who was riding rapidly along Grant Avenue toward Leavenworth. The prisoner states that he came from Kickapoo, six miles north of Leavenworth on the west bank of the Missouri River, that he has not been in Leavenworth in the past ten days, and knows nothing of the enemy. He also states that a troop of Blue cavalry was entering Kickapoo when he left there, about 10:30 A. M.

Required:

1. What disposition will you make of this man?

The enemy's line of sentinels appears to extend from Grant Avenue to the west toward Atchison Cross (X, Y, Z; X being a point 250 yards due west of north end of siding of electric line, southwest of Grant Hill; Y being at the northwest corner of new U. S. Pen; and Z being at Atchison Cross). No sentinels are observed near the reservoir of the Leavenworth waterworks, and you decide to move your patrol to that place.

Required:

1. Can this movement be executed under cover from the hostile sentinels at X?
(Trees shown on map to be considered thirty feet high.)
2. Indicate on the map the route of your patrol from your position at Pope Hill to the reservoir, and describe the conduct of the movement.

While concealed to the east of and behind the reservoir embankment you observe an officer in red (hostile) and an orderly riding northward from Leavenworth toward the reservoir. They apparently have not discovered your patrol.

Required:

1. The action you propose to take.
2. When do you send your first message during this reconnoissance?

Write out the message you would send (use message blank).

3. What instructions will you give the messenger?

EXERCISE.

The following is an exercise given to the Staff Class of 1906, by the Law Department of the Staff College. Each member of the class is required to submit answers thereto. The solution accepted by the Department will be published in the July JOURNAL, 1906.

* * *

DEPARTMENT OF LAW, STAFF COLLEGE, CLASS OF 1905-6.

PROBLEM NO. I.

The following letter was recently received by the commanding officer at Fort Leavenworth:

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
UNITED STATES MARSHAL'S OFFICE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI.

St. JOSEPH, Mo., Oct. 30, 1905.

Commandant, Fort Leavenworth:

SIR:—Would an officer be justified in shooting a deserter in order to effect his capture? I captured C. C. Crane, deserter, and took him to your post last April. He deserted last August and I almost captured him last Friday night, eight miles northeast of Easton, Mo. It would have been necessary to have shot him in order to capture him. He is sure to resist.

What are my rights, or rather, the law, in such emergencies?

Very truly,
(Signed) C. H. HASKELL,
U. S. Deputy Marshal, St. Joseph, Mo.

The word "officer" refers to civil officers.

1. The deputy marshal's request for information really involves two conditions: (a) forcible resistance to arrest; (b) when there is no forcible resistance, but merely an attempt to evade arrest by running away.

What answer would you make to the marshal's letter?

2. A detachment of soldiers is sent out to arrest Crane; what force may it lawfully employ under the two conditions mentioned above?

3. Crane, while being pursued by the detachment, takes refuge in a private house; can you as commander of the detachment forcibly enter the house and make the arrest against the will of the owner?

4. Crane is supposed to be concealed in a private house, but you are not certain; as commander of a detachment sent out to capture him, what steps would you take to have the house searched?

5. Crane is known to be a deserter; what would be the duty of the following persons should they encounter and recognize him, but have no positive orders to arrest him?

(a) A private soldier.

(b) A noncommissioned officer.

(c) An officer.

6. You are alone and unarmed, and learn that Crane is concealed in a certain public saloon of Easton, Mo., and being among his friends you cannot personally effect his capture; what steps would you take?

MARTIAL LAW AND THE SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN THE UNITED STATES.*

BY FIRST LIEUTENANT L. A. I. CHAPMAN, FIRST CAVALRY.

THERE sometimes arises a crisis in the life of an individual, when in the absence of legal protection he obeys nature's first and greatest law—that of self-preservation—and slays his assailant. Thus the taking of life by an individual is justified under the law on the ground of self-defense. Similarly, it not infrequently happens that the life of the nation is threatened to such an extent that the laws enacted for its preservation prove inadequate to the occasion; the civil power is unequal to the emergency, and the continued existence of the state itself becomes dependent upon the use of force. At such times the laws which have proved insufficient must be disregarded, if necessary, and the government resort to force of arms to maintain its existence. The civil power is set aside for the time being, and to the military power of the nation is assigned the task of protecting the state and restoring the conditions which will permit the resumption of the ordinary methods of government. This exercise of military authority in place of or over the civil power is called *martial law*. It is a condition based on necessity, and an exercise on the part of the state of the right of self-defense.

"The right to declare, apply and exercise martial law is one of the rights of sovereignty, and is as essential to the existence of a state as is the right to declare or carry on war."†

* Submitted to the Department of Law, Staff College, April 20, 1905, as a graduation thesis. Publication authorized.

† Halleck, International Law and Laws of War.

"The power is essential to the existence of every government, essential to the preservation of order and free institutions, and is as necessary to the States of this Union as to every government." * "We hold it to be an incontrovertible principle that the government of the United States may, by means of physical force, exercised through its official agents, execute on every foot of American soil the powers and functions that belong to it. This necessarily involves the power to compel obedience to its laws, and hence the power to keep the peace to that extent." † "If, in foreign invasion or civil war, the courts are actually closed, and it is impossible to administer justice according to law, then on the theater of active military operations, where war really prevails, there is a necessity to furnish a substitute for the civil authorities thus overthrown, to preserve the safety of the army and society; and as no power is left but the military, it is allowed to govern by martial rule until the laws can have their free course." ‡

Martial law is simply military authority exercised in accordance with the great law of necessity. It means the supremacy over the civil power to the extent that necessity may require. It may be exercised to the total exclusion of all civil authority; or it may supersede the civil power only to a limited degree. Justified by necessity in time of war, invasion, insurrection or other public danger, it either wholly thrusts aside the civil power, or acts in conjunction with it, as the exigencies of the case may warrant. Martial law accompanies the army when it is called into active service. It may be exercised over home territory over citizens not enemies, or it may be exercised over hostile territory over citizens of the other belligerent.

MARTIAL LAW AT HOME.

Martial law at home may either be limited or absolute. When the emergency arises and the civil power proves inadequate to maintain order, the military may be called upon to

* *Luther vs. Borden*, 7 Howard, 1.

† *In re Debs*, 158 U. S. 564.

‡ *Ex parte Milligan*, 4 Wallace, 2.

assist the civil authorities in quelling the disorder. Such occurrences have not been infrequent in our history. The Constitution of the United States and the Federal statutes fully provide for such emergencies. Article IV, Section 4, of the Constitution, states: "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the Legislature, or of the executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened), against domestic violence." In accordance with this provision, the regular army has been frequently employed. It has been said by some authorities that the request for Federal aid on the part of the State authorities is an admission by them that they are unable to cope with the situation, and that therefore the authority of the United States troops when called in should be recognized as supreme, and the situation handled by the military without reference to the State government. The custom, however, has been otherwise. The orders directing the movement of the regular troops to the scene of the disorder have in almost every case directed the military commander to consult and act in accord with the chief executive of the State.

Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution provides: "The President shall be commander in chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United States." Section 3, of the same article, provides: "He (the President) shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed." Under these constitutional provisions, the Federal troops have been employed on several occasions to secure the enforcement of Federal laws, most notably to prevent interference with the transmission of the United States mails.

Ordinarily in employing the military forces of the United States to carry out these two constitutional provisions above described, the exercise of martial law is not complete. In fact, it is not martial law at all, strictly speaking. Military force supersedes the civil power to the extent necessary to secure the enforcement of *existing* law and the maintenance of order. This exercise of the military power of the state

has been designated *military posse comitatus*,* or *limited martial law* as distinguished from *absolute martial law*. In this case, only that portion of the civil authority which has proven ineffective is displaced by military force; usually the civil police power is supplanted for the time being by the armed forces of the state. Protection is furnished by the military to persons and property; force is resorted to as the necessities of the particular case may require; arrests are made and prisoners held, frequently for a considerable period of time; but the trial of the offenders is not attempted by military tribunals but reserved for the civil courts, when order shall have been restored. At such times, then, there is no exercise of complete martial law jurisdiction, the military simply assisting the executive and judicial functions of the civil power in the execution of existing law.

For this limited exercise of martial law the Federal statutes have made provision, and the instances in which the troops may be so employed are fully set forth in Article XLVIII, Army Regulations. Briefly stated, the military forces of the United States may be employed for the following purposes to *assist the civil authorities*:

1. For the protection of a state against domestic violence under Section 4, Article IV, of the Constitution.
2. For the suppression of insurrection, etc., as expressly authorized by Sections 5298 and 5299 Revised Statutes.
3. As a *posse comitatus*, expressly authorized by the Federal statutes in the following cases:

Sections 1984 and 1989, authorizing the President to employ the land forces for the execution of the laws enacted for the protection of civil rights; Sections 2118, 2147, 2150, 2151 and 2152, authorizing the President to employ the military for the removal of intruders from the Indian country, for preventing the introduction therein of unauthorized persons and things, and for suppressing hostilities between the Indian tribes, etc.; Section 4792, requiring military officers commanding on the coast to aid in the execution of the quarantine laws; Section 5275, authorizing the Presi-

*Note issued by Major D. H. Boughton, U. S. Army, instructor Department of Law, Infantry and Cavalry School and Staff College, 1905.

dent to employ a military force for the custody of extradited prisoners; Sections 5287 and 5288, authorizing the President to avail himself of the army in executing the neutrality laws; Section 2460, authorizing the President to use the land and naval forces for the protection of the public lands; Section 5577, for the protection of the rights of the discoverers of guano islands; Section 67 of the Act of April 30, 1900, authorizing the use of the land and naval forces for the suppression of lawless violence, invasion, insurrection or rebellion, and to secure the enforcement of the laws of the United States in Hawaii; Section 29 of the Act of June 6, 1900, permitting the use of the military as a *posse comitatus* in the district of Alaska.

• Among the laws which it is the duty of the President to enforce under the constitutional injunction are the following:

Section 3995 Revised Statutes, prohibiting the obstruction or retarding the passage of the mail, and all other laws relating to the carrying of the mails; an Act of July 2, 1890, to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies; and the Acts of Congress establishing post and military routes and telegraph lines.

Of the power of the President to employ the military forces of the country "to see that the laws are faithfully executed," there is no longer any question. The Supreme Court has said: * "We hold it to be an incontrovertible principle that the government of the United States may, by means of physical force, exercised through its official agents, execute on every foot of American soil the powers and functions that belong to it. * * * The entire strength of the nation may be used to enforce in any part of the land the full and free exercise of all national powers and the security of all rights entrusted by the Constitution to its care. The strong arm of the national government may be put forth to brush away all obstructions to the freedom of interstate commerce or the transportation of the mails. If the emergency arises, the army of the nation, and all its militia, are at the service of the nation to compel obedience to its laws."

*In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564.

Under Section 5297, Revised Statutes, the application on the part of a State for the aid of Federal troops must be sent to the President. It is not left to the discretion of military commanders, although it has not been infrequent that governors have applied to commanding officers of departments or military posts for the use of national troops. In all cases where the commanding officer has yielded to this request without authorization of the President, the act has been disavowed by the Federal government. But Paragraph 586, Army Regulations, provides that "in case of sudden or unexpected invasion, insurrection or riot, *endangering the property of the United States*, or in case of *attempted or threatened robbery, or interruption of the United States mails*, or other equivalent emergency so imminent as to render it dangerous to await instructions requested through the speediest means of communication, an officer of the army may take such action before the receipt of instructions as the circumstances of the case and the law under which he is acting may justify, and will promptly report his action and the circumstances requiring it to the Military Secretary of the army, by telegraph, if possible, for the information of the President."

To justify the employment of the national military forces to assist the civil authorities, one or other of the two following conditions must exist:

1. A formal application to the President for Federal aid by the Legislature of a State (or by the Governor if the Legislature be not in session).
2. A decision by the President that it is impossible to secure the enforcement of the *Federal statutes* by means of the ordinary civil agencies.

In either event it is necessary for the President to publish a proclamation setting forth a statement of the conditions which exist and the laws provided in such cases, and calling upon the insurgents to disperse and cease their lawless acts. Proper and formal instructions are also issued by the President in such cases to the commanding officers of the troops employed for their guidance and conduct during the period they are to be employed.

Necessity will dictate the amount of force to be used in each case as it arises. Paragraph 488, Army Regulations, states that this is a tactical question which must be settled by the immediate commander of the troops, in accordance with his best judgment of the situation. The commanding officer, in such an emergency, is clothed with discretionary power, and so long as his course is determined by what he believes to be necessary and right, it will be upheld by the courts. It has been said by the Supreme Court of the United States that it knew of no case in England or this country, where it was held otherwise than that a public officer, acting from a sense of duty in a matter where he is required to exercise discretion, is not liable to an action for an error of judgment.* The law is stated in the following: "From a careful examination of authorities from the case of *Turner vs. Sterling*, 23 Charles II, 2 Ventris 26, down to our own time, both in English and American courts, the doctrine that a ministerial officer, acting in a matter before him with discretionary powers, or acting in a matter before him judicially or as a quasi judge, is not responsible to any one receiving an injury from such action, unless the officer act maliciously and willfully wrong, is most clearly established and maintained."† "It is sometimes difficult to draw the line between ministerial and discretionary, or judicial authority. The same officer may act sometimes in one capacity and sometimes in the other. A sheriff with an execution against the property of a particular person acts in executing it only as a ministerial officer, and if he takes any property to satisfy it except that of the defendant named, he is liable to an action. But the same officer, when he is authorized by law to suppress a mob, has more or less of discretionary authority entrusted to him. A military officer, who should be directed by the President in time of war to arrest a particular individual as a spy, would act in making the arrest merely as a ministerial officer, and if by mistake he arrested the wrong man, he would be liable to an action; but if his orders were

* *Kendall vs. Stokes*, 3 Howard, 87.

† *Reed vs. Conway*, 20 Missouri, 43.

general, to go with the military forces into an insurrectionary district and quell the insurrection, he would be clothed with authority discretionary, and in its nature judicial." *

ABSOLUTE MARTIAL LAW AS A DOMESTIC FACT.

Thus far it has been considered that the government has been able to quell the disorders by means of the civil authorities assisted by the military power. But riot may be followed by insurrection, and insurrection develops into rebellion. When conditions have become so unsettled that the courts are closed, or, if open are unable to serve their processes or to transact business, it becomes apparent that the civil power has ceased. The ordinary methods of government have failed, and either military authority must prevail or else anarchy will ensue. In fact, a state of war exists. "Armed or unarmed resistance by citizens of the United States against the lawful movements of their troops, is levying war against the United States." † "War has well been defined to be, 'that state in which a nation prosecutes its right by force.' " ‡ As the civil authorities have been replaced by military force, so the civil law ceases to exist for the time and the law and usages of war are administered. This exercise of supreme authority by the military forces is martial law proper. It exists "whether declared in specific terms or not. * * * Within its sphere the military is independent of the civil power, and if the latter is permitted to act, it is with the consent of the military authorities." §

"Martial law can never exist when the courts are open and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction. It is also confined to the locality of actual war. It will be borne in mind that this is not a question of the power to proclaim martial law when war exists in a community and the civil authorities are overthrown. It follows from what

* *Druecker vs. Saloman*, 21 Wisconsin, 629.

† Par. 817, Field Service Regulations.

‡ *The Prize Cases*, 2 Black, 635.

§ Major D. H. Boughton, U. S. Army, Note, 1905.

has been said on this subject that there are occasions when martial rule can be properly applied. If, in foreign invasion, the courts are actually closed and it is impossible to administer criminal justice according to law, then on the theatre of active military operations, where war really prevails, there is a necessity to furnish a substitute for the civil authority thus overthrown to preserve the safety of the army and of society; and as no power is left but the military, it is allowed to govern by martial rule until the laws can have their free course."*

It is essential to the existence of martial law that the authority of the military power be supreme. This, of necessity, implies the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise the military is not supreme. But it has been held by the Supreme Court: "If at any time the public safety should require the suspension of the powers vested by this act in the courts of the United States, it is for the Legislature to say so."† This opinion was again stated by Chief Justice Taney in *ex parte Merriman*. However, in both these cases, the court referred to the suspension of the privilege as an act of expediency, or as one to be decided upon for political considerations. In cases under martial law, the privilege is suspended as a matter of fact. As a preliminary condition of the exercise of martial law, it is essential that the courts be closed, or incapable of performing their proper functions. If this condition exists, there can be no question that the privilege has been suspended, *ipso facto*. The question is not now one of political considerations, or of expediency; it is one of conditions. When the courts have again resumed their proper functions, the necessity having ceased to exist, martial law gives way and the civil authorities again assume control.‡ "It is unquestionably true that where martial law exists, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Yet whether martial law shall prevail or not does not depend upon the will of the President. Martial

* *Ex parte Milligan*, 4 Wallace 2.

† *Ex parte Bollman and Swartwout*, 4 Cranch 95.

‡ *Ex parte Milligan*, 4 Wallace 2.

law comes with war, exists under proclamation or other act, and is limited by the necessities of war. It suspends the writ because the courts are closed."* "The doctrine seems to be that the suspension of the privilege of the writ contemplated by the Constitution has no relation to a state of martial law and can take effect only in those cases where rebellion or invasion where the power to issue and proceed under the writ is free and unobstructed."†

By the expression, "When the courts are closed," is meant not alone that condition when the court cannot sit, but that in which its legal processes cannot be enforced. The court may still be able to hold its sessions, but if, through hostility to the government or its laws, the great mass of the people defy the decrees of the court and prevent their execution, then its power has ceased to exist, and for the time being the court *is closed*. "Where it is impossible for the courts of law to sit or to enforce the execution of their judgments, then it becomes necessary to find some rude substitute for them, and to employ for that purpose the military, which is the only remaining force in the community.‡ "Courts are not open when—it mattering not whether they are really open or not if law cannot, either because of the great number of offenders or their great power, their ability to resist arrest by ordinary civil process, the difficulty of identifying or charging actors in particular outrages, and proving specific charges against them—many outrages may be committed and it may be impossible to arrest or identify one offender, and this is so where rebellion is wide spread. In such cases it would be idle to say the courts are open."§

It has been asserted repeatedly by the Supreme Court that the President must decide whether or not a state of insurrection exists as contemplated by the statutes and by the Constitution.¶ When in the discretion of the President, a state of insurrection or rebellion exists such as to warrant

*Hurd on Habeas Corpus, page 127.

†Taine, page 127.

‡Clode, Military and Martial Law.

§Finlayson, Martial Law 4.

¶Martin vs. Mott, 12 Wheaton 29; Luther vs. Borden, 7 Howard 1.

the use of troops for the establishment of law and order, then a state of martial law exists. It has frequently been stated that the presence of military force declares its own martial law. This power of the Chief Executive to determine whether or not the exigency is one warranting the use of troops, of necessity carries with it the power to *declare* martial law. Such a declaration by the President is not a political act, but simply a recognition of fact. In the case of the United States vs. Probasco, the court asserted that when the President has declared a State or a part thereof to be in insurrection, the courts must hold that this condition continues until he declares to the contrary.* The power of the President to declare martial law has been denied by some authorities, on the ground that he cannot suspend the writ of habeas corpus. But as has been shown, in times of insurrection and rebellion, the courts are closed of necessity, and the privilege of the writ is suspended as a fact. The recognition of such a state of affairs on the part of the President, coupled with the use of troops to restore order and to return to the courts the power which has been taken from them by force of circumstances, is a declaration of martial law, and carries with it all that that term implies. On the other hand it has been held by the Supreme Court that as a matter of political expediency, the Congress may declare martial law or suspend the writ of habeas corpus.† “An authority that cannot be delegated is comparatively useless; since the Executive cannot be omnipresent, it has been the uniform practice of the government from the beginning that martial law and nearly all of the war powers have been exercised through officers, acting under the Commander-in-Chief.‡ There can be no question that when the President can be informed of the state of affairs warranting the exercise of martial law powers, it would be wholly beyond the province of a military commander to act without the Executive authority. However, should the emergency be such as to compel immediate

* 11 Law Reports 419.

† Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wallace 2.

‡ Whiting, War Powers 307.

action, and there be no way to communicate at once with the President, *i. e.*, should a state of war exist so that the civil authority was powerless and the courts closed in a region so remote that to await action of the Chief Executive would prove fatal, it would then devolve upon the military commander to recognize the actual existence of martial law, and to take such action as circumstances might require. Again in a time of public war, with several armies actively engaged in different portions of the theater of operations, it would be proper for the President to vest in higher military commanders in the field the power to determine whether or not the circumstances would justify the exercise of martial law powers. This power was frequently so delegated during the War of the Rebellion, and was repeatedly exercised. Unless the power had been so delegated, or unless communication was impossible without fatal delay, it is not evident that a military commander would ever be justified in assuming authority to exercise the discretion which has been vested in the President.

Martial law does not mean military oppression. Its exercise includes solely such acts as may be necessary to the restoration of peaceful conditions. Military commanders are not justified in committing acts of wanton cruelty, nor in invading those personal rights guaranteed by the Constitution. For acts committed in excess of their authority, they may be held to a strict accountability, not only by their military superiors, but by the civil courts as well, when they shall have been restored to power. "If the power is exercised for the purpose of oppression or any injury willfully done to person or property, the party by whom or by whose order it is committed would undoubtedly be answerable. No more force, however, can be used than is necessary to accomplish the object."* For acts of unnecessary severity or cruelty, the civil courts will punish both civilly and criminally. This responsibility extends to the authority which declared martial law in the district affected and also to all officers acting under color of its authority for acts committed in excess.

*Luther vs. Borden, 7 Howard 1.

If the necessity was such as not to warrant the exercise of martial law powers, a military commander who declared martial law would clearly be held liable. So also where the jurisdiction had been given to the military authorities by the declaration of martial law, any act which was not justified by stern necessity would render the responsible officer liable before the civil courts. But where an officer has been invested by the law with discretionary powers, and it is evident that he has acted within that discretion, the courts will not hold him responsible for an error of judgment.* The liability of the subordinate depends upon the nature of the order under which he acts. If the order appears upon its face to be legal, the subordinate will be protected, though the order prove subsequently to be illegal.†

As martial law exists through necessity, so it ceases with the termination of the exigency warranting it. The exercise of martial law powers beyond that period when it is necessary because of the inability of the civil authorities to maintain order, would be as illegal as would the declaration of martial law in a time of perfect peace. When once order has been restored, when the courts have resumed the unobstructed exercise of their proper functions, martial law ceases, whether any proclamation be issued to that effect or not. As the presence of a hostile army proclaims its martial law, so the termination of the emergency restores to full power the civil authority and deprives the military of its unusual jurisdiction.

MARTIAL LAW IN HOSTILE TERRITORY.

Thus far martial law has been considered solely as a domestic fact, as existing through force of circumstances in time of insurrection or rebellion, or of invasion by a foreign foe. But as riots may develop into insurrection, so insurrections may grow in extent until they involve vast portions of territory, and rebellion results. At such a time it

*Kendall vs. Stokes, 3 Howard 87.

†Martin vs. Mott, 12 Wheaton 19; McCall vs. McDowell, 1 Abbott 22.

becomes necessary to accord belligerent rights to the rebellious subjects and the territory occupied by the armed force becomes, to all intents and purposes, hostile territory. When such hostile territory comes under the dominion of the military forces of the rightful government, martial law power is exercised until peace shall have been fully restored. This is the highest exercise of martial law. It has been called the law of hostile occupation. By others, it has been termed military government. But it can readily be seen that in a country like the United States, in times of rebellion, the only difference between martial law and military government would be territorial. If the two terms are to be used, then Kentucky during the Rebellion was held under martial law, while military government was exercised by the Federal military forces across the line in Tennessee. In both cases the authority of the military forces was supreme; the same powers were exercised by military commanders in both places, under the same rules—the laws and usages of war. The rights of the inhabitants of Kentucky were no greater than those of the residents of Tennessee. If there was a difference between martial law and military government, it was not known at the time, either by those in authority or those subject to the government in force. Both grow out of necessity and consist in the absolute supremacy of military authority in the total absence of civil power except as it may be exercised with the consent or by the direction of the military commander. If there be a difference, it is believed to be one of degree, and not in the nature of the power exercised.

But it is not essential that the hostile territory be that of rebellious subjects. The principle is the same if the territory be that of a foreign state which has come under the domination of the other belligerent. All hostile territory is considered foreign under the law of war. The rights of rebellious subjects, who have been recognized as belligerents, do not differ in kind from those possessed by the inhabitants of a foreign state in a time of public war. Territory of one belligerent held by the armed forces of the other is governed

by martial law until its status shall have been determined by the restoration of peace or until it shall have again passed to the original owner. "A place, district or country occupied by an enemy stands in consequence of the occupation, under the martial law of the invading or occupying army. Martial law is the immediate and direct effect and consequence of occupation and conquest. * * * Martial law in a hostile country consists in the suspension by the occupying military authority of the criminal and civil law, and of the domestic administration and government in the occupied place or territory, and in the substitution of military rule and force for the same, as well as the dictation of general laws, as military necessity requires this suspension, substitution, or dictation."*

It has been contended that under martial law, the military commander and his subordinates are liable before the civil courts for violations of civil rights of persons under their jurisdiction, but that no such liability to the civil courts exists under military government. But in *Mitchel vs Harmony*,† the Supreme Court held that a military officer was responsible civilly for a violation of the rights of an American citizen, although the act complained of was committed in hostile and foreign territory. If the difference between these two forms of military authority is one of liability, then Colonel Mitchel was exercising military government over citizens of Mexico and martial law over citizens of the United States at the same time and in the same place. The assumption by an officer that he is not liable before the civil courts for acts committed, not justified by necessity under the law of war, solely because the action was taken in foreign territory, is likely to be attended with some risk. It is well established, however, that members of the conquering army are not subject to trial, either civilly or criminally before the local courts of the district under martial law.‡

Under martial law in hostile territory, the military authority knows no limitation except that fixed by its national

*G. O. 100, 1863.

†13 Howard 115.

‡*Coleman vs. Tennessee*, 97 U. S. 509.

policy. By conquest and military occupation, the victorious army gains that firm possession which enables its commander to exercise the fullest rights of sovereignty over that place.* "In such cases, the conquering power has the right to displace the preëxisting authority and to assume to such an extent as it may deem proper the exercise by itself of all the powers and functions of government. It may appoint all the necessary officers and clothe them with designated powers, larger or smaller, according to its pleasure. It may prescribe the revenues to be paid and apply them to its own use or otherwise. It may do anything necessary to strengthen itself and weaken the enemy. There is no limit to the powers that may be exercised in such cases, save those found in the laws and usages of war."†

This exercise of martial law in hostile territory, based upon necessity, must terminate as soon as the necessity therefor ceases to exist.‡ This does not necessarily mean that martial law in the hostile territory will cease at the time that the treaty of peace is signed. The government in force, *i. e.*, the one under martial law, continues its operations until it is superseded by one established by the legislative branch of the victorious government.§

Unlimited as is the power which the conquering army possesses in the occupied territory, the manner in which it shall be exercised is determined by the policy of its government.|| Every action of the authorities governing under martial law must be in accordance with that policy and justified by necessity. The policy of the United States government has been well outlined for its military commanders in General Orders 100, 1863, which states: "All civil and penal law shall continue to take its usual course in the enemy's places and territories under martial law unless interrupted or stopped by order of the occupying military power; but all the functions of the hostile government—legislative, execu-

*U. S. vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton 246.

†New Orleans vs. Steamship Company, 20 Wallace 387.

‡Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wallace 1.

§Cross vs. Harrison, 16 Howard 164.

||Planters' Bank vs. Union Bank, 16 Wallace 483.

tive, or administrative—whether of a general, provincial, or local character, cease under martial law, or continue only with the sanction, or if deemed necessary, the participation of the occupier or invader.”*

To this end, the military commander, acting for his government, determines the political policy of the occupied territory. He becomes the legislature, executive, and the judiciary, or he may delegate such of these powers as he sees fit to subordinates. The government thus established by the commander of the United States forces has been sustained by the Supreme Court in repeated instances in the past.† The form of government to be established will be determined by the national policy as indicated in administrative orders. The President as commander-in-chief of the army, in the exercise of his war powers, dictates the manner in which the government shall be exercised, and the degree of liberty which shall be awarded the inhabitants. “In such cases, the laws of war take the place of the Constitution and laws of the United States as applied in time of peace.‡ The agents employed in administering the government in the occupied territory are usually army officers, although civilians may be appointed if the policy of the national government so dictates.

In the territory or district under martial law, the jurisdiction of the military authorities is complete. Over members of the conquering army, there can be no question as to jurisdiction. The jurisdiction extends to the same extent to all the inhabitants of the territory under martial law. This includes not only the citizens of the two belligerent governments, but to neutrals as well.

*See Par. 673, Field Service Regulations, where the same language is used except that “military government” has been substituted for “martial law.”

†Cross vs. Harrison, 16 Howard 164; Leitensdorfer vs. Webb, 20 Howard 176; Texas vs. White, 7 Wallace 700.

‡New Orleans vs. Steamship Company, 20 Wallace 394.

MARTIAL LAW COURTS.

Criminal jurisdiction is ordinarily exercised by means of the court-martial and military commission for military offenders, and the military commission and provost court for the trial of all offenses committed by inhabitants of the country under martial law. Civil jurisdiction may be exercised by the local courts, which may be retained by the military commander for the purpose, or by courts especially created for the purpose, except that these courts are not authorized to decide upon the rights of the United States, nor to exercise admiralty jurisdiction.* Nor have the local courts jurisdiction over members of the conquering army.† The jurisdiction of these martial law courts ceases in domestic territory as soon as order shall have been restored and the civil courts resumed their usual functions, and in hostile territory as soon as Congress shall have provided by law for the government of the district or place held by the conquering army. All cases not then completed must be turned over to the civil authorities for trial.

In conclusion, it must be remembered that grave responsibility rests upon him who is called upon to enforce martial law, whether limited or absolute, at home or in hostile territory. In the United States the rule is that the civil power is supreme and the military subordinate. For the military to exercise supreme control is the exception, and justified only by an emergency in meeting which the civil power has proven inadequate. So opposed is the exercise of martial rule to the popular ideas of government that military commanders will always be held strictly to account for all acts committed under it. Not only will the officer be held accountable to his military superiors, but to the civil courts if the district under martial law be in domestic territory. This same double liability exists in hostile territory if the person aggrieved be a citizen of the government the officer is endeavoring to serve. For his acts the officer can plead but one justification—that which justifies martial law itself—the law of necessity. In


*Jecker vs. Montgomery, 13 Howard 498.

†Twenty-five Hogsheads of Sugar, 100 U. S. 158.

the words of the Supreme Court in *Mitchell vs. Harmony*, 13 Howard 115, "he must show by proof the nature and character of the emergency, such as he had reasonable grounds to believe it to be, and it is then for the jury to say, whether it is so pressing as not to admit of delay; and the occasion such, according to the information on which he acted, that private rights must for the time give way to the common and public good."

NOTE.—In the preparation of the foregoing paper, in addition to the authorities cited above, the following works have been consulted and freely used:

Military Government and Martial Law. (Birkhimer.)
The Law of Civil Government Under Military Occupation. (Magoon.)
The Employment of the Military in the Suppression of Mobs. (Young.)
Federal Aid in Domestic Disturbances. (War Department Publication.)
Analytical Digest of the Military Laws of the United States. (Scott.)
Halleck's International Law, Vols. I and II.
Indian Treason Trials. (War Department Publication.)
Digest of Opinions of the Judge Advocates General U. S. Army.
Black's Constitutional Law.
Abridgement of Military Law. (Winthrop.)
Elements of International Law. (Davis.)



THE CAVALRY LESSONS OF THE WAR.

(FROM THE SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT OF "THE LONDON TIMES.")*

GENERAL NOGI'S HEADQUARTERS,
June 20, 1905.

AN army in the field must necessarily be composed mainly of infantry. The destructiveness of rifle fire has been demonstrated in modern warfare so effectively that the infantry weapon is recognized on all hands as the arm which turns the tide of battle. All strategy aims at the throwing of an army of infantrymen at some weak spot in the enemy's defense; and all tactics resolve themselves into the effort to bring preponderating rifle fire to bear at the decisive point.

Experience has proved that to employ infantry effectively the presence of certain auxiliaries is essential. Of these the most important are artillery and cavalry. As to the degree in which the latter is valuable as an auxiliary the Russo-Japanese War has much illustrative evidence to offer.

The functions of cavalry in regard to infantry may be divided broadly into three heads, under one of which it will be found are included all the various duties required of the mounted arm. These are (*a*) to show the infantry where to

*This article is reprinted from *The London Times*. The special correspondent is David Fraser, who wrote the article given in our last issue, "Doings of the Japanese Cavalry." Careful attention is directed to both articles.

strike, (*b*) to protect the vital lines of supply whilst the infantry fights, and (*c*) pursuit of a beaten enemy. Unaided by the eyes of the cavalry, slow-moving infantry is impotent to perceive a weakness in the enemy, and, unprotected by a wing of cavalry, its flank may be circled by opposing cavalry and the communications broken. Briefly, cavalry scouts for an army, on the alert against attack or ready to search out a crevice in the armor of the opponent. It need hardly be added that during operations it is necessary for cavalry to hold its own against opposing cavalry by fighting.

The prime value of cavalry lies in its mobility. As an actual fighting unit in battle a body of cavalry is much inferior to an equal body of infantry. The discrepancy is less marked if the cavalryman carries a rifle, but there is always the encumbrance of the horses, which require the attention of one man in every four when the rifle is employed. It being postulated that tactics resolve themselves into the effort to obtain a preponderance of rifle fire, it is evident that the necessity of dispensing with one quarter of a body of mounted riflemen before their weapons can be brought to bear, greatly lessens the value of that body. On the other hand, the mobility of the mounted rifleman compensates for his comparative ineffectiveness, to such a degree, it is believed in the British army, that elaborate arrangements have been made in our service for the provision and training of what is known as mounted infantry.

Granted the value of mounted and mobile men as an auxiliary to infantry, the question arises, What is the weapon with which they shall be armed, and what the nature of the training to which they shall be subjected? These things depend upon whether the mobility of a mounted man is regarded as secondary to his function as a rifleman, or whether his weapon shall be merely that most adaptable to his mobility. In other words, are mounted men wanted for their riding or their shooting? The arming of our cavalry with rifles, and certain modifications in its training, together with the formation of corps of mounted infantry, show that those who held the ear of the Secretary of State for War a few years ago pinned their faith to the superior value of shoot-

ing, and regarded mobility in a mounted man only as a means to an end.

If we turn to the conflict now proceeding in Manchuria, it is found that in one respect it differs considerably from other great wars, particularly those which have been fought on level ground. Cavalry has been conspicuous not by its absence, but by its utter and astonishing ineffectiveness. From Liao-yang northwards both armies have occupied part of the level plain traversed by the Liao River. The right of the Russian army and the left of the Japanese have faced each other for nearly twelve months, in country as flat as a billiard table and as suitable for cavalry evolutions as any of the low countries in which the famous leaders of last century made their reputations. Here have been conditions ideal for the employment of shock tactics; a veritable jousting ground where the vaunted Russian cavalry might have run a-tilt at the sword-worshipping Japanese. Yet no single instance has been recorded of combat between mounted men, and to the best of my belief none has occurred. Is it then, that those who advocate the substitution of mounted infantry for cavalry are in the right; that the lancer, hussar and dragoon of picturesque memory have become obsolete in these days of the breechloading rifle? Almost it would seem so.

But for two important considerations, the case for mounted infantry might well be deemed as proved. These considerations, however, are of such a nature as to lead the observer to directly opposite conclusions—to conclude actually that cavalry pure and simple is as useful to the army of to-day as it was to the army of Napoleon's day; and that it is totally erroneous to suppose that mounted infantry can be an efficient substitute for cavalry.

The cause of the ineffectiveness of Japanese cavalry is not far to seek. The men are the most intelligent of the Japanese soldiers, and their many fine patrol performances are evidence of the sound methods in which they have been trained. The weakness lies in the poor quality of the horses and the fact that the Russian cavalry outnumbers them by six to one. Marked inferiority of force, in all forms of rivalry, is a fatal disadvantage, and it is for this reason that

the Japanese have failed to shine in the rôle which experience has assigned to cavalry. The Russian cavalry, on the other hand, is estimated to number 30,000 sabers, a force of mounted men which, in the circumstances, ought to have made the lives of the Japanese commanders on the flank of the army a burden to them. Instead of which, life in the rear of the Japanese front has been a sinecure, a positive *dolce far niente*, undisturbed even by the distant flash of any of these sabers.

Is this a proof that, if the sabers had been rifles, something could have been accomplished? Very far from it. It is because the Russian cavalry, armed as it is with rifle and—shade of Seydlitz—bayonet, is trained to fight only on foot, thereby throwing away its most valuable weapon, mobility, that it has proved no more effective in the field than a flock of sheep. That the microscopic force of Japanese cavalry has held the Russian throughout the campaign, an exceedingly remarkable performance when it is remembered how indifferently the Japanese are mounted, testifies clearly enough that there must be something futile about the arming and training of the Russians.

The history of the Japanese cavalry in this war consists of one long record of laborious observation; an eternal alertness, to compensate for lack of numbers and of mobility. There have been brilliant episodes, such as the reconnoissances from Feng-hwang-chenn to the northeast of Mukden, and from the Sha-ho to the neighborhood of Kharbin. But where the tactics in which they are trained might have been employed the Japanese have been compelled to hold off. Almost invariably, when they have met the Russian cavalry they have had to face a superior force, and where numbers were equal they had still to deal with men much more heavily mounted and of considerably longer reach. It is not the policy of the Japanese to risk their slender force of irreplaceable cavalry in quixotic tilting; the men and horses are needed for indispensable scouting and reconnoitering. And so we have seen nothing of the shock tactics that the cavalryman dreams of in his sleep, and the mere thought of which makes the mounted infantryman gnash his teeth.

The Russian cavalry, however, has created so much dust on frequent occasions that it often has been impossible to see the tails of the horses. Throughout the campaign of 1904 and up to date in the present year, Rennenkampf, in command of half the force available for the flanks, has remained buried in the mountainous country east of the railway. Here the Russian cavalry, closely attended by infantry, has done yoeman service—for the Japanese. Bottled up in the hills, Rennenkampf made a feeble endeavor to threaten Kuroki's communications when the First Army was peacefully encamped at Feng-hwang-chenn. At Saimatse the Japanese infantry easily checkmated him—a ridiculous commentary on the capacity of the cavalry and the understanding of the commander who was responsible for the idea of employing cavalry in the mountainous regions between the Ya-lu and the railway.

On the other flank Mishchenko has performed some circus tricks for the edification of military critics, and to the disillusionment of those who hoped that when an opportunity really occurred the Russian cavalry would justify its existence. His raid on Niu-chwang last January was a masterly exposition of the possibilities of cavalry in general, and of the hopeless uselessness of the Russian cavalry in particular. Encumbered with horses, the Russians were ineffectual as riflemen, and, without lances, but encumbered with rifle and bayonet, they were ineffectual as cavalry. Detachments reached the railway in two places and did as much damage as occupied a repairing gang for some hours. They were within striking distance of a great supply depot, and these bold mounted infantrymen waited to see the handful of Japanese in occupation run of their own accord, instead of making them run. Immensely superior in numbers, the Russians showed themselves devoid of any initiative whatever, unless that of harrying the unfortunate Chinese villagers constitutes a legitimate *raison d'être*. They failed as cavalry and they failed as riflemen, and the reason of the failure was that they are neither flesh, fowl nor good red herring. They are organized as cavalry, but have been trained to dismount on service. In peace they are armed with lance and sword,

and in war they are asked to fight with rifle and bayonet. Truly an absurdity, worthy of one of those nebulous units evolved by our own Parliamentary military reformers. Last month Mishchenko, marching forty-five miles in four long summer days, again descended on the Japanese flank, accounted for a couple of companies and a field hospital, frightened a number of Chinese carters and stopped before a thin line of infantry guarding the approaches to Hsinmintun, where Japanese supplies are stored sky-high. Had he known it, he was within an ace of picking up a number of distinguished British officers, besides newspaper correspondents, and a famous general whom the Emperor William has specially delighted to honor. But an inferior number of riflemen checked the advance, and no use was made of the mobility of the column, except to retire by a circuitous route.

To harass an army in the field is an important function of cavalry, but its primary rôle is to assist the infantry in battle. The great struggle at Mukden affords an opportunity for examination of the manner in which cavalry was utilized in practice, or might have been utilized. In the west, Mishchenko is believed to have commanded some sixty squadrons, as against sixteen employed by the Japanese. Apart from the divisional organization, which assigns a regiment to each division, it will be noted that the Japanese massed the whole of their cavalry on their left flank, where the most important movement of the battle took place. Out-numbered by nearly four to one, the Japanese were able to cover this flank and protect their communications whilst Nogi turned the Russian right. During the maneuver they diverted a strong detachment to Hsinmintun, thus reducing the ratio of their strength to that of the Russians.

From March 4th to 10th, Nogi was hammering away at the Russian barrier west and northwest of Mukden, and in the latter stages of this period his army was considerably crippled by losses and exhaustion. Yet a comparatively trifling number of Japanese cavalry was able to save the Third Army from being harassed by the mounted men of the enemy. Meanwhile the Russians were hard pressed in their effort to preserve a front for the protection of the re-

tirement. Had Mishchenko on any one of these last four days held the Japanese cavalry in check with a portion of his own, and descended on Nogi's rear with the remainder, he would not only have completely relieved the situation, but he would have utterly disorganized Nogi's army, deprived him of supplies and ammunition, and generally ruined the Japanese plan.

Shock tactics in the days of muzzle-loading rifles were understood to mean the assault of infantry by masses of cavalry. How effective a cavalry charge could be is within the knowledge of all who dip into military history. But the magazine rifle, which permits the firing of many shots per man in a short period of time, has rendered the chances of cavalry onslaught exceedingly remote. Shock tactics in these days refer to the shock of cavalry against cavalry. Yet at Mukden it is undeniable that well-handled cavalry might have ridden over the Japanese infantry time after time. No observer of events and things in this war can doubt that the advent of a sufficient body of hard-riding lancers and swordsmen would have severely tried Japanese nerves.

So far as my information goes, the Russian cavalry west of Mukden never once took the offensive during the battle. Strapped up with rifle and bayonet, they are incapable of wielding the sword; their lances, except in the case of a small proportion of the Cossacks, have been left in Russia. So it was useless to contemplate old-fashioned cavalry work. But the Japanese communications were an easy mark, and it is one of the most singular features of Russian tactics that they did not avail themselves of so glaring an opportunity. Even as mounted infantry they should have been able to destroy Nogi's communications. Yet they never made a single attempt at interference.

The deduction is obvious; either training or arming must be at fault. When a mounted man dismounts he sacrifices his mobility to become a weak infantryman. The Russian cavalry has been trained to fight dismounted, and the result is that the Russians have divested themselves of the one arm which many keen observers believe might have availed to turn the tide in their favor. The battle of Mukden was a

great defeat, though not an overwhelming disaster. At one period the result absolutely hung in the balance, and it is no wild statement to say that if the Russian cavalry had been armed and trained in orthodox cavalry fashion, and handled in a manner consistent with cavalry tradition, Mukden would have proved a drawn battle. It is my firm belief—a belief shared with many others more competent to judge—that if French, with 10,000 British cavalry, had been given a free hand early in the war on the Russian side, there would have been no necessity for Kuropatkin to retire from his strong position at Liau-yang. And I have no less hesitation in saying that if the same able commander, with such a cavalry force as I have mentioned, had been attached to the Japanese side at Liau-yang or at Mukden, there would be no Russian army in Manchuria to-day. *En passant* it may be remarked that if the Japanese cavalry had been capable of pursuit at Mukden it would have proved a terrible thorn in the already bleeding Russian side. As it was, the Japanese were outnumbered, and hence completely ineffective.

The Japanese, inhabiting a hilly country practically devoid of wide plains, and having comparatively little use and small liking for horses, have restricted the cavalry arm in their military organization to the smallest possible dimensions. The war has brought home to them the value of cavalry, and one of the very first reforms in their army will be the augmentation of the mounted branch of service. To this end, and for the rehorsing of their artillery, they have recently imported a large number of Australian horses, ready, upon acclimatization, to be incorporated in the army now in the field, should the war continue. The Japanese are an eminently practical people. From the weakness in their own cavalry, and from the consciousness that properly handled Russian cavalry could have played havoc with their dispositions in action and in inaction, they have learnt the cavalry lesson, and they mean to profit by it. It is impossible to observe events in the war, and to discuss the question with Japanese officers and officers of many foreign armies, without being forced to the conclusion that the Japanese are sound

in their interpretation of the cavalry lesson—that genuine cavalry, and plenty of it, is essential to an army.

I have endeavored to show in what way the cavalry arm is essential to an army, how the Japanese feel the want of an adequate cavalry, and how the Russians have emasculated a branch of their service which would have been able to do much to save them from defeat. How do we ourselves stand in regard to mounted men? Are we able to put an efficient and sufficient force of cavalry in the field? We cannot. Our cavalry, and the mounted infantry which we have formed to supplement it, are in a dangerous and unhappy state of disorganization. The country has forgotten the cry for mounted men prompted by the war in South Africa.

Whilst the South African War was in progress, a scheme was formulated by which a company from each one of some eighty infantry battalions stationed at home should be trained annually as mounted infantry. A large sum of money was devoted to the establishment of three schools, wherein the selected companies should be given three months' training. The object of the scheme was to leaven our regular army with men trained to mounted work, whose place, on service, could be taken in their own battalions by reservists. There would then be available as mounted infantry, after the scheme had been in operation for some years, a large force of mobile riflemen, the class of soldier which, we assumed from our experience in the Boer War, will have preëminent value as an auxiliary in warfare.

Apart from the question of the correctness of the principle involved, and of the nature of the training given to the men in furtherance of the principle, it is startling to realize that, instead of seventy-eight companies being trained annually, only about forty go through the schools, and that among these forty are many men who have been trained again and again, thereby defeating the object of the scheme—which was to leaven our infantry with men able to ride and acquainted with mounted infantry drill.

If we keep in view the cavalry lessons of this war, it is unpleasant to learn that our scheme for the establishment of a mounted infantry force has been nullified. What is still

more alarming is that out of the seventeen regiments of cavalry on the home station, numbering 10,000 men, there are not half this number available for service in the field at the present moment. It is a fact that if called upon, the military authorities could not mobilize 5000 trained cavalrymen and horses. In Napoleon's time an army contained one cavalryman to eight of the other arms. In our army the proportion has been reduced to one to fifteen on paper. In reality the ratio is vastly different, and it cannot but be held by those who take an interest in the British army that our cavalry is hopelessly unequal to the task that would be imposed upon it in time of war.

There is no room for doubt in regard to either of these two points. Let the War Office publish the last reports of the Inspector-General for Cavalry and of the commanders of the mounted infantry schools, and figures approximate to those I have given will be found. The facts are well known to all cavalry officers, and to all who go out of their way to keep themselves informed. Many other interesting matters would doubtless come to light, particularly the position in regard to officers. Of these there is a deficiency representing nearly ten per cent. of the total required. It is an axiom throughout European armies that only the best and most intelligent of the year's cadets shall receive cavalry commissions. The position is such in the British army that any candidate for a commission who can scrape through Sandhurst is welcome in the cavalry, if he can show the £200 or £300 per annum necessary to keep himself.

To enter into the argument, cavalry *versus* mounted infantry, is not possible at the end of an already overlong article. But it must be apparent from what I have written that, as things have appeared to an observer on the spot, mounted infantry, imperfectly trained it is granted, has been a failure, whilst a minute body of ill-mounted but well-trained cavalry has done wonders. It would be less disquieting if one could think our mounted infantry was being well trained, but to those possessed of even the most perfunctory knowledge of what horses, horsemanship, and horsemastership mean, it must be evident that the three months' training given to our

mounted infantry is about as adequate for the purpose, as the training of a kindergarten would be adequate to fit a man for the University. Mounted infantry, particularly such as we are turning out in England, can never be expected properly to carry out the duties of reconnoissance, protection and the like, though these tasks are being required of it in South Africa to-day, and it is quite obvious that, if we are to be deficient in cavalry, the mounted infantry will be called upon to take its place in these respects, thereby depriving our army of what is deemed an important auxiliary arm, and employing it in work in which the Russian cavalry, similarly trained, has signally failed.

THE NORMAL MALAY AND THE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF INSANE MALAYS.*

BY MAJOR CHARLES E. WOODRUFF, M. D., SURGEON U. S. ARMY.

THE judge of the Court of First Instance, in the Seventh Judicial District of the Philippine Islands, asked me to make a professional examination of a certain epileptic (E. H.), aged fifteen and one-half, under trial for murder, and to give expert testimony, with the view of assisting the court to determine whether or not the accused was mentally responsible for his act. This paper is an outgrowth of the facts elicited in that examination.

"About November 1, 1902, a boy of about fifteen was missing from his home in Batangas Province, and five days later his half-buried body was found about 100 yards from the house of the accused. By the side of the corpse was the sheath of a bolo (large chopping knife used in all domestic purposes like a hatchet), recognized as belonging to the accused, who was thereupon arrested. His mother testified

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at the trial that upon the day of the disappearance of the deceased, her son came home with bloody hands, and upon questioning, he told her that he had just killed the deceased. There was no witness to the act and the prosecution had to depend upon the above facts.


"The accused stated, under oath, that he had met the deceased, who had accused him of stealing fruit from the orchard of the deceased's uncle, whereupon he charged the deceased with stealing fruit from him, the accused. The deceased then struck him with a club, and he struck back with the flat of his bolo, and in the ensuing fight he found he was being overpowered, and he then struck the deceased twice on the neck with the edge of his bolo, felling him to the ground; the accused then went home, returning about an hour later to find the dead body, the victim having died in the interval. He then dug a grave, buried the body and went home. He did not seem to conceal any fact, and was perfectly open in all his statements, which did not vary on cross-examination.

"The accused had a couple of convulsions in the court room, and in one of these I was present and recognized an epileptic seizure (*grand mal*) of ordinary severity. The testimony showed that he had had convulsions since about eight years of age, and that about the time of a fit he would often attack those near him, but in the prison, where he had a convulsion every day, he never showed this tendency.

His mother stated to me that these attacks upon bystanders always occur after a convulsion and that he then falls asleep. It was very difficult to talk through two interpreters—Tagalo to Spanish and Spanish to English—and we could not elicit exactly whether it was a real attack on people, of the nature of a postepileptic mania, or was merely the struggling of a convulsion. But it was never before the convulsion, and at the day of the murder he did not have a seizure until two hours after the murder, and a second one four hours later (2 P. M. and 6 P. M.). So the tendency to attack people can have no bearing upon the murder."

I saw in this case an illustration of the impossibility of applying medicolegal precedents found proper in dealing with higher races, and the necessity we are under in this, as in all other governmental matters in the Philippines, to strike out new paths. This paper is written with a view of calling attention to the extreme difficulty of administering legal methods according to our ideas at home.

Acts which we abhor are perfectly normal for these Malay people, on account of their savage brain. Most of them, by the way, have been in contact with civilization only about fifty years to one hundred and fifty years, about as long as our savage Indians, and some have never had civilizing influences. There is no appreciable change in the brain in several centuries, so that they are still savages, with a brain capacity of from sixty cubic inches to eighty cubic inches, or thereabouts, authorities differing very markedly in their estimates. It is safe to say that Americans on an average have twenty cubic inches or twenty-five cubic inches of brain more than this. So we must look upon Malays as savages



in mind, though some of them have money, know how to speak Spanish, and wear fine clothes. One must not confuse their condition with that of our own savage ancestors, who were a very brainy race, and though we call them savages, and the Romans called them barbarians, yet they had a high civilization which archeologists believe extend back probably so far as 5000 B. C. Rome was a sudden upstart of the same people, blood relatives of Teutons. The Germans, whom the legions met, were a well organized, well armed, brainy, civilized people, who subsequently made a more rapid and much greater stride in advancing civilization than the Roman branch did. But they all had the brain to work with, a brain

which required many millenniums to develop by natural selection, but our poor Malay, as to higher mental functions, is of a very low type, has been so for many millenniums, and will remain so forever.

The savage brain functions in a way we have not yet understood, and our mistake has heretofore been to consider that it is the same as our own, but merely untrained. We seem unable to escape from our early view that men are born mentally equal, or will be made equal by education. If the Malay and the civilized man are given a series of facts upon which to base an opinion, they may come to different conclusions, wholly at variance. We call the Oriental a mystic, and we have long ceased to try to fathom the ways of



the Chinese, or understand their reasoning, though the Chinese nation contains a large number of very intelligent men.

If some Malay soldiers are each given an anting-anting, or amulet to make them bullet proof, and half of them are killed in the first battle, we conclude from the facts that there is no protection in an anting-anting. They conclude there must be something wrong with the string, or the amulet was turned wrong side forward, or it had been bewitched by an evil-minded person.

The savage cannot help introducing into each syllogism a false independent idea, and he is just as logical as an insane man with a systematized delusion based upon a false idea.

Every alienist knows that the logic of many insane, particularly the paranoiacs, is perfect, only it is based upon a pre-existing false idea which is ineradicable. The logic of the paranoiac Guiteau was perfect, but it was based upon ineradicable false ideas which led him logically to commit the crime for which society said he should die, whether the alienists approved or not. Likewise, the savage does apparently illogical acts based upon false ideas which are not delusions, but are the product of a healthy though very inferior mind. For instance, when cholera appeared in the Philippines, and we fought it successfully in many places, we concluded our methods were good. Many of the Philippine physicians and priests concluded that, as so few people in the cities died, the disease was not cholera, and they logically advised that all precautions should cease. It is the commonest thing for Americans to deny the existence of contagious disease and allow it to spread, but it is a logical act, deliberately planned to avoid some inconvenience or loss, even if we do injure or kill others thereby. There are no false ideas about the matter at all, as it is the normal selfishness of human nature.


The false ideas of savage minds cannot be eradicated at present, and we cannot expect these men to do the right thing, for they are as dangerous to themselves and their fellows as the paranoiacs are among us. Yet it might be said that false ideas are very prevalent among us, and so they are. There are a million people in America with implicit faith in Christian science. There are millions who believe that if the government stamps a piece of paper or base metal, that the stamp gives it value; indeed one could write a book on popular false ideas. The point is this, it is generally only a very small minority which holds to any one false idea, and they gradually relinquish it. The weight of the majority convinces in the end, and fads disappear. In a savage race a false idea will become universal at once, and be held in spite of evidence. They cannot release the idea any more than a child can release the idea that the stars are very near the earth, and that the world is small and flat.

The more absurd the proposition the easier it is, apparently, for the Malay to accept it. Consequently he is victimized by innumerable fraudulent schemes. Alleged holy images of the Virgin are manufactured to extort immense sums from the credulous, who believe any stories of their miraculous powers. Only recently an alleged society was discovered, which, for a fee, promised the natives exemption from all taxes and all health regulations and guaranteed an honorable mention in Washington. Men convicted of crimes, but released by amnesty, have had no difficulty in convincing other natives that they were released through bribing the courts. In Batangas we noticed a native rain dance, evidently Malay in origin and modified by Christianity by having an image of a Christian saint to dance before, instead of the old idols. There is such a dread of famine that they pray for rain after the planting, which is done at the end of the dry season in May and June. They have probably done so for ages, and they were beating a tomtom exactly as American Indians or African negroes. They have implicit faith in the prayer or dance for rain, and my servant told me that when they dipped the Saint in the water the previous day it rained within thirty minutes. Among higher races we find now and then a few people who have the same childlike faith in prayer for rain in dry seasons, but among the Malays, all believe in its efficacy.

Malays are children scientifically, for their development is about that of a child of ten, and they behave as children. In the courts, their practices, subterfuges, excuses, denials of facts, avoidance of the spirit of rules while obeying the letter of them, and inability to see the truth or know its value, are precisely what we find among white children at home, and added to this there is a wonderful ingenuity in concocting falsehoods. It is an axiom of anthropology that lower races are in a state of arrested brain evolution, and that civilized children pass through all the stages found normally in adult savage ancestors. The natural causes which stopped their evolution many thousands of years ago, are now under discussion by anthropologists, but we may say in passing that if they are to grow more brain by twenty to forty cubic


inches, by the same methods which made ours grow—natural selection of the brainiest in each generation and destruction of the stupid—it will take many thousands of years. As a matter of fact they will never be more intelligent, but the reverse, from our philanthropic methods of keeping alive the most stupid by charity—men who would naturally perish.

No educational system can increase their brain weight, but will train them to use their defective brains to more advantage. Our pedagogs at home are bemoaning their utter failure to increase national intelligence, because they believed that education was to make our skulls balloon out to accommodate bigger brains. They have really been highly suc-



cessful, and have done grand work in that they have made it possible, by mental training, for Americans to use their brains to great advantage. The trained but poor horse wins the race over a better but untrained one. A college graduate has an immense advantage over a man of superior intelligence who cannot use it effectively by reason of lack of training. The same wail comes from our Indian schools, which are now pronounced to be flat failures because they did not make the red boys grow "white brains." When the teacher saw the boys go back to the reservation and take up blanket life, they were much discouraged, but it was a very natural thing for these boys to do, as they had the same "red

brains" they possessed before they went to school. It is very regrettable that educators do not recognize the fact that education will never make the brain grow larger. Our universities are forever preaching the doctrine that education is a panacea for national stupidity, and that if we will educate the negroes a sufficient number of generations, they will become white men. The false ideas following from this are very farreaching. Professor Frederic W. Atkinson,* who was Superintendent of Education in the Philippines, has written a very able article, calling attention to the tremendous difficulties of grafting an Aryan government upon the Malay, but he seems inclined to believe that in time the



Malay's brain will enlarge under the process. He mentions that our negro question is still unsolved, and he could have surmised that the negro will always be a negro with a brain many cubic inches less than the average white brain, and yet he concluded: "We have scratched a Malay, and at some future date we need not be surprised to find an American, at least in spirit, initiative and capacity." On the contrary, we should surely be surprised at such a violation of the laws of heredity. Some thousands of years hence, Malays will still be Malays, and white men will still be white men. Nevertheless, education has accomplished very much for the Indian,

*New York *Tribune*, October 30, 1904.

and will accomplish wonders for the Filipino, but it will never make either of them think like an Aryan.

The jury system is wholly unsuited to Filipinos. Even if they were friendly to American methods, a jury would occasionally bring in verdicts wholly at variance with facts. Even now, we may have gone a step too far, because we have made no provision to have white men always tried before white judges for alleged offenses—a rule we have found necessary in all other oriental countries. It is only within a few years that we have permitted the Japanese to try Europeans, and the Japs are much higher in intelligence than the Malay of the Philippines. At all other places, we have consular courts for such trials. In Batangas Province recently, a white school teacher was arrested for punishing a refractory pupil in a manner which, so far as known, would be allowed by any school board at home, and then without a hearing or trial of any description, was sentenced to fifteen days' confinement and actually submitted to confinement until released on a writ of habeas corpus. In Pampanga Province, a school teacher became an object of popular hatred and the town unanimously demanded his removal because he had expelled a boy for filling all the ink-wells one morning with human feces. In Mindanao, teachers were stoned because they were believed to have poisoned the wells and caused cholera.

We now see why these childish savages cannot possibly understand our legal methods. The laws of evidence are absolutely beyond the comprehension of their "brown brains." Our system of jurisprudence has been of very slow growth, and its rules are the survival of the fittest for intelligent Anglo-Saxon freemen, but wholly inapplicable to races of less intelligence. The English did not understand this fact when they first established courts in India, and their judges made very unjust decisions because they trusted the sworn evidence. They found eventually that false swearing was normal among the natives, and that the most solemn affidavit was more apt to be a tissue of falsehoods than to be the truth. Indeed, the presentation of manufactured evidence became a fine art—a trade even. A false deed to a property, or any other kind of document, can be obtained at

any time, and there are men who have adopted a specialty of making legal blanks with even the watermark of any required year made in the paper. Their jurisprudence now consists in roundabout methods of finding out what sworn testimony is false and what is true. As a rule, manufactured defenses destroy themselves by too much childish elaboration. For instance, a native policeman accused of murder of a man with whom he had previously had other fights, would probably have escaped if he had merely stated he had been fired at and shot back, but he introduced his hat in evidence to show the two bullet holes. These were simply two tears made by some sharp stick and connected by a black line on the outside of the hat, and the black mark on chemic tests showed no evidence of lead, as it would if it had been made by the bullet. Another policeman implicated in this murder showed his hat, too, claiming a bullet went through it, but the holes had been cut out by a knife.

Our system of jurisprudence is based upon our ability to elicit the truth by means of an oath, and it grew up because public opinion recognized the binding nature of an oath, and because he who ignored it lost caste and was otherwise severely punished. In other races, where the oath is not recognized as binding, other methods of eliciting the truth are evolved. These may be very cruel and brutal, as in China, but we cannot adopt such methods. Hence, we are without means now of getting at the exact facts in our courts, for the Malay considers perjury as a venial offense, if not praiseworthy, and it is generally recognized that it is possible to buy with a few dollars any kind of testimony we wish and to convict innocent men. In course of time, of course, perjury will cease when it becomes too dangerous, just as murders of Americans are becoming very rare because it is too dangerous to kill white men. There is an interesting account of perjury among Hindus in Lord Macaulay's essay on Warren Hastings, which exactly fits the Filipino. It is said that the State of California had to pass ingeniously contrived statutes which prevented the acceptance of the testimony of Chinese and Indians when opposed

to that of a white man, and this subterfuge was scientifically correct and necessary.

Most of us went to the islands thoroughly imbued with the idea of the truthfulness of the downtrodden native, and it is even rumored that occasionally a judge would accept a native's sworn testimony in preference to an American's when their testimony was contradictory. When these judges found they had been imposed upon and the testimony upon which they had based their decisions was a tissue of falsehoods, they were much chagrined.


There has been an opinion expressed that for the trial of white men in the tropics there should be some kind of a jury



of white American citizens in lieu of the consular courts elsewhere, possibly in the nature of a court-martial, but though it raises interesting psychologic questions, it does not concern us here, except to emphasize the fact that a jury of Malays to decide upon evidence is forever an impossibility. The sooner we recognize the differences between races of men, the sooner will we understand the new duties thrust upon us in the Philippines. The time is long past when one kind of legal procedure will fit all kinds of men in our possessions, and no one in the United States should insist upon such an unnatural uniformity.

The Malay, then, will commit crimes which are normal and natural for any childish savage. Captured soldiers have

been roasted to death over slow fires; one is reported to have been spitted on a bamboo thrust through his body from mouth to rectum, roasted, and then fed to the pigs. Many a corpse has been found with the sexual organs cut off and thrust into the mouth. Many have been buried alive, others half buried, and something sweet smeared on the face to attract ants and flies. Suspected spies or American sympathizers have been hamstringed or have had their tongues cut out, cheeks split open or blinded by cutting the eyes open, and others have had their ears cut off. Many have been murdered for mere suspicion that they were American sym-



pathizers, and very many of these were not American sympathizers at all, but the lie was invented by a personal enemy in revenge for some past grudge. To have killed an Americanista (Malay, who sides with the Americans) is a great honor and our former native friends, in a few places, were subjected to persecution where the ex-insurgents secured local control of civil affairs.

Manduducot is the Tagalog word for professional murderers, who are sufficiently numerous to have required a special name and the demand for their services is great enough to keep the profession in existence. So far as known, they are engaged in other work, but murder is their occasional business, that is, whenever they have a call. They

simply contract to receive a fee if a man dies and they dispose of him in any manner they please. A special small class of professional murderers are the poisoners called *Maglalason* (Tagalog). They are said to use a vegetable poison which acts something like rattlesnake venom, but very little is known as to the materials used. They are said to poison wells and streams, poison the fish, bows and arrows and the stakes used in pitfalls. The Malay thinks these are legitimate means of warfare, and they were directed in general orders of the insurgent army. Malvar had to forbid poisoning the streams, because it was killing his own people. Poisoning is so well known that it must be a common procedure, a fact we should surmise from the necessity for a special word in a poverty-stricken language which has so few words that curious roundabout expressions are needed for the commonest objects. Murder is such an important matter that they have at least two other words for the crime, used according to the manner and instrumentality, and not as in English where the words indicate the relationship of the murderer to the victim, as regicide, parricide, etc.

These facts illustrate the remarkable cheapness of life in all savage races. In their native state they must murder to live, for they are always encroaching on the hunting ground of others; and when they are subdued by a civilization which permits them to over-populate the country far beyond the means of existence, it is really a great advantage to have many killed off. A Moro Dato only voiced the general opinion when he replied to a white doctor's request for some volunteers to supply a little skin for grafting on a poor fellow of the tribe to save his life: "No, he is not worth it; let him die." Dramas in which murder is enacted seem to give exquisite delight to a Malay audience.


Like all savages, they delight in cruel deeds and seem to take pleasure in the sufferings of others. There are shrieks of laughter in an audience whenever a performing acrobat meets with a painful accident. If several men are carrying a heavy box and it slips from their grasp and crushes the foot of one of them, the others laugh inordinately at it as a fine joke. Cruelty to animals is also a normal trait. A car-

riage driver will try to run over dogs lying in the road and then laugh gleefully at the howls of the injured beasts. A Japanese driver or jinrickisha man will avoid a puppy in the road, even at the greatest exertion. A friend mentioned to me that he once heard prolonged agonizing groans, evidently from an injured cow, and upon investigation, he found one was being butchered. It is necessary to save the blood, as this country is suffering at all times from partial starvation, from lack of nitrogenous foods, and all animal foods are utilized to their utmost drop, and they even dig up the dead horses we bury. So they had broken the legs of the animal to quiet its struggles, and had partly skinned it alive from the neck down, to form a pocket to hold the blood. The Igorrotes beat their animals (dogs and hogs) to death, claiming the meat is much improved thereby. All the details of savage cruelty in Malays have been long familiar to us as a normal trait of North American Indians. There is indeed a wonderful resemblance between some of these Malays and some of our Indians. I have seen Malay tribes which could not be distinguished from Apaches. They are branches of one main stock.

Now, in the arrested development of the white criminals who are degenerate, Lombroso and others have pointed out the numerous resemblances to savages. Hence, we see that acts denoting criminality at home are perfectly normal in the Malay, and this brings us to the point of the case at hand. There was no escaping the conclusion that the act committed by the accused showed no evidence of insanity, as it was one which is quite common among normal Malays. According to our home standards, we would conclude that such a cold-blooded manner after the offense was committed surely indicated abnormality of some kind, and so it would in a white boy, but not in a Malay. The story of self-defense is very shrewd, but it overreaches itself, for it fails to explain fully why the fatal wounds were in the back of the head and neck, though it was possible for them to have been thus inflicted in the fight. Fights are usually to death, even in an altercation which at home would merely result in a few black eyes. So that it is really normal for a man to kill his antag-

onist as soon as he can. Murders for trivial matters are so common among white criminals as to have elicited a great deal of literature in criminal anthropology.

To show the normal character of Malay criminals, I had a few photographs taken in the prison yard. No. 1 is a Manduducot, and he seemed to be the best looking and most normal man in the prison. I could find nothing abnormal about him. The same may be said of the two other murderers, Nos. 2 and 3, who also claim that their acts were defensive.



This group of three are as good looking as average Malays, if not superior to the Malay workingman. It is to be noted that certain savage facial characters, high cheek bones, voluminous jaws, etc., mentioned by Lombroso as characteristic of his type of the born criminal, are seen here, but they are normal racial characters. Lombroso called them atavistic when found in whites, but in this he may have been mistaken, for we have but little or no evidence that our ancestors were ever exactly like existing savages, who have been

changed by natural selection very much since they separated from the parent genealogic stem. Indeed, no pure-blooded normal savages look exactly like his type of the white "born criminal."

Nos. 4, 5, 6 and 7 are ordinary thieves, who are charged with cattle stealing and such crimes. Here we have some evidence of abnormality, and it is likely that we have more or less difference from type and of the nature of degeneration. This is to be expected when we consider that their acts are antisocial and so harmful as to be looked upon as wrong by the mass of the people.



But in Nos. 8, 9 and 10 we have clear-cut evidence of degeneration in the evident stigmata, misshapen ears, etc. Curiously enough, there are no deformities of the teeth and jaws among the full bloods; their teeth are generally perfect in form and in the contour of the arches, and generally well preserved, though the half-breeds, or mestizos, particularly the Spanish types, have excessively degenerate teeth and jaws. One of the group is believed to have white blood (No. 8), and a more villainous looking wretch can scarcely be imagined. His face can be duplicated in Lombroso's pictures of the "born criminal." These men are all professional ladrones, real

parasites upon their kind. As soon as I had discovered the fact of degeneration in two ladrones, I was able to pick a third one of the crowd by his very evident stigmata, and found on investigation that such was his calling. Not all ladrones are degenerates by any means. Robbing neighboring tribes is a normal act among all savages, and this can easily be stretched to robbing as a profession, so there is no more disgrace attached to it as a business than there was in England a century or two ago, when highwaymen

were often aristocrats. Ladronism has always been organized, supported and led by the better classes of the people, the rich and cultivated, the mestizo, and it was precisely the same as the organized robbery which existed in London up to 1815. Yet it is curious that nearly all the degenerates in the prison were ladrones, and the murderers normal—a fact pointed out by Lombroso in Europe, also, as to the normality of many assassins. It is a remarkable fact that many, if not most of the Malay ladrones were guerillas in the insurrection, exactly like Jesse and Frank James, and the Younger brothers (Robert, Coleman and James), who were members of Quantrell's band of guerillas in our insurrection of 1861. They took to ladronism after peace was declared just as these Malays. No. 12 is another view of No. 6. He is afflicted with a form of insanity which is probably chronic mania in which there are peculiar cataleptic states, in one of which he was photographed.

The accused (No. 11) shows the typic placid *facies epileptica*, but no marked stigmata of degeneration; nor could I find any account of nervous disease in his seven brothers and sisters, of whom five had died. Such high mortality of children is not unusual in Malays. His mother was a well-marked degenerate, with goiter, arrested jaws, bad teeth and distorted dental arches, subject to headaches for two years, and all her life had had what was translated as "dizzy spells," but which were probably *petit mal*, as her mother and two cousins were epileptics. She was not pure blooded, there being a Spanish ancestor somewhere, which I understood was a grandfather. She was a tiny, frail, subdued thing, suffering greatly from dyspnea after climbing the steps, and with a serious cough and some evidence of tuberculous invasion of the lungs.

It is generally recognized that epilepsy is a symptom of an unknown cortical disease which may or may not cause an insanity, though sooner or later it always causes more or less dementia, according to the severity of the process. The disease attacks only those with some peculiar hereditary defect, which in the immediate ancestor may not necessarily have resulted in epilepsy. In this case the evidence and the

examinations showed nothing which might be called insanity—that is, he possessed reason. He showed he knew the difference between right and wrong—the old standard of responsibility. He knew it was illegal and wrong to kill, though it was a natural act. When we come to the newer and best, and only test, for Anglo-Saxon responsibility—"free will or power of doing or abstaining," we have an entirely different problem in the Malay. I seriously doubt whether two normal Malays in a serious personal quarrel can resist their normal tendency to kill. They are normally in the condition to which an Anglo-Saxon's volition may be lowered by a mental disease which does not affect his intellectual faculties to an appreciable degree. When the Malay is similarly afflicted with a mental disease, whether acute or chronic, which weakens his savage and therefore feeble volition or inhibition, his normal bloodthirstiness flashes out, and he runs amuck. His only desire is to kill as many as he can before he is cut down, and he therefore attacks mostly old men, women and children. The only case I know personally was in Pampanga, and the murderer was known to have had dengue fever for several days, and a temperature of 104° to 105°. In the delirium of this he boloed about eight people, half of whom died. The Moros practice the amuck also, but it is an entirely different matter with them, being a curious combination of religious and erotic exaltation in which they desire to be killed while in the act of killing Christians. It is reported that the priest causes an erection, then ties a string around the base of the penis to retain the blood, and after certain ceremonies the man is decked out in special costume, shaved in a certain way, and sent forth to kill. Perpetual sexual pleasures in heaven are to be his reward as taught in the Koran.

The insurrection was a grand opportunity for the Malay bad-men, who joined the army *en masse*. The better class of Filipinos, who organized the forces, did not know that they were creating a terrible Frankenstein which would destroy itself. The Spaniards, by force and by religion, had kept the Malay element in fair control, and the prisons were always crowded with men awaiting trial. Pangasinan is said

to have had 200 to 500, whereas at this writing it had but fifteen or so. We may question their method, but it certainly was effective in keeping the worst men locked up, and to this extent it protected the community. The mestizo rulers did not really understand the extent of this bad element, so carefully shut up by the Spaniards. When they found out what an awful savage machine this army really was, many of them stood aghast at the results of their own work, and tried to undo it by bringing about subjection to American sovereignty, to obtain that security of life and property unattainable by reason of their own army. The same thing happened in France, when during the revolution and also the commune, common criminals and even the insane were released only to rob and murder their friends. Hence, innumerable crimes were committed by Malay officers and soldiers, and as many of these had to be released under amnesty, they returned immediately to ladronism. At Naujan, some who had been sentenced to death returned, and the first thing they did was to capture and kill the town officials, including the justice of the peace, after torturing and mutilating them.

It is evident that inability to control themselves in the desire to do murder is a normal savage characteristic, and cannot possibly be urged as a basis for acquittal. With Anglo-Saxons, we do not consider why we abstain from criminal acts; it may be natural desire or deterrent effects of future punishment; the only thing the law considers is the fact that we have the power if we are in health, and that we must use it.

In the case at hand, we had this sure ground: "In true epileptic mania, the criminal act is usually unpremeditated, motiveless, and accompanied by impairment of consciousness and temporary loss of memory; conscious anger in an epileptic should, therefore, be distinguished from true epileptic mania." There was nothing left, then, but to report that there was no evidence of insanity at the time of the deed. If he had been in a psychic equivalent of the convulsion, his memory of the events would not have been as clear cut as his evidence shows, unless his statement was mostly fiction.

Under the intricacies of the Spanish law, which takes the

age of the accused into consideration, and makes many fine distinctions in cases having few facts for the prosecution, but relying in large part upon a confession, the whole of which had to be taken or not at all, and which provides that the plea of self-defense, though imperfect, mitigates the penalty, he was sentenced to confinement for four years, and the court ordered his further detention as an epileptic, also a matter possible under Spanish law.

After the case was well under way, the *Medical Record* of November 15, 1902, came to hand, containing the article of Punton on "The Criminal Responsibility of the Epileptic." It was used as far as practicable, but it was an intense satisfaction to know that away out there in the tropics, on the other side of the world from home, our courts in cutting out paths for these new problems, should instinctively take the pathway advocated by our best thinkers, but not always possible at home, because it necessitates moving the weighty courts out of the old ruts of precedent. The medical expert was called as an impartial agent of special knowledge to assist the court in coming to a just conclusion. It is also a satisfaction to know that in all such cases in which insanity enters as an excuse for murder, it is already possible to hold such persons "under rigid medical surveillance for the rest of their lives as too dangerous to themselves and society to be at large."

As an ethical matter, one might assert that it is wrong to punish savages for acts which to them are normal. Indeed, Manila native newspapers, on this ground, actually advocated leniency to criminals, and even liberating some of them. So long as the act is merely immoral according to our standard, it may be possible to ignore it and overcome the tendency gradually, though it must be confessed that two centuries of precept and example have not lessened to a marked degree the sexual or other immoral acts of our negroes. It can be answered that the welfare of civilized people demands that savagery must cease throughout the world. It must be safe to travel or do business wherever our needs compel us to go, and all people must abide by civilized rules, whether they like it or not. We, ourselves, are still immoral naturally, and would commit some crimes normally were it not for the

restraint of civilization, as seen in mob actions when the restraints are removed for a little while. Only a few crimes are unnatural, and only a few degenerates commit them, but the great mass of moral white men are restrained from committing natural misdemeanors and crimes by fear of punishment, not by abhorrence of the act. Civilization is a complex system of checks upon our tendency to do evil, therefore, the savage merely exaggerates to a large degree what we have in a minor degree, and he must abide by the same laws. Civilization has been thrust on us too quickly for us to be adjusted to it perfectly, for it takes many centuries to change the brain, and we naturally like to act like our savage Teutonic ancestors, but we restrict our personal freedom and submit to law, and remove those who will not submit to it voluntarily. We apply these rules to American Indians and to savage Malays, who will also be removed unless they submit to civilized law. They must be punished when they commit acts such as they normally committed before civilization reached them, but which are called crimes by us.

We must recognize the difference between a Malay and Anglo-Saxon brain, and must give full credit to the wonderful work being accomplished by the civil and military officers, both of whom have been confronted by conditions formerly undreamed of, and both of whom are hewing out new paths so different from the ones used at home for two centuries. The home people should be patient, and should not criticise until they learn what they are criticising. In the larger Philippine cities, where we can control the natives, life is already safer than in the larger cities of the United States, if we can judge by the proportion of murders to population. In the rural districts, where there is less American control, of course the conditions are worse, and the percentage of murders is quite high, but the American, nearly everywhere in the Philippines, is safer than he is in the slums of our cities.

As a side thought, we can well see that the time is not so far off when the civilized world shall demand that life and property be made safe in tropic America, and if we, by our Monroe doctrine, will prevent Europeans from doing this

work, and yet brutally refuse to do it ourselves, there is sure to be trouble. Our Philippine work, therefore, is the kind we sought when we migrated to America, and recent Panama history is a direct result of the spread of our northern civilization.

All that has been said here of the Malays refers to the full-bloods, whether educated or not. The half-breeds, quarter-breeds, etc., may be of any grade of intelligence, according to that of their white parents. Among them are some of the gentlest and most lovable people I have ever met; some are highly intelligent, cultivated and refined; some are great artists, and others are prominent jurists, yet many are very low in morals and intelligence. The better element among them, who compare favorably with Anglo-Saxons, are such a small percentage of the population—much less than a tenth of one per cent.—as to be negligible in such matters as we have discussed. The commission of natives which visited the St. Louis Fair and toured the United States was composed mostly of these mestizos of high character and intelligence. In the insurgent government the mestizos constituted, under the name of a democratic republic, an aristocracy, which attempted to establish an oligarchy, with pure-blood Malays as peasants and slaves.

The Malay characters come out strongly now and then, even in this upper better class, just as negro characters flash out in strong relief in our mulattos. Occasionally the mestizo shows the same inability to know or realize the truth as the Malay. For instance, some of the thin upper crust of educated people raised a great outcry against sending to the St. Louis Exposition any representatives of the 6,000,000 lower Malays, because they would give to the Americans a false idea of the real people of the Islands. They were perfectly honest in their belief that the Americans will know the Islands best by concealing from them the most, and really believe also that representatives of the small educated mestizo class will give the Americans a correct idea of the Philippine people. Gilbert H. Grosvenor's article upon the Filipinos* in this respect is very misleading, as it deals to a large

* Nat. Geog. Mag., April, 1905.

extent with the characteristics of the thin upper crust, which is not Malay at all. He pictures mestizos, but our photographs are of Malays.


The Chinese mestizos are the most vigorous both mentally and physically of all the half-castes in the Islands, as they are descended from two allied types, and are the most nearly adjusted to the climate. They constitute the mass of the leaders. One of the most curious and amusing incidents of my residence in the Philippines occurred at a debate of some high-school boys at their graduating exercises. They were all mestizos, and it was in a part of the Islands where nearly all the half-castes are of Chinese extraction. Some of them had Chinese facial characters, and I was informed that two had Chinese fathers. They were much superior to the Malay because of that Chinese blood, for the latter race is, on the average, at a much higher intellectual level than the Malay who had originated a very poor and primitive civilization with borrowed alphabet prior to Spanish times, while that of the Chinese is very high and very old. Yet each of these Chinese mestizo boys had something mean and ungenerous to say of the Chinese, calling them barbarians, even savages without history or civilization, and intimating that they were mere animals. It was a reflection of the general trend of public opinion, or an intense racial hatred, somewhat similar to that fraternal hatred formerly existing between Americans and the English, in spite of the fact that nearly all of our early great men were of English blood.

From what has been said, it is evident that the mestizo insurgent government was correct in attempting to form an aristocracy, for it would have been more terrible to allow the Malay to control by rule of the majority, than it was to allow the negro to control in the West Indies. Nevertheless, what would have happened when this aristocracy, if successful, began to quarrel among themselves is really too terrible to contemplate. General Luna's death was a foretaste of the reign of terror which was to come. These medicolegal cases illustrate the tremendous difficulty of grafting upon a lower race forms of government evolved by Anglo-Saxons for themselves and shown to be good in our villages, where every

man is able to take part in the town meeting, the modern descendant of the old folk-moot. Our Pilgrim fathers established an aristocracy as in Greece, and dared not admit the Indian to a share in the sovereignty, and the descendants of the first settlers cannot admit the Malay, who in so many respects resembles the Indian. The exclusion of most of the negroes from politics in our South, and Chinese in our West, and the exclusion of most of the Malays from Filipino politics, are as natural as the exclusion of the Indians from a share of the government of the New England colonies.

There is a curious similarity in the opinions which certain white men entertain as to negroes, American Indians and Malays. The man who understands these lower races the best expects the least from them, treats them gently but firmly, as children, though never as equals, is never disgusted with them when they act like cruel children, and, in their proper sphere, invariably loves them for their good traits—and they have good traits and plenty of them, too. But he who knows the least about them expects them to act like the highest races, and when he finds the poor things fail to live up to such a standard, he develops a hatred for them which is as unreasonable as his first attitude. The men who injured our negro the most were those who, through sheer ignorance of his abilities, forced upon him the civil powers he could not use, and who now hate him for his failure; and the greatest enemies of the Malay at the present time are these same men, who, through ignorance of his abilities, are clamoring as in 1860 to 1865 to give him full civil powers which he cannot understand nor use. We deprived both negro and Malay of his protector; and let us not neglect the Malay as we did the poor emancipated negro. We must silence that foolish clamor to give to the Malay an independence which he can never sustain, and above all else, we must resist the clamor to give him a government fit only for a New England village.

Facts mentioned in this paper are matters of personal observation or have been certified to me as facts by those who have observed them.



NOTES ON CAVALRY.

BY BRIGADIER-GENERAL HENRY T. ALLEN, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY.

PERIODICALLY appear expressions on the part of army officers recommending government stud farms where horses may be bred for cavalry purposes. From many points of view this measure commends itself, and I do not doubt that good mounts could be secured by it. The attempt on the part of the government to breed its own horses would, however, be opposed to our traditions, and not in harmony with the decentralized policy of a government where all possible is left to the initiative of individuals. The measure would be not only unpopular with horse breeders, but would be bitterly opposed by them. Under present conditions and considering the opposition that would be engendered, it is not deemed wise to push this method.

The following is the outline of a system partially under government supervision that, it is believed, would be satisfactory and one that should commend itself to horse breeders and mounted officers. By this, contracts would be given to

breeders for horses conforming to required specifications, from sires and dams approved by quartermasters or other officers detailed for the work.

Presenting this in a concrete form, it would be necessary to find certain horse breeders in favored parts of the Middle States or Middle Western States, in any event in localities near large cavalry garrisons, who would agree to furnish sound four-year-olds, solid colors, broken to saddle, and not less than fifteen hands high, from sires and dams to be selected by the officers designated. For properly bred horses delivered at garrisons the government could well afford to pay twenty to thirty per cent. above prevailing contract prices, which do not include delivery.

Admitting that the ideal cavalry horses are hunters which can carry weight at stiff paces over rough country for long periods, every effort should be made to produce such animals in numbers for our service. The sooner we get away from the so-called "typical cavalry horse," with his short coupling and big barrel—in most cases an overgrown pony that will strain itself in a five-mile gallop at a pace that would be at the normal stride of a real charger—the better it will be for the mounted service. In fact, if a horse has good broad loins his length of body will never be too great.

It is not believed that proper types can be obtained from thoroughbreds alone, for the simple reason that they are not strong enough. It will be necessary therefore to cross standard bred stock with the thoroughbred, special attention being given to size, strength and temperament. It would be unfortunate to start with stock of vicious temperament, because this would entail double work and time in the training.

There is a difference of opinion as to whether the thoroughbred strains should come from the dams or sires. In my opinion, both ways should be practiced until something definite be ascertained. It does not follow from what is stated here that only thoroughbreds or standard bred sires and dams should be used; but it is important that the strains be known and that enough good blood be in them to produce at least half thoroughbred offspring.

While stationed at Fort Riley I took up this matter of breeding cavalry horses with two local stockmen, who readily assented to the proposition, provided a contract could be made with the Quartermaster Department to be effective about four years beyond the fiscal year appropriation. Perhaps that would require special legislation. The breeders in question agreed to be responsible for everything connected with the purchase, care and maintenance of the farms, to permit any army officer to select within reasonable limits the sires and dams, and in general to supervise the breeding and selection of strain on condition that they receive twenty-five dollars above the then existing contract price for their four-year-olds, delivered at the post and conforming to specifications.

Under these conditions the breeder would have a sure market for his stock and the government, without any risk whatever, would be encouraging the breeding of good horses, and would be securing at a most reasonable price what it needs in order to maintain a high grade mounted service.

Following this still further, it would be advisable that the mounts furnished by the various contract farms be turned into a horse recruit school at the nearest large cavalry post, where they should receive at least three months' systematic progressive training.

Provided the breeders, who should be bonded, get lawful assurances that their mounts will be received when duly delivered, there should be no difficulty in making a beginning in this important matter.

GALLOPING TRUE AND GALLOPING FALSE.

BY CAPTAIN H. LA T. CAVENAUGH, TENTH CAVALRY.

IN our present Drill Regulations there is a strange inaccuracy, which has been repeated word for word in all the Cavalry Drill Regulations since 1891, and possibly before that. This inaccuracy is in the description of the manner in which a horse gallops true, in the analysis of that gait, and in the instructions for taking it; and arises from the vagueness and ambiguity of terms used, conveying to the reader an entirely false idea of that gait. As a matter of fact, the analysis of the gait is diametrically opposite to that made by other good authorities, and one of the two must be wrong. This same confusion and ambiguity of terms appears in Carter's "Horses, Saddles and Bridles," though his discussion of galloping true and of the galloping stride may be correct.

Cavalry Drill Regulations, page 139, says: "A horse gallops on the *right* foot when the right fore and hind legs *move in advance* of the left fore and hind legs. He gallops true when he gallops *on* the right foot in marching to the right, etc." What do these mean? The right legs *pass* the left legs, and vice versa, so that in the same stride, first one leg of a pair and then the other is in advance. Does the text mean in advance at the beginning of a stride or at the end of it? What does galloping on the right foot mean? He uses *both* feet. The terms may mean something to a horseman, but what does it mean to a recruit, a noncommissioned officer, or to many officers? I must confess it doesn't mean a thing to me personally.

On page 140, in instructing how to take the gallop, the text says: "Carry the bridle hand to the left, and press the left leg with vigor; these actions throw the weight on the near hind foot, and allow the off fore and hind feet to lead." Is this correct? Will pressing in the left foot throw the weight on the near hind foot? Decidedly not; it will throw

the weight on the *off* hind foot, and the horse will step off with the near hind foot.

Again, on page 200, in the analysis of gaits, the text says: "The gallop has four beats, the regular order of succession being right hind foot, left hind foot, right fore foot, left fore foot, and so on. When galloping to the *right* hand, the horse goes into the air from the *left* fore foot." Compare this with what the well known authority, E. L. Anderson, in his "Curb, Snaffle and Spur," says on pages 84 and 85: "In galloping right the horse plants the left hind leg after going into the air; it then plants the right hind leg, then the left fore leg, and lastly the *right* fore leg, *from which it goes into the air for a new stride.*" In this paragraph the italics are mine, and, either Drill Regulations or Anderson is wrong. Anderson has the support of other writers, but I have yet to see any support the Drill Regulations. Carter, in his "Horses, Saddles and Bridles," discusses the gallop, and illustrates a complete stride. If only he had said whether, in the illustration, the horse was galloping right or left, his discussion would have been clear, but unfortunately he does not. On pages 124 and 125 he says: "When the course is curvilinear * * * he must steady his equilibrium on that side by the foothold of the corresponding propelling member; the right if the course turn to the right, the left if it turn to the left." Which is perfectly correct, but does not explain clearly how it is done. Again, on page 125, he says: "The gallop is called true when it is effected upon the right foot when the horse turns to the right. It is called false under contrary conditions, that is, when the horse gallops to the right on a curve while leading with the left fore foot." On page 126 he says: "In the riding hall or on a curved track the horse leads with the fore foot which is nearest the center." Now what is meant by saying that the gallop is "effected" upon a certain foot, or that a horse "leads" with a certain foot? If in the illustration on page 123, the horse is galloping to the right hand, then Carter agrees with the Drill Regulations, for Figure 2 shows his horse going into the air from the *left* fore foot, and is therefore, according to the Drill Regulations, traveling true to the right. If, however,

the horse is galloping left, the Drill Regulations do not agree with him. In Figures 4, 5, 6 and 7 the right foot is leading; in 8, 9, 10 and 11 the left foot is leading; to which does the term apply? It would seem very simple and clear to say that the horse gallops right when the right fore foot strikes the ground last at the end of the stride.

I would instruct the recruit, in order to make the horse gallop right: Carry the bridle rein *gently* to the left and lift it slightly, press the left foot with vigor, and *throw his balance* slightly to the right. If this is done, and the aids and balance are changed at the proper moment, any horse, even an old troop plough horse, will gallop true on a figure eight.

It is not difficult to watch the fore feet, and only a few lessons are necessary to teach the soldier that, galloping on a curve, the inside fore foot strikes the ground last, and to show him how to accomplish it.

RIFLE PRACTICE AT WEST POINT.

WE give below two articles from *Shooting and Fishing* relative to rifle practice at West Point. We must say that we agree with the remarks of the superintendent. It has of course been some years since our own West Point experience, but we understand that the summer months at the Academy are more fully occupied than formerly. This being so, we see no chance for detailed instruction of rifle teams, due to lack of time. The editor of the valuable paper whose articles we give below thinks the superintendent's report open to argument, and gives two points in support of the wish to have Academy teams still compete. We think his first argument answered by the suggestion given in the *Infantry Journal*. As for the second, it is not so easily answered, for the idea there expressed compels the attendance of an Academy team.

As we recall our summers at the Point, we remember but one summer, the one when we were first class men, when we

could have found any time for the practice necessary for a competing team. We had during first class camp about one month when our afternoons from 2 o'clock to 4 were not used. It might be possible, if those hours are still available (which we doubt) to so interest certain cadets that they would be willing to forego their only resting spell from four years' hard work, excepting of course furlough, to try to maintain the enviable record that West Point holds in other competitive events. People who are not West Pointers do not understand the terrible strain that is put upon the cadets, and when we say cadets, we mean every one of them, for the strain is universal. If the conditions at the Academy were like those of the ordinary academy or university, time might be found for rifle practice, but we hardly see any chance for a gain of the time that would be necessary to train a team that would reflect credit upon the greatest military school, not only in our own country, but we believe in the world at large. It does seem that our leading military school should be ready to compete with other schools in matters military, but the conditions at the Point happen to be such that time is not available for everything under the sun. The cadet does as much in his four years as we can *unreasonably* expect of him, and we believe the medical department would promptly call a halt on any addition to the curriculum.

As for his subsequently becoming an instructor, there are many things that a cadet does not learn at the Academy, and that the service has to teach him after his graduation. We believe that under present conditions finished instruction under the best coaches in firing will have to remain as one of the service lessons.

The taking of a month from his graduation leave is rather a hardship, but one well calculated to influence the service for great good. The growing interest in target shooting is something that all officers hail with delight, and everything should be done by the army to foster and keep up this interest. Careful instruction of every appointee to the army in target practice for the first month of his service will affect his subsequent career, and raise the standard of firing throughout the army.

* * *

The rapid and satisfactory instruction of enlisted men in target practice depends on their officers, and it is scarcely necessary to say that the latter should thoroughly understand both theory and practice. The *Journal of the United States Infantry Association* comments as follows on the lack of instruction in rifle practice under the present West Point system, and suggests:

"All who are acquainted with the curriculum of the United States Military Academy know that the limit of work that can properly be required of cadets has been reached. And it must be admitted that at graduation the cadet is far from being able to act as an instructor in target practice. If all companies had their complement of officers always present this fact would be unimportant, since the newly-arrived graduate could quickly receive the proper instruction after joining his company. Unfortunately it often happens that the newly-arrived graduate is in command of his company during the entire practice season. The instruction of the company then suffers, and the company commander occupies in the instruction a position inferior to that of the noncommissioned officers.

"It seems that this condition could be remedied very easily by establishing a school of musketry, through which the graduate goes before joining his company. This would not require any great expenditure of either money or personnel; neither would it be absolutely necessary to delay joining his company by the graduate. The necessary personnel could be found at Fort Leavenworth, and the school of musketry could consist of a six weeks' course at the Infantry and Cavalry School, the time being taken from the last six weeks of the period now passed on graduation leave."—*October 19th.*

* * *

General A. L. Mills, the head of the United States Military Academy at West Point, has issued his annual report. After complimenting the members of the rifle team upon the excellent showing made in the Sea Girt competitions, he states that a representation of cadets in these contests in the

future is not deemed advisable. The full text of this portion of the report is as follows:

"A cadet rifle team, composed of twelve principals and three alternates, represented the Military Academy at the competition for the national trophy for excellence in marksmanship at Sea Girt, N. J., from August 18th to 31st. The question as to the practicability of cadets engaging in this contest had previously been referred to me by the Secretary of War and had received my cordial approval. The team sent acquitted itself with credit and took a good standing among the other teams engaged, considering the character of the latter and the opportunities and time the members of the cadet team had for preparation.

"I regret to report, however, after experiencing the difficulties encountered in sending the team, that a future representation of cadets in this contest will not be advisable. To fairly prepare a cadet team, time and opportunity for much practice are required, and this necessarily interferes with the other work of cadets, which the gain in marksmanship to the individual cadets participating does not offset. The preparation also seriously interfered with the general instruction of other cadets in target practice, and the team missed the valuable experience of the practice march which the remainder of the battalion participated in. The time of cadets is so limited and so fully occupied that the very best that can be done is to give general instruction in target practice to all, making them conversant with its procedure, methods, and principles, and not expecting to produce expert shots, which takes great time and is really post-graduate work.

"I regret to take a step which may in the slightest detract from or fail to stimulate the increasing interest throughout the country in the important subject of marksmanship."

General Mills' statement that, "To fairly prepare a cadet team, time and opportunity for much practice are required, and this necessarily interferes with the other work of the cadets, which the gain in marksmanship to the individual

cadets participating does not offset," is at least open to argument.

To consider that the attainment of skill in rifle shooting is merely for the benefit of the individual who receives special instruction is certainly a narrow view to take of the subject. The object of developing a team at West Point should be with the idea that the members, after graduation, will be in a position to instruct their various commands in rifle shooting to the best possible advantage. Furthermore, the interest in rifle practice which is certain to be aroused by annual competitions between teams from West Point, Annapolis, and our leading universities, and the spirit of rivalry which would be engendered, should certainly be worthy of consideration by those who would relegate the development of skill in shooting to a post-graduate course.

—November 9th.

A NEW FORMATION ON THE MARCH.

BY OSCAR PREUSS, TROOP F, SEVENTH CAVALRY.

THE present formation of our cavalry on the march, that is, the sets of fours or twos following in the tracks of the preceding set, with a distance of four feet from head to croup, possesses many disadvantages.

Theoretically assuming a troop was to keep perfect distance between its sets of twos, there would yet be always a disadvantage in the length of the troop and great difficulty to preserve a steady gait throughout the column, more especially so by changing the same.

In the practice we find that the distance between sets of twos is, as a rule, more or less than four feet, caused partly through carelessness on the part of the troopers, but more especially because the horses walk better when they are close behind each other. In consequence of this last fact a horse is unable to see the road immediately in front of him

and will stumble over the same stone or step into the same rut or hole as the preceding animal. Another great disadvantage also appears by increasing the gait in losing distance, which is immediately followed by hurrying up and exciting the horses unnecessarily; while a decrease of the gait is always followed by closing up too much and jerking of the horses by their riders; but the greatest injury is inflicted by the horses stepping on the heels of those preceding them, which is clearly proved by the many scars that the heels of almost every troop-horse show.

In a formation where the sets of fours or twos do not follow in the tracks but in the intervals of the preceding sets of fours or twos, all this would be prevented.

No. 1 of the second set of fours would ride in rear of the interval between Nos. 1 and 2 of the first set of fours, No. 2 in rear of the interval between 2 and 3, No. 3 in rear between 3 and 4, and No. 4 to the left rear of No. 4 of the first set of fours, thus bringing the heads of their horses on the line of croups of the preceding horses. The third set of fours would then follow in the tracks of the first, and the fourth again in the tracks of the second, etc., etc., as the accompanying figure shows.

The advantages of this formation are as follows:

1. The column is much shorter and the gait will be therefore more steady.
2. By increasing the gait there will be little or no loss of distance and the horses will take up the next gait without undue excitement.
3. By decreasing the gait, the horses may, perhaps, run a little between the preceding horses, but will not step onto their heels, while the jerking of the horses will be avoided altogether on that occasion.
4. The horses are able to see the ground immediately in front of them, they are better able to avoid obstacles, and in consequence their gait is surer.
5. The horses will keep their places better, as well as walk steadier, especially when once trained to this formation.

It is assumed, of course, that the road be wide enough to enable five horses to walk abreast.

The one and only disadvantage would be a possible increased raising of dust.

To form line by fours right or left, would necessitate resuming of the original distance; but it is understood that this proposed formation be used only on the march; and it could be arranged that at the command "Route Order" the men take the formation indicated, and at "Attention" resume the original order.

Several of the foreign armies are using this formation on the march, and I think it would be worth trying.



COLUMN OF TWOS



COLUMN OF FOURS

DESERTIONS.

BY LIEUTENANT C. A. SEOANE, THIRD CAVALRY.

ST. PAUL, August 16.—A wholesale desertion of privates from the post at Fort Snelling was reported at army headquarters here to-day, when it was announced that about fifty privates had left the post without permission. The cause of the desertion is said to have been a disinclination of the men to do manual labor. The desertion occurred about August 1st, when the men were paid. The government recently purchased a large tract of land to extend the rifle ranges at the post, and instead of hiring common laborers to do the work, impressed the privates to do the leveling and grading. The strenuous job placed before the men and the hot weather, it is said, caused the men's patriotic spirit to wilt and they deserted. None have been apprehended.—*Washington Post*, August 17, 1905.

The merits of this particular case do not concern us, but we may ask why as a general rule do men desert in greater numbers when assigned to large fatigue tasks? All who

have seen work as described above assigned to troops know that desertions in considerable numbers result, and most officers generally dismiss the subject by being of opinion that the average soldier comes into the service with the idea formed that no manual labor will be required of him, and that when he is assigned to a continuous task he becomes discouraged, dissatisfied, and deserts in order to escape hard work. The question of desertion and its causes is an interesting psychological study yet awaiting intelligent treatment. The limited knowledge of the writer and the short space of this paper preclude any attempt at discussing it here. But I am firmly of the opinion that it can be shown that tasks of manual labor in themselves do not cause desertion. On the contrary, the actual work has very little to do with fostering the spirit of discontent which underlies all desertions. It is the manner and methods applied in carrying on the work which breed grievances. Implicit obedience to the arbitrary enforcement of orders sounds well enough from a disciplinary point of view, but a discontented command seeks escape by deserting, a crime difficult to prevent by the issuing of orders. From my own experience I will cite some typical fatigue works in which no desertion occurred.

This last spring, the undersigned, as range officer, was allotted the task of preparing firing points on the target range. Owing to irregularities in the profile of the range, the various firing points required raising. The 600-yard firing point had to be elevated twenty-three feet. Lumber was on hand for the construction of platforms. To secure proper stability at a firing point for three troops against crowding and the high winds which here prevail, any system of platform construction, with unskilled labor, appeared a difficult problem. Therefore, I recommended to the post commander that the platform idea be rejected, and instead that parapets of earth having a width of fourteen feet on top be constructed. This involved moving 3000 cubic yards of earth from barrow pits. As the average dirt wagon holds one yard, the size of the task is readily perceived as being about three thousand wagonfuls of dirt. Two weeks were available for the work, but not one dollar. All avail-

able men in the post were to be detailed for fatigue. This proved to be between twenty-three and twenty-five privates. Only two noncommissioned officers were detailed. Mules, plows and scrapers were to be had in sufficient quantities. It was announced beforehand that the working day would consist of seven hours actual work. Guard duty was cut down by the post commander to one post, mounted at retreat. There were to be no drills nor afternoon stables. The horses were to be groomed and cared for by the stable gangs. The men engaged at work answered reveille, morning stables and retreat. They were hauled to and from the work, about half a mile, in wagons. The work was not easy, for in each barrow pit huge boulders, weighing as high as half a ton, sometimes were encountered, which had to be worked around. This retarded progress and caused extra work in digging and plowing around these stones, and getting them out of the way.

Every man worked willingly, the task was completed, and not one desertion occurred. It would have been an easy matter, indeed, to have caused a desertion of fifty per cent. of the working force. It would only have been necessary to have required them to attend drill in the morning, afternoon stables, and a drill at retreat, thus involving the changing of clothes three or four times, and resulting in two or three hours actual fatigue work. Drill is paramount, but some day it will be written as an axiom: "You cannot make the soldier drill half the day and work with a shovel the other half unless it be your intention that he shall desert." As soon as this precept is violated all foot-loose men pull out. According to the general law of economics, one cannot expect to receive something without returning an equivalent value. As soldiers enlist to perform military duty and not manual labor, the equivalent to be returned to them must consist in a certain amount of relaxation of their military duty, which, by reason of daily repetitions becomes monotonous, and they are only too glad to secure a brief respite by being assigned to something else. But add something on to the daily routine of drill, such as hard work, and nothing but poor results need be expected.

Another case: Last fall the undersigned was detailed to construct a telephone line thirty-eight miles in length. The further end was ninety-five miles away from the post and the command was in camp during the entire time. After working during the day they slept on the ground at night. Camp was moved every ten miles. Men were not allowed to ride their horses to work but were hauled in wagons, the mules from the wagons being used during the day in snaking poles from the woods. The noon meal was carried to the site of work in a light spring wagon. An ordinary and ideal way to have produced a dissatisfied command and consequent desertions would have been as follows: After the men returned from work to have had stables; this followed by retreat under arms with fifteen minutes drill in the manual, and finally a guard detailed over the picket line from the men who had worked all day; no Sunday; shifting details, so that the man who dug holes yesterday would chop trees to-day, irregular distribution of work, etc. But instead, the scheme adopted was as follows: The command consisted of two depleted troops making a total of sixty-five men, or one full troop, but a double force of cooks and stable men were on hand. Owing to the great distance from the post, there were besides the horses some twenty-eight mules. There was one month of fall weather, and the problem demanding solution was to get the line built over the continental divide, and get back to the post before the snow set in; but the problem had nothing to do with maintaining proficiency in the manual of arms, so the arms were left in barracks. Digging holes for telephone poles three and a half feet deep, along a stretch of thirty-eight miles, is not the easiest of tasks. Neither is it an easy task to straddle a green pole full of sticky pine sap all day and peel off the bark. The first thing done was to relieve all working men from any duty whatever, except line work. The horses were groomed and cared for by the double stable gang; during the day they herded them while grazing, and at night they furnished the guard detail. Four cooks made kitchen police unnecessary. Before work commenced it was announced that a mile and two-thirds, or fifty poles of com-

pleted line would constitute a day's work. Men were assigned by permanent details so that those who dug holes the first day continued to do so until the last hole was dug. Two officers and two first sergeants distributed along the work maintained the standard of construction adopted. Reveille was the only military duty required.

It would, indeed, have been pleasing to the most pessimistic believer that soldiers will not perform manual labor, to have observed the spirit which entered upon this work. A friendly rivalry sprung up among the different gangs. The surveyors finishing their day's work first, laughed at the axmen; the axmen finishing would laugh at the peelers still at work, the peelers at the erecting gangs, they at the wire stretchers, and so on. The hospital corps man in camp was ridiculed to such an extent that he volunteered for work. The day's work was generally finished by 3 o'clock; some details would finish a half an hour earlier. In long drags I saw the snaking details give up part of their noon hour in order to catch up with the choppers. Other details that had fishermen among them would do the same in order to get an hour's fishing in the afternoon. The line was completed on schedule time and the command got back to the post one day before the first snow storm. And not a man deserted from either troop.

Under a system where a stable formation and possibly other military duties awaited the termination of the day's work, the men, instead of hurrying to get through, would have systematically delayed progress in hopes of avoiding what was to come after. The writer has seen men prolong a small fatigue task with the hopes of escaping afternoon stables. When soldiers desert on account of being detailed for long periods of fatigue, the work itself is only a pretext for deserting; beyond the pretext there is an underlying cause. And in studying the question of desertions we must observe that the pretext is to be brushed aside and the cause searched for. We must also be careful not to confound the pretext with the cause. When we look for the cause in desertions connected with extra work, it will in almost every case lead up to the conclusion that the axiom cited above has

been violated. It would be very nice if we could eat our pudding and have it too, but, unfortunately, no one has as yet shown how it can be done. Soldiers will not work and drill too. I cannot aspire to discuss theory with elders who have years in the service for my every month, but I have found it an easy task to present facts.

CHIEFS OF CAVALRY AND INFANTRY.

Extract from the Report of the Inspector General, U. S. Army, 1905.

THERE is a strong and growing sentiment in the infantry and cavalry arms of the service for a representative in the War Department in the form of a chief.

The infantry in our service, as it is in all others, comprises the bulk of the army. The artillery and cavalry are necessary auxiliaries thereto, but the infantry, from its magnitude, plays the principle rôle in war, and its efficiency determines the character of the army as a whole. In our country, especially, an overwhelming proportion of the organized militia in time of peace, and volunteers in time of war, are, and always will be, infantry, because of the prohibitory cost to the States of organizing and maintaining cavalry and field artillery. And this force, which will be our main dependence in time of war, is constantly striving to attain the standard of efficiency established by the infantry of our regular establishment. Whatever, therefore, promotes the efficiency of the infantry of the army promotes the efficiency of the soldiers who are in a large measure to fight the battles of our country.

With reference to the cavalry, the increasing complexity of questions affecting that arm of the service, such as tactics and training, arms and equipments, horses and forage supplies, veterinary service, cavalry pioneers, etc.; the relief from the consideration of petty details which the creation of

a representative at the War Department will afford the Chief of Staff and the General Staff officers, leaving the former more time to devote to broad supervisory duties and the latter freedom to work out General Staff problems, and the quickened *esprit de corps* which will result therefrom, together with the increased confidence which this arm will feel in having a representative at the seat of government, tend to make it highly desirable and advantageous to have for this, as well as for the infantry, representation in the War Department.

These officers should be appointed upon the recommendation of boards of general officers, from the list of colonels of each arm concerned, to be detailed for a term of four years, and to have the rank, pay and allowances, while so serving, of a brigadier general. They should be made under the same conditions as now govern in the case of officers detailed to the special staff corps under the act of February 2, 1901. Both officers should be limited in assistants to one officer, to be taken from their respective corps, thus effectually checking any tendency toward making them bureaus of the War Department.

A great step forward has been made and the efficiency of the artillery increased by having a representative in the War Department in the person of the Chief of Artillery. It is fair to presume that similar action taken by the government for the infantry and cavalry would meet with like results. It is therefore urgently recommended that the Secretary of War and Chief of Staff consider this subject with a view to early action.



BITS—A LESSON IN PICTURE.

As we have heretofore had occasion to remark, we never had an idea other than that the bit and bridoon was the best bit made. In this issue we have sought to impress this idea upon the readers of the JOURNAL by means as near as possible to an object lesson. We are indebted to Captain W. C. Short, Thirteenth Cavalry, instructor in equitation at the Fort Riley school, and First Lieutenant S. B. Pearson, Ninth Cavalry, also at Fort Riley, for the photographs from which our half-tones were made.

As we have frequently seen the bit and bridoon improperly adjusted, we thought it well to give a plain print of this bit when properly fitted to a horse's mouth. This we follow with the prints of what may be termed, for want of better phraseology and the possibility that it may be adopted by the cavalry, the military hand. We direct the careful attention of our readers to the next seven prints and ask that the hand there described be given a fair trial. The pages of the JOURNAL are always open to discussion upon such timely topics, and we would most gladly welcome letters upon this subject, whether the ideas agree with ours or not. If we are to have the double-rein bridle the hand is a most important subject and one not to be adopted hastily. Figure 9 is the trainer's hand.

While upon this subject we will mention that we have lately received letters from some officers asking if the Sievert bit was upon the market, and where one could be obtained. As Captain Sievert is stationed at Fort Leavenworth, we saw

him personally and requested information as to the above. He stated that he had considered it advisable to make a slight change in his bit, and that as soon as made the bit would be upon the market, which should be in some three or four months. While we believe only in the one original four-rein bridle, we are not so prejudiced but that we are perfectly willing to try any bit whatever and enter into a fair discussion of the same. The ideas of one who has spent the time and money upon the subject of a proper cavalry bit that Captain Sievert has deserves respectful consideration. We hope to be able to give our readers a print of the Sievert bit as modified in our next issue, and a description of the same by the Captain himself.

FADS.

We have, at odd times during the last three or four years, been hearing from the kickers, or rather knockers, as their growls are not backed by any action, that the army has gone school mad and a new fad has sprung up. We always ask the growlers if they ever knew of a fad that did anything but good, and they are forced to admit they did not. When we look back over the records of our army we see nothing but a large amount of good following the inception of each fad.

Some years ago the "army went mad" over target shooting. Officers would employ spare moments in their back yards practicing aiming and trigger pull, while the men in the barracks, with mouths and fingers full of cartridges were trying to find the way to carry the largest number for the rapid work of skirmishing. Did this hurt anyone or did it hurt the army? No. Only the greatest good flowed from all this craze, and much of the interest in firing to-day results from the lessons learned and unlearned during the time of inception of the fad.

Then came the athletic fad. The army went mad over the physical training of the enlisted man and drilled him in this and that. Various were the manuals adopted. Did this do any harm? Can anyone say that West Point has not ben-

edited by the football spirit developed there in the last fifteen years? Does anyone believe the post field days and department competitions are not of great value to our enlisted force, and hence to the army? We believe that the officer that would claim that athletics had no good in them for our men is nowhere to be found, certainly not if he has any brain power to note improvement. It is true some of our officers decry the fact that at times individuals get more training than organizations, but we have yet to see the officer who wishes to eliminate the athletic fad. If organization training is not universal it is the fault of the officers that are in charge of events and not of the system. A proper assignment of points to company events leads easily to an elimination of the individual training evil, and we would suggest this idea be constantly in mind of program committees. Two writers in the last issue of the *Military Service Institution*, Major Bullard (infantry) and Captain H. S. Hawkins (cavalry) have, we think, taken rather a narrow view of the subject of army athletics. Their great objection to the system is that it rewards one or two stars in an organization, while the rest of the men do not train at all. As stated above, this can be eliminated by a little common sense, and is eliminated when officers possessing that valuable attribute have charge of events. But even could this not be done, the *esprit de corps* engendered by athletics and the contentment rising from keeping the minds of the men occupied, are factors that amply repay the importance given the subject. Some officers go so far as to say these are the main ends of athletic competition, and though we do not agree with them, we recognize them as valuable assets of the fad.

Then there was another fad—that of the canteen. The originator of this fad met with much opposition at the start from non-progressive officers. Just the same old knocking that we hear to-day from some upon the present school system. It was this and that; the government had no business to start in the liquor traffic; it would cause drunkenness and loss by desertion, etc. But long before a misguided Union, aided by saloon keepers' leagues and liquor dealers generally, had succeeded by Congressional action in destroying this pow-

erful factor for good, the kickers had all become converts. Now every officer in our army, we believe, except those that have some personal reason like the love of notoriety, that comes from stubbornness in holding out against universal opinion, would most joyfully welcome the return to the army of the old post exchange. The fad is as strong as it ever was, more so for that matter, now that its value is recognized by its loss, and we trust it is strong enough to overcome, in our Congressmen, the misguided ideas of certain classes and the personal interests of others.

There is this to remember about fads, army fads at least, and that is, they never die. The army never yet has dropped a fad. The rank and file to-day are as carefully instructed in target work as they were years ago, when the fad was supposed to be at its height, and the interest in competition is continually growing more and more keen. It is said that at the national shoot this year, arrangements were made for some expected 125 competitors. The number actually reporting was over 800. There is as much interest in shooting now as there ever was, and the fad has remained with us, developing our practice by careful supervision, trying new methods and rejecting old ones, but constantly and continually working through the years. The man that thinks the target fad has died out in our army must be a fool.

The above is equally true of other fads. As great interest is manifested to-day in the physical development of the soldier as ever, and one has but to look at the Presidio program of the last athletic department competition at San Francisco to see that it was as large as any competition ever held. Many officers objected in the Philippine Islands to the detail of their men in Manila, ostensibly for clerks, but as every one knew for baseball in the league. This may have inconvenienced some organizations, but the clerks must be taken from the troops, and it makes little difference from what organization they come. And if they reflected credit upon the army (which they certainly did) by their cleverness at the great American game, and by their gentlemanly demeanor on the field, the idea was commendable.

It has been our experience with enlisted men, that the

baseball players and athletes, excepting of course the old noncommissioned personnel, are the best soldiers. A young, virile man must have some recreation, and its control by the officers is what was accomplished by the athletic fad. And it still exists to-day as strong as ever, in all its good influence for contentment, sobriety and discipline.

And now as to the school fad, the latest one of all:

It would certainly seem to an impartial observer that there could be no growls about improvement by study. We recall the top line in our old copy book—Knowledge is Power—with capital K and P, but nevertheless we do hear the remarks, old as time, about the new fad and how long it will last, etc. It has been our observation that much of the knocking of the present school system comes from officers that stand most in need of the system for themselves. But our innate desire not to wound feelings prevents our making this remark to them personally. Such, however, has been our observation, fairly keen, as we have taken great interest in the matter, and we are satisfied that such has been the observation of the majority. Of course there are many officers that can point out defects and suggest remedies, but they are not as numerous as the plain complainers who have no remedies to suggest.

Nothing can stop the tread of progress, and certainly the school fad makes as much, probably more, for advancement than any of the previous fads. We can inform the young men of the service that it will be much better for them to get on the band wagon than to stand on the ground listening to the carpings of some disgruntled officer while the wagon rolls by. Our advice to the younger officers is to get busy in their post schools, and get to the service schools if they can. To do their very best with the present system, becoming its earnest advocates, and preparing themselves for instructors when the time comes. Certainly this fad is also here to stay, and in a few years we are going to have an army. In that army the man whose time has been spent other than in self-improvement will be relegated to the rear to mark time while the faddist will be running the machine. By this I do not mean that an officer necessarily has to run the gauntlet

of the service schools. The idea of these schools is to learn who are the capable, so they can be picked up and used when needed. But reputations may be made by work in garrison, though the process is longer and more tedious. All officers cannot attend Fort Leavenworth, Fortress Monroe, or Fort Riley. There will always be a large percentage of non-graduates of these institutions, but there will not be any that have not been connected with the post schools, and there will not be any whose work and interest in the post schools will not be carefully reviewed by the generals commanding. It stands to reason that education along professional lines will help the worker in that profession. Mr. Schwab's derogatory remarks about collegiate education was not that it was not a good thing, but its particular usefulness in business was not apparent to him. But what Mr. Schwab did believe in was business training for business men, and that is really what the school fad in the army is doing, giving military training to military men. That there can be any criticism seems preposterous, and can only be understood as remarked above.

One of our returning attachés from the Russo-Japanese War remarks that the Japanese have fought a book war—the book pure and simple. Not a movement was made, not an action engaged in, but that the book rules were followed implicitly. The result speaks for itself.

Our army has entered a new phase. The spare time of years ago is no longer here, and it should always be remembered that the one who lies down in the race, no matter what his natural abilities may be, will surely be passed by the student of his profession.

FAKES.

Occasionally, quite occasionally, we are reminded of the fact that army officers, American at least, are easy. Not long ago a stereopticon affair advertised extensively in a certain post that it would show on a particular night views of the siege of Port Arthur and the battle of the Yalu.

The flaring headlines caught the eyes of many officers, and some fifty or sixty attended, ourselves among the number.

After some considerable fixing and fussing with the machine, the war was on. White coated men, supposedly Russians, were valorously contending with men of smaller stature clothed in dark material of some kind. The battle of the Yalu was being enacted before our eyes, eager with brightness in anticipation of gaining valuable information. A line of the small, dark colored men was supposed to be seen in the distance at the foot of a hill. The hill looked more like one in Central Park than we had any idea that a Korean or Manchurian hill could look, but we quietly swallowed the hill. A battery of two guns with white-coated cannoneers came rapidly into the very foreground of the picture, so close in fact that the battery must have made its stand not twenty paces from the machine photographing it. The guns were unlimbered and swung around and commenced firing at the distant line of Japs, at least three hundred yards away. The Jap line approached slowly; the guns redoubled their fury. As the dark line came nearer, with few if any casualties, some white-coated infantry came into view, running up apparently from behind the machine. Some ten or twelve of the infantrymen piled pell mell into the small interval between the guns, an interval of about six paces, and one calculated to make a good picture. The black line approached closer, and as it stopped to fix bayonets about seventy-five yards from the guns, terrible destruction came upon the white coats. Why this destruction we could not understand. Very few had apparently been hit up to this time, but now, while the Jap line was fixing bayonets, the white-coated men fell by the wholesale. It was as if the Angel of Death that breathed in the face of Old Sennacherib's army had passed over them. When bayonets had been properly fixed the black line moved forward. Then the white, what was left of it, turned and ran out of view of the machine. The Jap forces advanced, growing rapidly huge in the changing focus, and right between the two captured guns was planted the Japanese flag, fluttering away in a sixty-mile breeze, larger than the rest of the field of view. Here it fluttered

and flapped until with a flash the scene was out and the battle of the Yalu was over.

Next came a naval scene at Port Arthur. A bewhiskered officer stepped onto the bridge of a man-of-war and seizing a glass from a private struck a tragic attitude, one foot well in advance of the other, shoulders well thrown back and body bent forward, and carefully scanned the horizon. In a moment we judged he had seen something. We might say had seen things, for we should expect one in the last stages of the jim-jams to act as did this pictured form before us. He steps to the ladder, he steps back, he throws off his hat, he tears his hair, he throws his hands above his head like the French Count in *Fantana*, he disappears and reappears. Some officers rush onto the deck below, he shouts to them, they shout back (at least we suppose they are shouting), they all run to a port, a flash, darkness, smoke and water in confusion dire confounded. The explosion of a torpedo under the ship, so we are informed in the nasal twang of the operator of the machine who has been giving us a great lecture on strategy, as the pictures flickered before us. Then we see large strong men swimming in the ocean, and wonder of wonders, all in Long Branch bathing suits. We had not supposed the Russians had taken the precaution to have their sailors clad in bathing suits for underwear. Such foresight was not to be expected on the part of the Russians, though we must say, in the light of the events of the war, it was most timely. The faces of the men as they swam, were the smiling faces of happy-go-lucky vacation Americans, and not those of frenzied, drowning Russians.

The show was a gigantic fake. So much so that the officers slipped out quietly and said not a word, like the man sold at a side-show that kept his mouth shut in hopes he could see some one else get bit. We walked slowly home and wondered how any man could have the nerve to come into an army post with a fake army show and proceed with such a brazen face. Then we began to recall some former experiences, and remembered that there is much of such nerve in the world, some of which we had seen.

In the winter of 1900 two officers of the Peking American

garrison made a trip to Tientsin and there made the acquaintance of a person who posed as the reporter of some London daily. Shortly after the return of these officers to Peking this person made his appearance, was asked to dinner, and as the hour was late was fitted out with a bed in the tent of one of the officers. It was a month before that mess got rid of him, due to the extreme courtesy of the officers and their innate dislike of hurting anyone's feelings.

Such experiences have been quite common with our officers. We recollect having heard of a couple of fake German counts (we think they were German) that worked all the officers from Arizona to Denver a few years ago. This would only be a laughable matter did it extend only to such affairs as given above. But when we stop for serious consideration we find this matter of gouging us extends to most of the affairs of life. We pay exorbitant prices for everything. The price of any salable article in the Orient has doubled, then trebled, and then gone on by leaps and bounds since the advent of the Americans in that region of heretofore low prices. And in our own country we are safe only in the hands of our most reputable dealers. The majority of people put prices to us like those of an oriental rug merchant. He prices his rugs, not on what they are worth, but on what he thinks he can get for them.

Why is all this? We think the answer easy. It is because we ourselves have allowed it. We are principally the cause. Most officers rather than haggle over a few cents will pay the added amount rather than have any trouble and bother about the matter. Could we one and all come to concerted action, determining no longer to be made food for fakers, we could easily control the situation. But this of course will never happen. Such concerted action could not be obtained a few years ago in trying to kill the tipping fad, and concert of action is not to be expected of military men in matters other than professional.

We can recall some individual instances of the proper action, and only wish we could say they are more frequent than they are. One instance in particular was the action of an officer on the wharf at Malta. Four of us got to the dock

about midnight on a rainy, disagreeable night, and the boats wanted a six pence per passenger to take us to our transport. Rather than stand and haggle with the miserable boatmen in the rain three of us (we regretfully state that we were one of the three) paid the six pence in order to get to our comfortable staterooms. The other officer called a policeman, and came over only a moment or two later at the regular fare of three pence. And moreover he had the satisfaction of feeling that he had not been worked. We wish we could recall more instances of such common sense, but most of our recollections are of the opposite. But we will take our hat off to that officer hereafter, and we realize in him certain qualities that are most valuable, and that will be of use to him hereafter in high positions. The higher up the line of promotion we go the more fakers we will surely encounter. If we have not learned the proper method of handling them when in the lower positions, our later years will be neither easy nor pleasant.

FIELD TRAINING.

We take it that the aim of all our training of the soldier is to make him a good field man. Garrison life of course has its duties which must be performed. But the most important duty of garrison life is training for the field. That regiment best answers the reason of its being that can do the best work when it comes to real action. We have a standing army, so that in time of peace we may prepare for war. And the proper preparation is work, not by perfection of battalion or company drills on the drill field, but by simulating real conditions on varied ground.

It is true that since the Spanish War our army has largely been filled with recruits. To get any work out of them, company drill was necessary, so that they could be moved about with some semblance of order and not act like a mob. But now some five or six years have passed since the grand change in our army, and we are beginning to have a few non-commissioned officers for each organization with some pre-

vious experience. These men occupy a position for usefulness in our army to-day that is not excelled by any other, even if it be the position of an officer. A company commander can get along better with poor lieutenants than he can with poor noncommissioned officers, that is, if he is disposed to do any work himself.

We believe the time has now come when much of the drill that has been so necessary during the last five or six years can be dispensed with and more instruction given in field training. Officers will remember that in 1901 we had five new regiments to organize in each the cavalry and infantry, let alone the increase in the artillery. We recall the work that was done in one of the organizing regiments in the fall of 1901 by three captains and a first lieutenant, commanding troops in one of the squadrons. Every afternoon that squadron was taken to wooded country, one troop detailed for ambush work, the other three for advance and rear guard drill, patrolling, etc., on the lookout for the opposite Brown men. Conditions as near real as possible were adopted. Strange to say, this was done with only the grudging approval of the commanding officer of the post, who was more impatient over a few horses galloping over the parade ground when some of the men were pursued into the post, than he was over the ignorance of his command in field work. After six weeks of this afternoon work (done in addition to the two hours' forenoon drill), this squadron was ordered with the rest of the regiment to the Islands. Inside of three weeks after landing it was under fire. The result of the six weeks' work in the States was more than was expected. Every man knew what to do; he simply transferred his training from the woods of Vermont to the real conditions of the Philippine jungle, and adding his little instruction to his natural ability as a hunter, was a satisfactory soldier.

Now, how shall instruction in field training in our army be imparted? Like it has heretofore, according to the ideas, and oftentimes whims, of post commanders? Or shall we have a recognized system of training, so that when a new officer assumes command of an organization he can, by a glance at the drill record book, see how far the organization

has advanced, and can himself know what to expect of his command? The new field service regulations have laid down a system to be followed in general. But when the officer starts instruction along the lines of these directions he finds much that must be supplied by his own initiative and his own intelligence. The practical exercises must be worked out by himself, and many lectures or lessons of instruction must be imparted to his command that are not to be found in the print of our regulations. Now, most of our officers could do this, but we are satisfied they will not do it until some more definite help is given them in the way of what can be done each day in a progressive system of instruction. In this connection we wish to call attention to an English work, the third edition of which has just appeared.* It is "Catechism on Field Training." With this as a guide, no company commander can longer excuse himself for not having a thoroughly trained organization in field work. Of course there is really no excuse at the present time, but we all know how meager the drill in maneuvers or simulated conditions is.

The aim and object, as stated by the author of this work, is to present in one volume (a very handy one with soft leatherette binding and of convenient size) the substance of the many and varied subjects comprised in "Company Training." This information would otherwise necessitate the perusal of the various official publications and the many text books in order to obtain the information required. The catechism is, however, not merely a reprint of these books, but a handy compendium.

The book is divided into sections, which, instead of being called chapters, are headed Working Days, the idea being that the instruction imparted under the section should occupy one working day. To our idea the instruction under the separate working days will take more of the company's time

* "Catechism on Field Training." By Captain Lascelles Davidson, Royal Scotch Fusiliers. Revised and edited by Major S. T. Banning, Royal Munster Fusiliers. From the press of Gale & Polden, Lmtd., 2 Amen Corner, Pater-noster Row, London, England. Price, two and six, post free to any part of the world.

than one day, but that will not require any change in the book, as the subjects are carefully graduated, and no better division could be made. Let a company take as many days as it sees fit for each subject and then, when ready, go on to the next. There are twenty-one working days comprised in the book. The first working day comprises the infantry in attack (general ideas), the company in attack, the battalion in attack, and skirmishing. After the catechismal exercises there are some two pages of what the author terms practical work and headed "Exercises." This gives anyone ideas from which to get up many and varied field problems and exercises to illustrate the subject covered in that working day.

The second working day gives the field calls, signals and whistle sounds; fire discipline; supply of ammunition to troops engaged, and infantry in defense. This is an important part of the book and one that is well handled. Many and many ideas that our space does not allow us to mention are given, and officers will derive valuable information from these twelve pages alone. The other working days are given up to the various subjects of field training, as follows: "Attack and Defense of Positions, Defiles, Woods, etc.;" "Cavalry and Artillery, with Attack and Defense of Convoys;" "Advance and Rear Guards," two working days; "Outposts," two working days; "Hasty Intrenchments;" "Defense of Posts;" "Searching Small Woods and Groves;" "Reconnoitering;" "Operations by Night;" "Camping;" "Water Supply and Bivouac." This completes fifteen of the twenty-one working days, and the other six are given to field engineering, not a bad idea when we remember that in the past the cavalry and infantry have invariably built their own bridges. In the back part of the book are twenty-eight plates illustrating the various subjects, particularly engineering. From the practical work at the end of the second working day, we quote one of the exercises as follows:

"Nineteenth Exercise.—When ranges are available, practice training (fire) against targets and dummies. If dummies, to make the exercise more interesting, have as many dummies as there are officers, noncommissioned officers and men in the company, and previously writes the names of each on a

dummy. After the exercise advance straight up to the target, each man to his own target, if possible, and see the result of whom he has wounded or killed."

This system of instruction can be followed. And something of the kind must soon be adopted and followed if we are to have an army worth anything. And it will have its rewards in peace as well as in war. The profession of a soldier is a pretty one. But to master it requires time. Not so much brain power as simple application. After a noncommissioned officer has spent three years in the service he should have become a trained man with a profession, and with a pride in his knowledge of his profession. He should feel that his three years have been spent to some advantage, and that he is now a professional man and his services valuable. If he feels this we need have no fear of losing him at the end of the first enlistment. But if we simply drive him fours right and fours left, give him fatigue work and charge of quarters with no technical knowledge, who can expect to retain him after his first trial or get him back in after years?

Many officers do not believe in the lecture system. It is because they are misled by the word lecture. It is our firm conviction that not enough instruction is given the enlisted men. Take any company out for field exercises and we have found the greater part of them enter it with enthusiasm if they are given to understand the problem and made to comprehend that much of the success or failure of their particular organization is due to their own interest and carefulness and watchfulness. Frequently fights in the back stables follow maneuvers, and these fights are surely good things.

Now how can we give the enlisted men any idea of the exercises, the work to be accomplished and its results, if we do not tell them? And telling them is simply the lecture system. Some men are so gifted that they can explain things with more clearness than others. But we have yet to see the officer that cannot do something in this line, and after his explanation he will find his advanced men riding with far more watchfulness than if they are simply riding along trying to kill time till recall. We should remember

that if we are in charge of an advance guard or patrol in war times, we would certainly let our men know our object. It is a duty to the men who are voluntarily going into danger and it is a duty to our commander, so that the death of the officer might not frustrate the idea of the order.

It is not necessary for the men of a division to know the ideas of the commanding general. On the contrary, it is desirous that they should not. But when we strike the company, where the captain knows his men, it is necessary that they understand their particular sphere, and what is expected of them. As long as maneuvers are conducted without the idea of instruction for the enlisted man, just so long will the maneuvers be failures. And if an officer cannot impart the instruction necessary to teach the enlisted man and awaken his interest, that officer should be relegated to the rear and mark time till his promotion, and then fired from the service, if we cannot rid the service of him in any other way.

It is surely necessary that more time be spent away from the barracks and quarters, and out in the field. The commanding officer at the last post at which we served in the Islands, had days set apart when particular troops should start early in the morning for exercises, and such distances had to be covered that it was dark before the troops returned to the post. This is soldiering, and this is the instruction that will make us proficient. We may remain in the post and become beautifully drilled in manual execution or riding hall work, but we shall be worthless as soldiers unless we can take our troops and in one week have them prepared to take the field against a well trained enemy, one that is as well trained as we *should* be. And this can be done and lessen the desertions and guard-house punishments that at present are troubling us. Men that enlist in the army have no objection to military work. Let them have it intelligently explained, and we will have an army that will be better than the one Shafter took to Santiago, and that will be perfection enough to be attained at once.

BOOK ON THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

As we stated in our July number of last year, of the making of books there is no end. We see little reason to change what we there said as to the fact that no transcendent genius in the shape of a historian has so far made an appearance in connection with the late war.

It is our intention to read the various books on the war as they appear, and give our readers our own unbiased opinion as to their value. Of course this will be only an opinion, but it will be one that is impartial and influenced by no desire except to give our subscribers our ideas of what books one should read to be well posted, and what books are only for the general reader and of little value to a military student who wishes to get much knowledge out of the time he has for the study of the late conflict. But the books have been appearing so rapidly that we could not get the time to read each one with the care that is necessary from one who is actuated by motives such as indicated above. But, in cases where we could not cover the ground ourselves, we have given the volumes to some officer in whose judgment we repose confidence and whose name will always appear in the review, so that the personal element will not be lacking in judging what the review is worth. One book we have so turned over is, "The Truth About the War," which review is by Major D. H. Boughton, Eleventh Cavalry, and appears in the column of book reviews, and to which we direct attention.

We are glad to inform our readers that during the last few weeks we have closely read a book upon the war that is the best we have seen so far. We refer to Colonel Wood's book, "From the Yalu to Port Arthur." We briefly referred to this in our last issue, and stated that we reserved it for further notice. We are glad to give it such notice at the present time.

As army officers know, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver E. Wood, of the United States Artillery Corps, was lately military attaché at Tokio, and hence possessed great advantages in compiling a work on the war. This is also evident from his work.

Only one in such a position could have done the work so well. From the preface we quote the following: "This brief summary of the first period of the Russo-Japanese War covers only the operations of the Japanese armies, no reference being made to naval operations except when land and sea forces coöperated. The basis of the work is the Japanese official reports daily received from the Imperial headquarters before being given to the press, supplemented by important information from other reliable sources."

As indicated from the above, the work is brief, and is mostly a compilation. It covers the period of the war, from the beginning up to the end of the year 1904. It consists mostly of reports arranged in chronological order, and is the most complete of any work yet out. It is possible that being nothing but a description of campaign details, of value to the military student, it may be somewhat arid reading for the general reader, as is stated by the review in the *Literary Digest* of October 28th, last year. But we are glad the author has not encumbered the book with personal opinions or narratives that have no military value. As military men we care nothing for a historian's personal experiences, and only want detailed descriptions of what was done by one division at the time another division was doing so and so. That is, what we care for is simply a panoramic description of the different units of a command, and that is what we get in Wood's book, and nowhere else.

It is a book that, to the military reader, is of the greatest value, and will be always used by him for reference long after he has read it, and we believe long after more elaborate histories have been written of the terrific struggle. We do not expect to see this work supplanted at any time in the near future by any work of greater value to the military student.

The maps are as good as can be obtained at this time, and are nine in number, and the titles are given here, as it may be of interest to know just what actions are so completely given as to call for separate maps. In many of these maps the changing positions of the forces are given as the action progressed:

The theatre of war.

The battle of the Yalu.

The battle of Nanshan.

The battle of Tehlisz.

The battle of Fenshuiling.

The battle of Tashihkiao.

The field of operations of the battle of Liaoyang and of the Sha-ho.

The Kwantung Peninsula.

The city and harbor of Port Arthur.

The labor that was spent upon these maps is forcibly shown from the following, which is an extract from a personal letter of Colonel Wood's to a friend:

"It may possibly interest you to know that the maps are the handiwork, under my direction, of an expert Japanese cartographer of the topographical bureau of the Imperial Geological Survey of Japan, who did not understand a single word of English, and the names of places, originally in Chinese, Korean, Japanese or Russian, were translated into English, then into Japanese for his benefit, and again printed by him in English."

No military man can afford to be without a copy of Wood's book. And it is one of the few that we recommend spending money for, unless one has money to burn, and if one tries to purchase all the works upon the war that are appearing, he will have to have a large amount to burn if it is expected to last even a short time.

* * *

Closely connected in style, clearness and brevity with Wood's work, is a work that has just appeared on the war of ten years previous to the one we are considering. We refer to Vladimir's work, "The China-Japan War."

To students of the Russian-Japanese conflict this book comes like the remembrance of a dream. Or we might better say, like one of those elusive, evanescent flashes over our intelligence that gives us the inklings of former existence. For here we see the same field of action as the one we are familiar with from our study of the Russian War. We see

the same soldiers, and the names of the generals are like those of old friends, such as Oyama, Yamagata, Nodzu, Togo, and of course in the study of Port Arthur one is not surprised to find that Nogi in 1894 commanded the advance guard that led the way to and into that stronghold.

We follow these strangely familiar forces from Chemulpo and Fusan to Ping Yang and on to the Yalu, across the historical river into Manchuria to such places as Feng Huang Cheng and Mo-tein-ling Pass. We start with another one of the Japanese armies at the mouth of the Hua-Yaun River and follow it to Nanshan Hill and on into Port Arthur. We see the concentration of the Feng-Huang-Cheng and Port Arthur forces and remember the battle of Mukden when Nogi, no longer held by Port Arthur, swept around the Russian right, bringing disaster to those forces.

It seems strange at first to see the same strategy used by the same commanders over the same terrain that they used in a previous war. The keynote of successful military operations is to deceive the enemy in regard to your ideas, plans and movements. That Japan should follow the same ideas, carry out the same plans, and make the identical movements against the Russians that she did ten years before against the Chinese seems incredible. It was hardly to be expected—was not expected by the Russians. Possibly the very fact that she did this may have constituted a greater surprise than any newly conceived scheme. Her marvelous success in the Russian War would seem to indicate that such was a fact. In reading this book we cannot help being struck with the tremendous advantage enjoyed by the Japanese forces in the Russian struggle. If anything is calculated to make one familiar with the topographical situation and condition of a country, it is fighting over that country. It is not at all strange that the Japanese forces were familiar with the roads and terrain when we see the trouble experienced by them in 1894, when they found it necessary to repair and build the very roads that they would use to such effect another time.

The book we are now considering is divided into three parts as follows: "The History of the Korean Question;"

"The Korean Campaign;" "The Campaign in Manchuria." It is written by a person whose pseudonym, which may or may not be his real name as far as we know, is Vladimir. Whoever he was, he was lately a Russian official at the Korean court, and he certainly knows what he is telling about in his book. In his preface he states his information was obtained from all available sources—from Chinese and Japanese accounts, and from the reports of foreigners, whenever any were present, either on men-of-war or on land. But he further states that his acknowledgments are chiefly due to Japanese war publications. In this regard his book resembles Colonel Wood's very much, and there is really quite a striking similarity in the two works, as stated above.

The first part is given, as indicated, to a short history of the Korean question, and we see from reading it that there is nothing new under the sun, for China and Japan have been wrangling over this Korean problem for centuries, and one becomes very much interested in the success or failure of Old Hideyoshi and others of the old Japanese regime.

The causes leading directly to the conflict with China in 1894 are given in full, and the declaration of war is given verbatim, and also the diplomatic correspondence previous to the outbreak. One thing that to us was alone well worth the study and time spent on the book, was the expression used by Komura in the last letter just previous to the declaration of war against China, and we recall a similar, if not identical expression, in the note to Russia, and which the Russian government professed not to understand as the final word between the governments. This expression is as follows and is from the letter to the Ministers of the Tsung-li-Yamen, dated July 14th: "The only conclusion deducible from these circumstances is that the Chinese government are disposed to precipitate complications, and in this juncture the Imperial Japanese government find themselves relieved of all responsibility for any eventuality that may, in future, arise out of the situation."

Now that two wars have followed on this plain language, we doubt very much if any nation hereafter will misunderstand such a combination of words, when directed to them

from Japan. It will be well not to misunderstand, for in each of the two instances, events of reaching importance have immediately followed, in one case the defeat of the Chinese on land and sea, on the 25th and 29th of July, though the formal declaration was not issued until the 1st of August, and then simultaneously by the two governments. In the other case, events are too fresh to need recall the capture of the *Variag* and the *Koriets* in the harbor at Chemulpo, following the use of the above expression, which Japan took pains to insure had reached the authorities at St. Petersburg.

The details of the campaigns are full, and to help the student a fair map accompanies the book. This might be better, but it is as useful as the best of the maps that accompany treatises, all of them being more or less deficient in not giving all names mentioned in the text, and those given not always being spelled alike on the map and in the text. There is also a map of the naval engagement of Hai-Yang Island, the important event that assured Japan absolute control of the sea, and hence all military events that followed.

To the student of international law there is an appendix that gives a fairly complete account of the Kowshing affair; affidavits and personal accounts of survivors, both Chinese and European, the latter from the ship captain and mate, and Mr. Von Hanneken, the German engineer employed by the Chinese government.

All in all, this is a most interesting account of the war between China and Japan. The student of the late war should possess this volume, and also Colonel Wood's book on the struggle ten years later. Both are small, handy books that cost \$1.50 each. He will then have as full an account of the two conflicts as he can get from any other and more numerous sources. Put the two side by side in the library, and feel confident that you are as well supplied as you can be at the present time, without an unusual outlay of time and expense.

* * *

"Port Arthur, A Monster Heroism," by Richard Barry, is admirable as a Carlylean effort, but it is of little value as a

military work. Mr. Barry is, presumably, a young man. He has learned much of military matters and talks of them entertainingly and intelligently. His similes are striking and original and remind us a little of Stephen Crane. But while the general reader may be much impressed, the military one will remember the book only as one that breathes the spirit of Japan. The book is but a narrative of certain little episodes of the siege, and is not, nor does it profess to be, a work of valuable history. There is not a *map* in the book. It is word painting of a fair kind, but only once or twice does it cause any unusual heart-beating. The chapter on "Who Pays for the War," is very pretty and quite touching, but that is all an old story to men whose business it is to leave family ties for the dangerous sphere of action. It will give one a few hours of interesting reading, but is not to be seriously considered as an addition to valuable works upon the war.

* * *

All in all, in possessing the following books on the struggle, we shall at the present time consider ourselves as having done our duty in studying the war:

On the Causes: "The Russo-Japanese Conflict." (Asakawa.)

On the War: "From the Yalu to Port Arthur." (Wood.)
"The Russo-Japanese War." (Cowen.)
Articles in the *Outlook*. (Kennan.)

For Comparison: "The China-Japan War." (Vladimir.)

We hope to see Kennan's work put into book form soon. All the above have been reviewed in this and the July 1905 numbers of the JOURNAL. Cowen's book can be purchased for \$3.50, from the Baker & Taylor Co., New York City; Asakawa's book from Houghton, Mifflin & Co., \$2.00; and Wood's and Vladimir's from the Hudson Press, Kansas City, Mo., for \$1.50 each.



Cavalry in Action.*

Instruction in the use of cavalry in the presence of the enemy is a branch of military training that has been somewhat neglected in our service. During the Civil War modern cavalry received a new direction, due perhaps to the influence of our experiences in Indian campaigns, but there was no particular rule or system about its use. There was an indiscriminate use of mounted and dismounted action, with a tendency to neglect the former as was natural with a volunteer army, untrained in theoretical methods. Merritt and Forrest charged field intrenchments, and Morgan captured steamboats with cavalry, but such could not be said to be typical uses for the arm. Since the war, cavalry ideas have continued to be somewhat mixed, and abroad the arm continues to be ruled by the traditions of the days of chivalry.

The cavalryman with his three weapons and his horse is a complicated bit of machinery; first, as a mounted trooper he is supposed to charge like a knight of the middle ages; second, as a dismounted trooper he is taught to use his carbine, but at the same time to look out for his horse; third, as a combination of the two he is expected to recognize the proper moment to change from one to the other. Without systematic training it

* "CAVALRY IN ACTION." Studies in Applied Tactics, by P. S. Hugh Rees, Ltd., London, 1905.

is easy to see how one man's temperament would lead him entirely to mounted action, and another to dismounted action, while the well balanced officer, who is prepared for either, would be rare.

Proper tactical instruction can be obtained first, by deciding upon principles, and second, by learning them in a practical way. For instance, suppose that the following principles are selected for demonstration in a practical way:

1. Cavalry should not charge unbroken infantry at a greater distance than 450 yards.

2. The mounted action of cavalry should generally be limited to the offensive, and its dismounted action to the defensive.

3. Dismounted cavalry should employ as many carbines as possible from the first.

4. Dismounted cavalry, which is unable to hold the enemy at a distance, should break off the action before the enemy gets as close as 450 yards.

5. Cavalry may be used for offensive action when the ground does not favor mounted action, but in such cases the cavalry should be moved forward as far as possible before dismounting.

6. Cavalry should combine its mounted and dismounted action whenever quick results can be obtained thereby. Thus dismounted cavalry may be used to occupy the enemy, while a mounted force is held ready to take advantage of any weakness or confusion on the part of the enemy.

7. Cavalry should be prepared to change its role quickly from dismounted action to mounted action. Decisive results are often lost on account of the exhaustion of dismounted troops, which are unable to follow up their advantages. Similarly the role should be changed promptly from mounted to dismounted action when the conditions require it.

To fix one of these or any other collection of principles on the mind we select a concrete case in which the principle has a direct application. The example is then worked out, and studied from every point of view in as practical a manner as possible. This gives us the "applicatory" system of training which is now accepted by the military world and

which forms the basis of the peace training of soldiers of all great armies.

The applicatory system of training had always labored under the disadvantage that its most brilliant professors have begun at the wrong end. It is quite easy to study the conduct of a force of the three arms combined into the highest units of command, but it is difficult to find text books in elementary practical work. This lack is particularly noticeable in the cavalry, which has been in a transition stage due to the changes wrought by modern improvements in firearms.

The author of "Cavalry in Action" is apparently a French officer, who, like many a good writer, preserves his incognito, and gives us an excellent work. In his book he gives about twenty-eight studies, which have very much the appearance of so many kriegsspiel exercises which the author has worked out on the map of the country around Metz. The application is first made to commands as small as one of our troops of cavalry, and increases to the larger operations of a cavalry division.

Such tactical instruction should be a part of the daily work of every cavalry command. To make it practical I can only recommend you to read the book, then make an enlargement of one of the simple maps to a scale of twelve inches to the mile, which can be done roughly in an hour at least. Then with small blocks of wood or leather to represent the troops, work out the tactical situation after the manner of an exercise at kriegsspiel. After working through a number of exercises in this way the various tactical principles will be well fixed in the mind, an officer will have his mind well stored with well settled convictions as to the best way of acting in numerous possible emergencies which he never thought of before. Of course this involves plenty of hard work, but there is no other way of acquiring knowledge and skill than by work.

Several months of such work would then prepare the officer for field work in the spring. Let each officer of the command ride out in the country about his post and get up a problem of the same character as those which he has been studying. Let the assembled officers of the squadron discuss and criti-

cise the problem and solution of each of the individual officers of that squadron. Then let the commanding officer select a number of the problems to be actually worked out by the troops with all accompaniments of actual war except the ball cartridges. By this systematic instruction maneuvers will be removed from the disheartening, unreal character that is so often given to them.

Much of the value of the book is nullified by poor maps in the English translation. The large map is a cheap reproduction of the staff map, and the small maps are indistinct, and there are not enough of them. E. S.

**The Provisioning
of the
Modern Army
in the Field,***

Published by the Franklin Hudson Publishing Company, Kansas City, Mo., is the title of the latest literary production of the present Commissary General, Henry G. Sharpe, U. S. Army. This excellent work would be a most valuable addition to any military library. It is well written, instructive and highly interesting.

The text is rich in historical narrations pertaining to the supply of armies in recent wars and in well selected quotations from the most eminent foreign writers on kindred subjects.

The field duties of all commissary officers, from the chief commissary of an army down to the regimental commissary, are given in detail. The service performed in the rear of the army, service of the line of communications, the utilization of the local resources, and gathering of statistical data, billeting, contributions, requisitions, foraging and expeditions beyond the sea (contrasting in a striking manner our predicament in 1898 at Daiquiri with the systematic debarkation of the Japanese at Chemulpo six years later) are among the many subjects handled in a masterly manner.

L. R. H.

*"THE PROVISIONING OF THE MODERN ARMY IN THE FIELD." By Henry G. Sharpe, Commissary General, U. S. Army. Published by the Franklin Hudson Publishing Co., Kansas City, Mo. Price \$1.50.

**The Development
of Strategical
Science.***

Commencing with a general introduction of the whole subject of strategy, General Von Caemmerer gives a concise review of the authors since Napoleon's time. He gives the principles and important truths brought out by Von Bulow, Jomini, Archduke Charles, Clausewitz, the "school master of the Prussian army;" Willisen, Moltke, Blume, Scherff, Lewal, Von der Goltz, Boguslawski, Verdy du Vernois and Schlichting. He shows how succeeding authors have exposed the fallacies of earlier writers and how the close study of numerous wars has evolved a number of principles which are fixed.

Considerable space is given to a comparison of the strategy of Von Moltke and Napoleon, and an inclination is shown, in common with Von der Goltz and many other recent German authors, to class Von Moltke a little above Napoleon on account of Von Moltke's principle of concentrating on the battlefield itself. Many military students will not agree with this.

Military students are indebted to the author for a text which, in a broad minded and judicial manner compares the works of all the prominent writers on strategical science, selecting and emphasizing in a clear and concise manner those truths and principles of strategy which have stood the test of time.

This work would make an excellent text for post or service schools.

H. E. E.

**History of the
Thirteenth
U. S. Infantry.†**

A regimental history is likely to be dry and uninteresting, principally because of the long uneventful period spent by a regiment in routine post duties—especially was this true for the period just preceding the Spanish-Amer-

*"THE DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGICAL SCIENCE." By Lieutenant General von Caemmerer, German Army. Published by Hugh Rees, Ltd., 124 Pall Mall, SW. London.

†"HISTORY OF THE THIRTEENTH REGIMENT UNITED STATES INFANTRY." By Captain U. G. McAlexander, adjutant Thirteenth Infantry. Cloth and leather, 328 pages. Printed and illustrated on the Thirteenth Infantry regimental press.

ican War—and also from the fact that the recital of the names of the officers of a regiment is properly a matter of reference.

This has been happily overcome in the "History of the Thirteenth Regiment United States Infantry," which is now presented to the public. Briefly it treats of the organization of the regiment; the Vicksburg campaign; frontier campaigns, and life broken only in its monotony by the competition among the companies for perfection in drill; the taking of San Juan Hill; the varied service in the Philippine Islands, viewing the regiment first as a *fighting regiment* in the swamp and jungle, then as a *working regiment* in the suppression of disorder, the establishment of peace and the reconstruction of civil government; and finally, at home again as a *training regiment*.

The names of all officers who have served in the regiment at any time are shown in the appendix.

These important events are clearly and accurately brought out, and the scenes of activity and the principal actors are presented to the eye by a great number of maps, sketches and photographs. A cut at the beginning of each chapter shows the successive uniforms worn by the United States soldier. The excellent pictures of the Thirteenth Infantry officers who have especially distinguished themselves or who are well known, give additional freshness to the well printed pages. Thus this regimental history has been made not only attractive but also extremely fascinating.

Remembrances of the Thirteenth Infantry's many honorable engagements, among them, "first at Vicksburg," Missionary Ridge, and Santiago de Cuba, bring to the old officers and men of the regiment a feeling of security in its honor, and rouse in the young and active ones a pride in its past and an eagerness of purpose steadfast to emulate its record in the future. Hence the history well answers its purpose by so vividly commemorating the deeds of the past and engendering in the young soldier the truest *esprit de corps*. Consequently it may be frankly said it is one of the best histories which has yet been published by a regiment. A copy of it should be in every military library in the United States.

W. N. H.

**New Infantry
Drill Regulations.***

This is a reference book, of pocket size, designed to assist in the study of the Infantry Drill Regulations. Its explanations and interpretations have been made, evidently, after very careful thought and study by the authors, Captains Stewart and Davis, Department of Tactics, U. S. Military Academy, and are clear and reasonable. It takes up the drill regulations paragraph by paragraph, and explains everything which might be obscure, citing other paragraphs for authority and using legal rules of interpretation.

It will be a valuable help to all officers concerned with the new infantry drill regulations, and especially helpful to officers of the National Guard. The plates clear up at a glance passages whose meaning it would otherwise take a considerable time to study out. The treatment of extended order and ceremonies is especially thorough. The problems for practical field work for a small command are excellent; if similar ones should be practiced by companies, either of regulars or of the National Guard, their showing at maneuvers would be greatly bettered and their gain in knowledge increased 100 per cent. over organizations which had not had such practice.

H. E. ELY,

Captain Twenty-sixth Infantry.

**The Truth
About
the War.**

This is a new book about the Japanese War, or a part of it at least, but told this time by the other side—the Russian. The author is Mr. J. Taburno, a special correspondent of the *Novoe Vremia* and an author of considerable prominence, who went to Manchuria for the purpose, as he says, of becoming acquainted with the true situation of the Russian army and of presenting it in its true light.

Mr. Taburno was with the army from December, 1904, to April, 1905, and was, of course, present at the battle of Mukden, which he describes in a very lucid manner for so extended an engagement. He then gives pen pictures of what

*"NOTES AND SUGGESTIONS ON THE INFANTRY DRILL REGULATIONS." Stewart-Davis. By The Hudson Publishing Company, Kansas City, Mo,

he observed, pointing out the weaknesses in the Russian armor, sparing no one. These glimpses, as it were, behind the scenes, make the book very interesting. He describes the panic in the trains retreating from Mukden caused by disobedience of orders, and the presence of an officer's young wife; General Kuropatkin reporting to General Linevich when the latter was made commander-in-chief; the sanitary service; scenes attending the evacuation of Mukden; military censorship; rear of the army, etc.

Mr. Taburno attributes the Russian failure in Manchuria to several causes, chief among which was the inadequate means of communication furnished by a single line of railway; second the impedimenta, much being officers' baggage, which clogged the army's movements, and the luxuriousness of the higher officers who sacrificed military mobility and the welfare of the troops to their own personal comfort. The Russian cavalry has been criticised, and apparently with justice, for not accomplishing more during the present war, but according to Mr. Taburno this arm was greatly weakened by useless details on orderly and kindred duties. Lack of information of the enemy and his movements is severely commented upon and contrasted with the efficiency of the Japanese in this respect.

Two sketch maps are provided, one showing the operations in January—battle of Sandepoo, and the other the operations in February—battle of Mukden.

The author is unsparing of his criticism of General Gripenberg, who left the army after the former battle and against the will of the commander-in chief. The book is published by the Franklin Hudson Publishing Company of Kansas City, Mo.

D. H. B.

**1815:
Waterloo.***

A new work on this much-discussed decisive battle in the world's history would appear at first sight to be superfluous, but a glance at the literature on the subject will show that a

*"1815: WATERLOO." By Henry Houssaye, of the French Academy. Translated by S. R. Willis, Kansas City, Mo. Franklin Hudson Publishing Co., 1905. A short review of this book was given in the last issue of the JOURNAL.

work of this kind from a French pen was needed to close the subject and present the final view, and no one was better fitted to do this than the author of the present volume.

For some years after the battle of Waterloo, the only accounts of the battle available to English readers were those from English pens, which were naturally prejudiced in favor of the great Duke, and, moreover, largely neglected the important part played by Blücher; gradually, however, the German accounts (giving Blücher proper credit for his action) became known to English readers, and views were modified accordingly.

The early French accounts, on the other hand, were intensely enthusiastic in Napoleon's favor, attributing the cause of defeat entirely to fate; but little attention was paid to them in England, consequently they had but slight effect in influencing English views. It remained for Ropes, the American historian, to present the first clear, unbiased view in English, a view which was promptly accepted by the world at large, even by the military students of England. Lord Wolseley, in his work on *The Decline and Fall of Napoleon*, evidently accepted Ropes' view, but it must be admitted with surprise and regret that so great a general and military student as Lord Roberts, in his work on *The Rise of Wellington*, still adheres to the old view.

The fact that this latter view is still held by some English writers, after all that has been done to clear up the matter by Ropes and his followers, is sufficient to warrant the publication of another account of the battle, especially one from a French pen.

Henry Houssaye, the author of the present work, is a prominent French historian and critic. He distinguished himself in the Franco-Prussian War, and is therefore practically familiar with military matters. He has also high literary ability, and has been editor of the great French literary and critical journals, the *Revue des Deux Mondes* and the *Journal des Débats*. In 1875 he received for his work on the *Athenian Republic* the Thiers prize of the French Academy, and in 1894 he was elected a member of that august body.

He has written several other important historical works, and of late years he has made a careful study from the original documents of the fall of Napoleon, which he has embodied in three volumes, viz: 1814, 1815 (to include the return from Elba and the Hundred Days), and the volume before us entitled 1815: *Waterloo*.

These books are among the most readable that have been published upon the latter part of Napoleon's career, and at the same time present the most accurate and reliable views obtainable on the subject.

The latest volume is of special interest, and treats the subject in great detail, particularly as regards the points usually in dispute, such as the *exact times* of all events which bear on the correct interpretation of the operations, from the morning of June 16th to the evening of June 18th. The subject matter is conveniently arranged and subdivided, the style is interesting and attractive, and the conclusions and criticisms are clear and convincing.

A few extracts will illustrate these points:

First, as regards Wellington's dispositions to meet Napoleon's advance:

"According to these orders, despatched only on June 15th, between 6 and 7 o'clock in the evening, the troops were simply to assemble by divisions at Ninove, Ath, Grammont, Brussels, Braine-le-Conte, and Nivelles, and to be ready to march next day at dawn. Thus, at the time when the French left wing had passed Gosselies and the right wing had arrived within sight of Fleurus, Wellington, in place of directing his troops upon the threatened point, contented himself with uniting them in isolated divisions within a parallelogram of ten leagues by nine. In truth, he must have been deluded and paralyzed by the vision of Napoleon attacking in person upon all points at the same time.

* * * * *

"After having given these orders, which, by reason of the advanced hour and the extent of the cantonments, could not be put in execution before dawn, Wellington said to Muffling, 'My troops are about to put themselves on the

march. But here the partisans of Napoleon begin to raise their heads. We must reassure our friends. Let us go to the ball of the Duchess of Richmond, and we will mount on horseback at 5 in the morning.'

* * * * *

"Muffling says that during the ball Wellington was very gay. There certainly was no reason for this gaiety. During the entire day he had persisted in leaving his troops dispersed in their cantonments at four, eight, ten and fifteen leagues from one another; and the orders of the evening, by which he flattered himself to repair victoriously his great error, were pitiful. His last dispositions tended to nothing less than to uncover the route leading from Charleroi to Brussels in order to protect that of Mons, which was not threatened. If the orders of Wellington had been executed, a gap four leagues wide would have been opened between Nivelles and the Lower Dyle; a gap through which Ney would have been able to advance half way to Brussels without firing a shot, or better still, as Gneisenau has said, 'to turn back on the rear of the Prussian army and cause its utter destruction.'

"Fortunately for the allies, many of Wellington's subordinates had taken it on themselves to act without awaiting his orders, and others had intelligently disobeyed those which, after so much time lost, he had decided to give.

* * * * *

"But in war, as in play, nothing can prevail against Fortune. When Wellington, who had left Brussels at 6 in the morning, arrived about 10 at Quatre-Bras, he found there the division of Perponcher, when he should have found the advance guard of Marshal Ney. His Grace, appearing to forget the fact that he had acted contrary to his orders, deigned to congratulate General Perponcher and also the Prince of Orange—who had had nothing to do with it—upon the position taken."

Secondly, we find the following interesting and instructive remarks on the action at Ligny:

"Clausewitz, after having argued long and confusedly, concludes that '10,000 men in the rear of the Prussian army

would have only rendered the battle more doubtful by obliging Blücher to withdraw sooner.' The proof of the weakness of his case is that he wittingly gives us false figures. Clausewitz knew very well that it would not have been 10,000, but 20,000, horse and foot, that would have attacked the Prussians in reverse. * * * Charras has a wholly personal way of looking at things. 'The generals,' he cries, 'were admirable. They did not fail the General-in-Chief; the General-in-Chief failed them.' He extols the conduct of Ney, 'who accomplished the impossible in arresting Wellington with 20,000 men.' Charras seems to ignore the fact that Wellington, until the arrival of the divisions of Cooke and Cruse (at half-past six) had scarcely 26,000 men to oppose the French, who numbered more than 23,000. And he voluntarily forgets to say that if Ney had but one army corps to oppose the English, it was because he had neglected in the morning to concentrate the Second and First Corps between Gosselies and Frasnes. This was—we cannot too often repeat it—the initial fault from which all the others proceeded—those of Ney, those of Reille, those of d' Erlon, and those of the Emperor.

"The facts and written orders, the hours and figures, contradict the conclusions of Clausewitz and Charras. There is also the testimony of Kellermann: 'Napoleon did not attain his object through the fault of Marshal Ney.' Of Reille: 'A far greater success would have been obtained by taking in reverse the right of the Prussian army. Of General Delort: 'Ney could have, with 44,000 men, contained the English and turned the army of Blücher.' Here is the judgment of Ropes: 'If Ney had executed the orders of the Emperor, the issues of the campaign would have been modified.' There is the judgment of Marshal Wolseley: 'If everything had passed as Napoleon had planned, we are justified in saying that the corps of Ziethen and Pirch would have been annihilated, and that, according to all probabilities, Blücher and Gneisenau would have been made prisoners.' There is, finally—and it is worth all the rest—the admission of Gneisenau, chief of staff of the Prussian army, who wrote June 12, 1817, to the King of Prussia: 'If General Perponcher had not made so vigorous a resistance, Marshal Ney, arriving at

Quatre-Bras, would have been able to turn to the right and fall upon the rear of the army that was fighting at Ligny, and cause its total destruction."

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Thirdly, with reference to the retreat of the Prussians after Ligny:

"Napoleon, Soult, Grouchy, and all the staff thought the Prussians were retreating toward the Meuse; it was in the direction of the Dyle that they were falling back. On the day before, at night, whilst their troops were rallying between the route of Namur and the Roman road, Ziethen, Pirch I., and other generals, no longer receiving any orders, hastened to Byre, where they expected to find Blücher. At this moment the dragoons, who had picked up Blücher from the battlefield, bore him all bruised from his fall and in a half-swoon into a cottage of Mellery. His staff was without news of him; it was ignorant if he were a prisoner or free, dead or living. Consternation reigned supreme; every eye was fixed with expectancy on Gneisenau, to whom in Blücher's absence belonged the command by reason of his seniority of rank. What course would he take? Would he abandon his lines of communication with Namur to try once more to unite with the English by a parallel march, or, in order to fall back on his base of operations, would he leave Wellington alone against the French army and overturn the plan of campaign decided upon for two months? Gneisenau sat his horse in the middle of the road which joins to the north of Brye the route of Namur; by the light of the moon he consulted with difficulty his map. After a short examination, he cried: 'Retreat on Tilly and Wavre.'

"Some days later Wellington wrote emphatically to the King of the Low Countries: 'It was the decisive moment of the century.' Likewise the German military historians have exalted the retreat on Wavre as the equal of the finest strategical conceptions. We think this is putting it a little extravagantly, to say the least. This determination marks in Gneisenau firmness in reverses and an understanding of the necessities of war; but when he ordered this movement,

he certainly did not foresee the immense consequences that were to result from it. At that time he had no intention of rejoining the English army in order to cover Brussels."

Finally, as regards Napoleon's physical and mental condition at the time, a few words will suffice :

"In 1815 Napoleon's health was still such as to support the fatigues of war, and his brain had lost nothing of its puissance. But in him his moral nature no longer equaled his genius. While in his dictations at Saint Helena he attempts to demonstrate that he had committed no fault in the course of his last campaign, in his familiar conversations he permits the secret of these faults to escape him: 'I no longer had in me the sentiment of final success. It was no longer my first confidence. * * * I felt fortune abandoning me. I no longer obtained an advantage that was not followed by a reverse. * * * None of these blows surprised me, for I had a presentiment that the result would be unfavorable.' This state of mind explains the hours lost by the Emperor during the campaign, his sometimes troubled views, the respite left the enemy. He no longer believes in success; and his boldness declines with his confidence. He no longer dares to seize, to seek the occasion. While his faith in his destiny lasted he had always been an audacious player. Now that he feels fortune deserting him, he becomes a timid one. He hesitates to begin the game, no longer yields to inspiration, temporizes, weighs the chances, sees the *pros* and *cons*, and wishes to take no risks.

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"Never did Napoleon exercise more effectively the command, and never was his action more direct. But, obliged precisely to play that rôle of *sergeant de bataille* which is condemned by Maurice de Saxe, he employed himself entirely in repairing the mistakes, the forgetfulness, and the faults of his lieutenants. And, seeing all his combinations miscarrying, all the attacks proving unsuccessful, his generals wasting his finest troops, his last army melting away in their hands, and the enemy laying down the law to him, he lost resolution with confidence, hesitated, confined himself to

providing for the most imminent perils, awaited the hour, allowed it to pass, and dared not risk all in time to save all."

The absorbing interest of the work is evident from these few quotations; the descriptions of actual engagements, however, are far more absorbing.

The translator has performed his part remarkably well, faithfully reproducing the original in English idiom entirely free from any Gallicisms. The fascinating character of the style of the author is well preserved, and his graphic pen pictures are vividly presented to the English reader.

The volume is well bound and neatly printed. It constitutes a prime study for military students, involving as it does both tactical and strategical principles to so great a degree, and historically it is the epitome of all the best essays and publications on the subject, and one of the great works of the past decade. The author is a soldier of note, a historian who has won high honors, and a literary writer and critic of acknowledged ability. The work is a most important addition to general as well as military history, and, while particularly valuable to the military student, is also a noteworthy volume for the general reader, who cannot dispense with the information it contains, based as it is on original documents, nor with its literary qualities, which place it far above the average accounts in beauty of style and diction.

JOHN P. WISSER,
Major Artillery Corps.

**The Army
Horseshoer.**

A manual prepared for the use of students of the Training School for Farriers and Horseshoers, by the training school instructors, is a neat, cloth-bound volume from the press of the School of Application for Cavalry and Field Artillery. The book is not on the market. A copy has been sent to each organization commander of cavalry and field artillery, and to regimental, squadron and battalion commanders.

The subject matter is presented in progressive form, the first chapter dealing with the anatomy and physiology of the horse's foot. In the preface we read that "Experience has

shown, however, that the enlisted man learns the technical terms of anatomy as readily as the common terms, and these latter vary in different localities." It can be readily understood that the farrier, who is the veterinarian's trained nurse, requires a knowledge of the technical terms, in order to intelligently follow the instructions of his superior; but we cannot see a similar necessity in the case of the horseshoer. The familiar terms, "coffin bone" and "shuttle bone" seem to be more at home in the shoeing shop than their Latin equivalents, and the words "upper," "lower," "inner," and "outer," would appear to be easily grasped and unmistakable. Their technical equivalents always remind us of the old story of the gentleman riding in his carriage, which runs something like this: "The superior, seated in the interior, can see nothing but the posterior of his inferior riding on the exterior." With this exception, the book will appeal to every mounted officer. It certainly fills a long-felt want.

Tools, the forge and the anvil, are described in simple and clear language. The treatment of the foot axis is superior to anything we have seen. All the minute details of the preparation of the foot, and of turning, fitting and securing the shoe are presented concisely. The chapters explaining how to correct faulty action and gaits, and how to treat the simple ailments of the foot, are excellent.

One of the merits of the manual, it appears to us, is that it informs the organization commander just how much he can expect from the graduate of the training school. By referring to its pages he can keep close track of his horseshoer's methods. It is to be regretted that mounted subalterns have not been furnished a copy, for the manual contains, in condensed form, information which the student without it can acquire only by plodding through many books. The illustrations, twenty-two in number, are full-page half-tone engravings of excellent quality. The subjects of illustration have been selected with good judgment, with the result that the text is thoroughly elucidated. The training school at Fort Riley is an unqualified success, and the manual is worthy of the school.

**The
Horse.***

The Macmillan Company has just published a book on the horse. We are very glad to get it, and derived much pleasure and much valuable information from it. It reminds us very much of the old book by Herbert, and contains a great deal that we are glad to have in print so that we can refer to it when questions about the horse arise. Even the best of horsemen in the cavalry will be much benefited by reading this book.

The author, Mr. Isaac Phillips Roberts, Emeritus Professor of Agriculture, late dean of the College of Agriculture of Cornell University, author of "The Fertility of Land," "The Farmstead," "The Farmer's Business Handbook," is, as one can easily see, a great lover of the horse, and a master of his subject. He handles his subject in an easy way and yet imparts more information by his method than he would by tabular statistics or scientific demonstrations.

He divides horses into four groups, and intelligently discusses each, with its various characteristics. He gives a brief history of the domesticated horse, and then devotes one chapter to the horses of America. He then takes up the subjects of breeds, subbreeds, families, varieties, cross-breeds and grades. Here we get ideas that have been imperfectly forming in our minds for some years. Occasionally a young lieutenant in the service will get under a captain that is a horse shark, and that lieutenant has a great advantage over one who serves with a captain to whom "all horses look alike to him." If a young man wants to know about horses, and feels somewhat at sea when local horsemen begin to talk about the Rex McDonalds, The Ikes, and a lot of other families, he will be able, after reading this book, to know what people are talking about and need feel no uneasiness in any discussion of horses. We cannot say that we have ever heard of many of the Missouri breeds that are now somewhat familiar until we came into the State. But we had some ideas about breeds and families, and realized that it was local habitation alone that seemed to give the glib dealers such superiority

*"THE HORSE." By Isaac Phillips Roberts. From the press of The Macmillan Company, New York. Price, \$1.25.

of information. But unless one possessess the information to be found in Roberts' book he will be at considerable disadvantage, and often chagrin, when meeting men who make their living handling horses.

The author discusses the thoroughbred, giving credit to a well known horseman for the information contained in the chapter on this breed. He then tells us much about the coach, the hackney, the hunter, ponies, and then on to the heavy types, such as the Suffolk Punch, the Shire, the Percheron, and the Clydesdale. He also contrasts the trotter and the pacer, and then devotes a chapter to the American saddle. He then goes into the principles of breeding, following that with a plan of breeding that will be of great assistance to one about to engage in this business. In fact, common sense is one of the great features of the book.

Chapter XV is devoted to judging horses. Most of our readers, if they buy the book, will remember many of the pictures in General Carter's book. One of the valuable parts of the book is the chapter on "Hands" in driving, and, though we may not agree with the particular hand recommended for driving, yet the statements made meet our views exactly. For instance, the author can hardly say enough to condemn the cruel over-check, and explains its proper use and shows that it should never be used except in trotting races. We recommend a careful reading and re-reading of this chapter on hands, for all that he has to say as to the hands in driving applies equally well in riding as far as the hard or easy hand is concerned.

In the appendix we find first a short article on breeding horses in Canada for army use, furnished the author by the kindness of J. G. Rutherford, chief veterinary inspector. About a page is devoted to each of the subjects, The Artillery Horse, The Cavalry Horse, and The Mounted Infantry Horse. Appendix 2 is a discussion of the ration for animals, somewhat scientific and yet of importance. Appendix 3 gives the live-stock registry associations, with the names of the secretaries or editors, and the appendix closes with a compilation from the twelfth census as to the number and value of horses and colts in the United States in 1900.

There is much valuable knowledge to be gained from the reading of this book, and we recommend its purchase by those wishing to keep informed as to what the horse world is doing outside the army.

The author's devotion to the horse is shown all through his work, and to show this we quote from a part of his chapter on ponies: "The pony can be made very useful, under proper supervision, in educating children to be self-reliant, courageous, kind to and thoughtful to brute creation. The American farm boy is usually an expert horseman, due without doubt to his early familiarity with colts and horses on the farm. The city lad may acquire much of the same expertness by handling ponies. This four legged associate is often a safer companion for a hot-headed youth than a two-legged one. The question as to whether there is profit in raising ponies sinks into insignificance beside the larger one, Is there profit to the country in rearing self-reliant, strong, humanized citizens?"

In the chapter on the saddle we find the following: "These saddle horses can be taught to go the Eastern high school gaits of the walk, trot and canter type, if such perversion of taste is desired. They are also fine roadsters and do not show their saddle gaits in harness. Contrary to general impression, such use does not lessen their value as saddlers or make them forget their gaits." The question of the advisability of training horses in the high-school has its advocates for and against in the army, and we do not intend to enter a discussion of this subject at this time; we only quote to show the author's opinions.

And now that mechanical contrivances are becoming so common, is the horse to be supplanted? This is what Roberts has to say in part upon this question: "It is said that the horse is to be supplanted by mechanical contrivances, which will take his place in the street, the field, and for recreation. It is also contended that horses are too expensive in that they require feed and care when not at work; while the bicycle, the automobile and street car require no care when not in use. The last argument may be met with the fact that nearly all classes of machinery and appliances rust

out and depreciate when not in use faster than when they are constantly employed." Horses are higher to-day we believe than they ever have been, and we see no reason to expect lower prices in the future. So the idea that the horse is an animal whose use is growing smaller is quite as erroneous as the idea that cavalry as a war branch is losing its use and reason of being. We anticipate a greater demand for horses hereafter than at any time in our short history, and we believe likewise that the cavalry arm of the service will retain its peculiar and indispensable efficiency.

**The Horse
in America.***

Our readers are already more or less familiar with John Gilmer Speed, and they will be quite glad to know that he has published a book giving us much of his valuable information upon the horse. In the last issue of the JOURNAL we gave our readers Mr. Speed's letter to Colonel Edwards, relative to the purchase of horses for the Philippine civil government. We are sure all that read that article will be glad to purchase a book by Mr. Speed on the subject of the horse.

There is considerable similarity between Mr. Speed's book and the one by Mr. Roberts, above reviewed. Both are by sincere lovers of our dumb friend, and both men are masters of the subject. Mr. Speed enters more deeply into the subject of the horse in America, as one would readily infer from the title of his work. When we have finished the first part of his book we feel that we are quite well instructed upon the subject of the different breeds of importance in this country. About three-fourths of the book is given up to the following subjects, one chapter being given to each subject:

Prehistoric and Early Horses, Arab and Barb Horses, The Thoroughbred in America, The Morgan Horse, Messenger and the Early Trotters, Rysdyk's Hambletonian and the Standard Bred Trotters, The Clay and Clay-Arabian, The Denmark or Kentucky Saddle Horse.

*"THE HORSE IN AMERICA." By John Gilmer Speed. Published by McClure, Phillips & Co., New York. Price, \$2.00.

One would naturally expect a person of such experience with horses as has the author to have prejudices, and so we find Mr. Speed has, but we must say his prejudices are as well founded in reason and sense as we could wish anything to be. It is probably true that this book will be the result of much discussion and much hard feeling, but we are convinced that the author is entirely right in his views on the superiority of the Morgan and the Denmark over the Hambletonian, and we have little fear that in the end his views will be adopted by the majority of horsemen in our country.

His fairness is unquestioned, for he has the black and white to prove most of his views. And of course for us who are interested particularly in getting the most valuable cavalry animal, we hardly see how any officer can help but agree with Mr. Speed's views relative to the valuable breeds in America.

We are not insensible to the rumor that Mr. Speed's book is simply an advertisement of Randolph Huntington's Clay-Arabians, and that it was written with the purpose of aiding the sale of that stock to the Federal government. We do not believe it. The last issue of the *JOURNAL* gave Mr. Speed's views as to purchase of horses for the Philippine government, and of course his views would be the same for the Federal government. As the government already knows his views we do not see that any book he may now write will have any more influence than his first recommendations. But had it been written with that intention we do not see that it would have lessened the value of the book to horsemen, as truth is truth, whether told in advertisements or in other matter.

The latter part of the book is devoted to the following subjects: The Government as a Breeder; Foreign Horses of Various Kinds; The Breeding of Mules; How to Buy a Horse; The Stable and its Management; Riding and Driving; Training vs. Breaking; Conformation and Action.

Here is displayed good horse sense, and by this we mean good common sense, as Mr. Speed thinks that the horse being rather a stupid animal, it is no compliment to a person to say he has horse sense. After finishing the book we laid

it down with a renewed feeling of pride in our Cavalry Drill Regulations, for once more we again find the best horsemen talking along lines carefully laid down in those regulations. And we again are led to remember that the temper of the rider is reflected in the horse under him with almost the accuracy that a form is reflected in a perfect French plate mirror. We are glad to see that one of Mr. Speed's experience in handling horses at horse shows and competitive exhibitions can still say what we have always maintained, that the combination horse is the valuable one for this country. Of course, as the author states, if a man has money enough to own a stable that is a credit to a millionaire, it is well to have saddlers and roadsters, but for the great majority of our people who are not in affluent circumstances, the combination horse is the sensible one to possess. And as Mr. Roberts states in his work, the value of the horse for one purpose is not harmed in the least by his being able to do the other.

In his remarks about riding, the author pays a compliment to West Point as a riding school that we are not sure it quite deserves, but on the other hand, we think him rather severe and even unjust when he states that the greater number of American cavalry officers do not look smart in the saddle. It seems to us he should remember that the majority of officers ride a McClellan saddle, and that alone has much to do with a man's appearance when astride. Moreover our uniforms are made with the idea of being serviceable rather than smart. Take the most of our officers and dress them up in white stocks, with Jacob colored vests and handsome riding trousers, put them on saddle horses of finished gaits, clothed with neat dress in the shape of English saddles with white pipe-clay trimmings, and we dare say they would, as a majority, look as smart as any class of riders, and we venture to state, compare favorably with the Kentuckians, whom the author calls the best riders in the world.

But we are not going to enter into a long discussion with the author over so relatively small a matter. The book is too full of information to specifically dwell upon one point,

or many points. The truth is that mounted army officers cannot afford to be without this book, and we recommend its purchase to one who wishes to have an intelligent understanding of the different breeds in this country, and who also wishes to get the views of one who is a recognized horse expert the land over.

Mr. Speed thinks the value of the large draft horse likely to decline, due to the hauling of large loads hereafter in our cities by auto trucks. But as for any other style of horse, any one will be convinced, after reading the book, that the days of cheap horses have passed. Breeding is becoming more scientific than at any previous time, with the result that better horses will be raised with corresponding higher prices. As to the high school horse, he refers to it with some more consideration than does Mr. Roberts, but as we shall probably have more to say upon this subject another time, we will say nothing further at this time upon the worth or worthlessness of high school training.

We congratulate the publishers upon the neat style in which the book is gotten up, but more upon the fact that they have secured an author who has decided views of his own and is not afraid to express them.


Our officers should possess both the above books on the horse, and considering the modest price at which they can be obtained, may think themselves fortunate in being able to acquire so much valuable information at so low a price.

For a review of the following books, see Editor's Table, under "Books on the Russo-Japanese War," page 551.

"From the Yalu to Port Arthur." By Lieutenant Colonel Oliver E. Wood, U. S. Artillery Corps, late military attaché at Tokio. From the press of the Franklin Hudson Publishing Company, Kansas City, Mo. Price, \$1.50.

"The China-Japan War." By Vladimir, late of the * * * Mission to Korea. By the Franklin Hudson Publishing Co., Kansas City, Mo. Price, \$1.50.

"Port Arthur: a Monster Heroism." By Richard Barry. From the press of Moffat, Yard & Co., New York. Price, \$2.00.





BRIGADIER GENERAL WM. H. CARTER,
U. S. ARMY.